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Abstract 
 
Over the last 25 years, cross-national variation in voter turnout has received increased 
attention from social science researchers. The dominant view in the field is that existing 
research on voter turnout has established some robust patterns and we know relatively well 
why voter turnout is higher in some countries than in others. Key variables for explaining 
cross-national variation in voter turnout are compulsory voting, electoral system, level of 
economic development, unicameralism, size of country, and literacy rate. This thesis 
formulates hypotheses concerning the causal effects of these variables alongside additional 
theoretically important variables, estimates their causal significance and checks for the 
robustness of their effects. By conducting a comprehensive research strategy involving both 
general and time-specific cross-sectional analyses, this thesis tests a series of research 
hypotheses on a data set that spans 90 countries across a long time period (1950-2000). The 
results indicate that the majority of the determinants behind cross-national variation in voter 
turnout are time-specific. This means that we cannot (as previous research has done) discuss 
the determinants behind cross-national variation in voter turnout without taking the time 
dimension into account. Only very few determinants, like compulsory voting, economic 
development, flow of information and equality in the distribution of income can be said cause 
variation in turnout across countries irrespective of time.  
 3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I leave this thesis indebted to my supervisor, Michael Alvarez, whose firm assistance has been 
invaluable. Thank you for your flexibility in the face of my ad hoc visits and irregular email 
correspondence, for helpful and constructive comments, for introducing me to the Nlogit 
software package, and for your linguistic advice.  
 
I would also like to thank the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen 
as well as Pål Hermod Bakka at the Social Science Faculty Library. Thank you for your kind 
assistance upon my request for books, articles and datasets. 
 
And last, but not least, thank you for all your encouragement, Annelise. Your support really 
means a lot to me. 
 
Errors and shortcomings are my responsibility alone. 
 
 
 
 
Bergen, September 2007 
Arild Een 
 4 
List of Contents 
 
 
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………….  2 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………………  3 
 
LIST OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………….…  4 
 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES …………………………………………………..  6 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………….  7 
1.1 WHERE WE ARE ………………………………………………………………………………..   8 
1.2 PURPOSE OF PAPER ……………………………………………………………………………   9 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF PAPER ………………………………………………………………………..  11 
 
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH………………………………………………………….. 13 
2.1 SCOPE OF SAMPLES IN EXISTING STUDIES………………………………………………..  13 
2.2 INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES …………………………………………………………………  15 
2.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES ………………………………………………………………  20 
2.4 PARTY SYSTEM …………………………………………………………………………………  21 
2.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ……………………………………………………………………… 23 
 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES …………………… 25 
3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION IN THIS THESIS ……………………………………………………….  25 
3.1.1 Limitations of previous research ………………………………………………………… 25 
3.1.2 My approach ……………………………………………………………………………..  26 
3.2 VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES ……………………………………………………………...  27 
3.2.1 Dependent variable – electoral turnout …………………………………………………..  28 
3.2.1.1 Which elections? ………………………………………………………………..  29 
 3.2.2  Independent variables and hypotheses …………………………………………………...  29 
  3.2.2.1 Institutional variables …………………………………………………………….  30 
  3.2.2.2 Socio-economic variables ………………………………………………………..  35 
  3.2.2.3 Information circulation variables……………..…………………………………..  38 
  3.2.2.4 Activism variables .……………………………………………………………….  38 
  3.2.2.5 Political legacy …………………………………………………………………...  40 
  3.2.2.5 Summary of variables ……………………………………………………………. 41 
3.3 QUALITY OF MEASUREMENT …………………………………………………………………  41 
  
4. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH STRATEGY………... 43 
4.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ……………………………………………………………..  43 
4.1.1 Quantitative method ……………………………………………………………………..  43 
4.1.2 Multiple regression analysis ……………………………………………………………..  44 
4.1.3 The Krieckhaus approach ………………………………………………………………..  45 
4.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY ………………………………………………………………………..  46 
4.2.1 Research strategy outlined ………………………………………………………………  46 
4.2.2 Datasets ………………………………………………………………………………….  47 
4.2.3 Software ………………………………………………………………………………….  49 
 
5. AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL PATTERNS ……………………………………… 50 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ……………………………………………………………………  50 
5.1.1 Outliers …………………………………………………………………………………..  51 
5.1.2 Collinearity ………………………………………………………………………………  52 
5.2 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT …………………………………………………………………  53 
5.2.1 Literature model …………………………………………………………………………   53 
      5.2.1.1 Brief discussion of findings …………………………………………………………… 54 
 5 
5.3 CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION IN VOTER TURNOUT – BUILDING A MODEL ………..  56 
5.3.1 A second preliminary assessment – bivariate regressions ……………………………….  57 
5.3.2 Building a model …………………………………………………………………………  58 
5.3.2.1 Interpretations of findings …………………………………………………………..  63 
5.3.2.2 Other interpretations ………………………………………………………………..  67 
5.3.3 Methodological considerations …………………………………………………………..  68 
5.3.3.1 Heteroscedasticity …………………………………………………………………..  68 
5.3.3.2 Multicollinearity …………………………………………………………………….  69 
5.3.3.3 How good is my model? ……………………………………………………………  70 
 
6. TIME-SPECIFIC EMPIRICAL PATTERNS …………………………………… 72 
6.1 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT ………………………………………………………………..  72 
6.1.1 Outliers ………………………………………………………………………………….  73 
6.1.2 Bivariate regressions …………………………………………………………………….  73 
6.1.3 Brief discussion of bivariate results across decades …………………………………….  74 
6.2 DECADE MODELS ………………………………………………………………………………  75 
6.2.1 The 1950s ………………………………………………………………………………..  75 
6.2.2 The 1960s ………………………………………………………………………………..  78 
6.2.3 The 1970s ………………………………………………………………………………..  79 
6.2.4 The 1980s ………………………………………………………………………………..  80 
6.2.5 The 1990s ………………………………………………………………………………..  81 
6.2.6 Interpretations of findings ……………………………………………………………….  83 
6.2.7 Other interpretations …………………………………………………………………….  85 
6.2.8 Methodological considerations ………………………………………………………….  86 
6.3 CROSS-TIME VARIANCE IN THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TURNOUT……………..  87 
6.3.1 Consistent variables ……………………………………………………………………..  88 
6.3.2 Inconsistent variables ……………………………………………………………………  89 
6.3.3 What are the implications of these findings? ……………………………………………  91 
 
7. CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………….. 92 
7.1 CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION IN VOTER TURNOUT ……………………………………  92 
7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS BY THIS THESIS …………………………………………………………..  93 
7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH …………………………………………………..  94 
 
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………….. 96 
8.1 BOOKS AND ARTICLES ………………………………………………………………………..  96 
8.2 DATA SOURCES …………………………………………………………………………………  99 
 
9. APPENDIXES………………………………………………………………………. 100 
9.1 APPENDIX A – COUNTRIES WITH COMPULSORY VOTING LAWS …………………….. 100 
9.2 APPENDIX B – VARIABLE CODING ………………………………………………………… 101 
9.3 APPENDIX C – ASSUMPTIONS OF THE OLS ………………………………………………. 102 
9.3.1 Assumptions of the OLS estimation method …………………………………………… 102 
9.3.2 About the assumptions …………………………………………………………………. 102  
9.4 APPENDIX D – SAMPLE SELECTION ………………………………………………………. 105 
9.4.1 Democratic elections and turnout rate – cases in my study …………………………… 105 
9.4.2 Countries and years in the literature studies …………………………………………… 109 
9.5 APPENDIX E – CORRELATION MATRIX – GENERAL MODEL …………………………. 111 
9.6 APPENDIX F – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – DECADE MODELS ………………………. 112 
9.7 APPENDIX G – BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, ALL VARIABLES – GENERAL MODEL … 117 
 6 
List of Figures and Tables 
 
 
FIGURE 1: MEAN VOTE/VAP, 1950S-90S …………………………………………………………….  7 
FIGURE 2: ELECTORAL SYSTEM FAMILIES ………………………………………………………. 32 
FIGURE 3: RESIDUALS – GENERAL MODEL ………………………………………………………. 104 
FIGURE 4: RESIDUALS – 1990S MODEL ……………………………………………………………. 104 
 
 
TABLE 1: LITERATURE REVIEW – VARIABLES, DIRECTION AND SIGNIFICANCE ……………  23 
TABLE 2: HYPOTHESIZED EFFECT OF EACH INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ON TURNOUT …….  41 
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – ALL VARIABLES IN GRAND DATASET ……………….  51 
TABLE 4: COLLINEAR VARIABLES IN GRAND DATASET ………………………………………… 52 
TABLE 5: VARIABLES FROM THE LITERATURE, BEST SHOWING ………………………………  54 
TABLE 6: BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS – MOST SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES ……………………...  57 
TABLE 7: TWO-VARIABLE REGRESSIONS – COMP AND ONE  
     INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ADDED AT A TIME …………………………………………  59 
TABLE 8: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS – COMP, DISTRICT 
     AND ONE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ADDED AT A TIME……………………………..  60 
TABLE 9: CORE OF FINAL MODEL – COMP, DISTRICT, NEWSPAPER  
     AND POPDENSITY – ONE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ADDED AT A TIME ………….  61 
TABLE 10: DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION  
          IN VOTER TURNOUT – 1950-2000 …………………………………………………………  63 
TABLE 11: TOLERANCE TEST – GENERAL MODEL ………………………………………………..  70 
TABLE 12: BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS – T-STATISTIC SCORE FOR EACH VARIABLE ……….  74 
TABLE 13: DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION 
      IN VOTER TURNOUT – 1990S ……………………………………………………………..  82 
TABLE 14: TOLERANCE TEST – 1990S MODEL ……………………………………………………..  86 
TABLE 15: DIRECTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CORRELATION –  
      MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODELS ………………………………………………..  87 
TABLE 16: COUNTRIES WITH COMPULSORY VOTING LAWS …………………………………… 100 
TABLE 17: DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AND TURNOUT RATE …………………………………… 105 
TABLE 18: CORRELATION MATRIX – GENERAL MODEL ………………………………………… 111 
TABLE 19: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – 1950S ……………………………………………………… 112 
TABLE 20: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – 1960S ……………………………………………………… 113 
TABLE 21: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – 1970S ……………………………………………………… 114 
TABLE 22: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – 1980S ……………………………………………………… 115 
TABLE 23: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – 1990S ……………………………………………………… 116 
TABLE 24: BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS, ALL VARIABLES – GENERAL MODEL ……………….. 117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
I. Introduction 
 
A central democratic institution is the election. By showing up at the polls and casting their 
vote, the electorate decides which party or coalition of parties is to rule them for a fixed 
period of time. The number of people casting their vote at an election constitutes the electoral 
turnout of the election.1 Even though voting is the form of electoral participation in which 
most people engage, we find that there is considerable variation across the democracies of the 
world in voter turnout rates. For example, average voter turnout in the 1970s was 44% in 
Switzerland, 75% in Great Britain, 80% in Norway, 72% in Japan, and 94% in Italy. As 
Figure 1 below shows, while the degree of variations within countries is not particularly 
striking, the degree of variation across countries is quite significant. 
 
Figure 1: Mean Vote/VAP, 1950s-90s2 
 
Note: Mean Vote/VAP is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in 
parliamentary elections. VAP, Voting Age Population. Source: International IDEA database, available online at 
www.idea.int. 
 
                                                 
1
 Voter turnout has commonly been measured in two different ways: turnout as a proportion of the registered 
electorate or turnout as the proportion of the voting age population (VAP) that cast a vote (discussed below).   
2
 Votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population, 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s.  
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How can these cross-national differences in turnout be explained? More specifically: Why 
does Italy enjoy a higher turnout than Norway? Why do Norwegians vote at a higher rate than 
the Japanese? Furthermore, do factors that explain cross-national variation in turnout in the 
1960s, also explain variations in the 1990s? In other words, are the factors behind cross-
national variation in voter turnout consistent across time? Questions like this motivate this 
thesis.  
 
 1.1 Where we are  
The dominant view in the literature is that the existing research on voter turnout has 
established some robust patterns and we know relatively well why voter turnout is higher in 
some countries than in others. Some argue that differences in voter turnout are inevitable 
because countries differ in terms of political culture – that is, in terms of their citizens’ 
“subjective orientation to politics” (Pye and Verba 1965:513).  In other words, we are dealing 
with participatory cultures, and some countries are said to have more of it than others 
(Almond and Verba, 1963). Cultures that foster such participatory values enhance voting 
turnout. An alternative to the cultural explanation of voting turnout centers on institutional 
factors. As Jackman (1987) argues, it makes good intuitive sense that voter turnout should 
respond to institutional patterns. Voting is everywhere systematically governed by laws and 
institutional arrangements that vary markedly from nation to nation. Jackman lists a number 
of institutional characteristics that affect voter turnout, including compulsory voting, electoral 
disproportionality (in turning votes into seats), unicameralism and the party system (number 
of parties). His findings are supported by subsequent studies (Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 
1996; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Norris 2004) which also add other characteristics to the 
“institutional” explanation: electoral frequency, electoral system, electoral decisiveness and 
district size.  
 
Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978), in their study of different forms of political participation, 
propose a distinction between two types of forces that affect political activity. On the one 
hand, individuals bring attitudes and characteristics to the political arena, and, on the other 
hand, this ‘participation’ is facilitated or hindered by the institutional context within which an 
individual acts. As for the first dimension, participation is, in general, facilitated by greater 
socio-economic resources and by general levels of political awareness and self-confidence. 
This is supported by a number of studies (Powell 1982, 1986; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; 
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Norris 2004) which present a number of socio-economic variables that affect turnout: level of 
economic and societal development, literacy rate, the size of the country and party group 
linkages. The second dimension affects the first, as legal rules, social and political structures, 
and configurations of partisanship all present the individual with conditions that shape his or 
her choices. Furthermore, these conditions are relatively difficult for the individual to change. 
Hence, voter turnout is affected by what the individual brings to the participatory scene 
(socio-economic and cultural “baggage”), a scene which itself play a role in shaping 
participation through rules, structures and institutional characteristics. However, when cross-
national variation in voter turnout is discussed there is one distinction that is important to keep 
in mind. Voter turnout at the aggregate level is a feature of an electorate, not a voter. Even 
though an electorate is an aggregate of voters, the process of aggregation is not simply one of 
adding up relevant features of the individuals who form part of it. An electorate is not a voter 
writ large, any more than an economy is a consumer writ large (Franklin 2004).3 This paper, 
like other studies dealing with cross-national variation in voter turnout, concerns itself with 
turnout at the aggregate level, meaning that it does not ask questions like “Why do people 
vote (in the first place)?”. The question is rather: “Why do Italians vote at a higher rate than 
Norwegians?” and “Why do Norwegians vote at a higher rate than the Japanese?”, and so on.  
 
 1.2 Purpose of paper  
Research has dealt specifically with these kinds of questions for over 25 years. Do we need 
more research on the topic? The answer is yes and the reasons are threefold:  
- Too few cases. Research dealing with cross-national variation in voter turnout has not 
exploited the richness of the data that exist. Instead they too often rely on a limited 
number of cases (19-32) upon which the possibility of making generalizations is 
limited. For example, one of the most famous studies on cross-national variation in 
voter turnout, Jackman’s (1987) Political institutions and voter turnout in industrial 
democracies, rely upon 19 countries from which he generalizes across the entire 
universe of democracies.  
- Too short time period. Research typically examines short time periods upon which the 
possibility of making generalizations across time is limited. For example, Norris 
                                                 
3
 In his famous studies of suicide rates, Durkheim confronted the same problem of distinguishing between the 
causes of suicides and the prevalence of high suicide rates. 
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(2004), in her Electoral Engineering, generalizes upon findings conducted across only 
six years (1996-2002).   
- Contradictory findings. A number of variables are found to have different effects and 
sometimes even different directions of correlation across the studies.  
 
I am not convinced by previous research on cross-national variation in voter turnout. This 
paper has come forth as a result of this and I will make a unique contribution to our 
knowledge of cross-national variation in voter turnout, by addressing the issues above. In my 
study I will: 
 
- Include a great number of cases. By including every democratic country in the study, 
the results I obtain are more robust. Based on ACLP’s4 dichotomous approach 
(discussed below), I have come up with a list of 90 countries to include in my 
analyses. Only by including as many democratic regimes as possible in the analyses, 
can the results be generalized upon, irrespective of the space dimension. 
- Expand the time period under review. By examining a long time period (1950-2000), 
conducting analyses across each decade and looking for time-specific variance, the 
results I obtain are more robust. Only by conducting across-time sensitivity regression 
analyses can the results be generalized with confidence, irrespective of the time 
dimension.  
- Once and for all try to determine the direction and effect of each variable’s correlation 
with voter turnout. This is achievable based on the above, and the inclusion of a wide 
range of control variables, some old and “established”, other new and never before 
included in research on cross-national variation in voter turnout. Only by including a 
great variety of explanatory variables will the true effect of each respective variable 
upon turnout stand out. 
 
The discussion of voter turnout is often followed by a discussion of the health of the 
democratic institutions. Low electoral participation is often considered to be bad for 
democracy, whether inherently or because it calls legitimacy into question by suggesting a 
lack of representation of certain groups and in-egalitarian policies (Franklin 2004).  Above all, 
as Franklin (2004) notes, “low turnout seems to be seen by commentators as calling into 
                                                 
4
 ACLP is an acronym for a comprehensive dataset, compiled by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski in 
the preparations for Democracy and Development (2000).  
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question the civic mindedness of a country’s citizens and their commitment to democratic 
norms and duties” (2). However, differences in participatory norms are not, in turn, 
systematically linked to turnout rates. For example, as Crewe (1981) noted over 25 years ago, 
 
The best known (and still most useful) comparative study of subjective orientations, 
The Civic Culture, found that interest in politics, attention to political affairs in the 
media, feelings of civic duty and individual political efficacy, and trust in political as 
opposed to other solutions to individual and communal problems, were consistently 
higher in the United States, followed by Britain, then Germany, and finally Italy – 
exactly the reverse of their rank order for postwar turnout! (239: emphasis added).  
 
Whether or not low turnout is bad for democracy and whether or not countries that experience 
higher turnout are necessarily better democracies than those experiencing lower turnout is not 
the concern of this paper. For a discussion on the topic, see Franklin (2004) and Norris 
(2004). 
 
1.3 Structure of paper 
As noted above, the dominant view in the literature is that we know relatively well why 
turnout is higher in some countries than others. I start out, in Chapter 2, with a presentation of 
the findings in the literature, focusing on six studies which represent important contributions 
to our understanding of cross-national variation in voter turnout. Each study is discussed both 
in terms of their sample selection and findings. This approach will allow me to build upon the 
existing literature and hence make it easier for me to make a contribution to this field of 
research. In Chapter 3 I discuss my basis for sample selection and identity the variables I will 
include in my analyses. All of the variables from the previous chapter (alongside some new 
variables) are included, and each variable is discussed in terms of measurement and data 
source. The chapter ends with a discussion of the validity and reliability of my measurements. 
In Chapter 4 I present my methodological approach by briefly discussing the quantitative 
method, the regression analysis techniques at hand, namely the OLS-method, alongside my 
research strategy. In Chapter 5 the strategy is played out as I conduct the analyses for the 
general model, which pertains to explain cross-national variation in voter turnout for the 
entire time period under review. My analyses are time-specific in Chapter 6, meaning that the 
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analyses are conducted on the basis of shorter time periods (decades). The final chapter 
summarizes the findings and provides suggestions for future research.  
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II. Previous research 
 
Comparative research has long sought to understand the reason for voting participation and 
the explanations for cross-national differences.5 I will now present some selected works in the 
literature on cross-national research in order to establish a basis for my own analysis. Many 
studies have been conducted to try to explain the differences in voter turnout one observe 
among democratic regimes. I will present some of these studies and have decided to focus my 
attention on the following seven publications: Powell (1982; 1986), Jackman (1987), Blais 
and Carty (1990), Franklin (1996), Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), and Norris (2004). These 
are all regarded as important contributions to our understanding of cross-national differences 
in voter turnout (Blais 2006). By reviewing these studies and identifying their results, we get a 
good picture of what we know today about the determinants of cross-national variation in 
voter turnout. Furthermore, by identifying significant variables from the literature, I will 
establish a theoretical platform from which I can base my own analysis. This way it is 
possible to build upon the existing works of other scholars and, in addition, make my own 
contribution to this field of research.  
 
The first necessary step in any study of voter turnout under democracies is to identify the 
population of existing democratic regimes. Before we turn to a discussion of the findings, a 
brief note on each study and their approach to this matter is in place. 
 
2.1 Scope of samples in existing studies6 
By defining five criteria that need to be satisfied in order for a country to be classified as 
democratic, and by reviewing the work of other scholars, Powell, in his award-winning book 
Contemporary Democracies (1982), came up with a list of 29 countries to include in his 
analysis. Powell’s American Political Science Review article, American voter turnout in 
comparative perspective (1986), examined 20 countries in the 1970s, including Western 
European countries, Israel, Canada, the Unites States, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. This 
article’s main emphasis was American voter turnout in comparative perspective, so the low 
number of cases is justifiable. In Political institutions and voter turnout in industrial 
                                                 
5
 Powell 1982, 1986; Jackman 1987; Blais and Carty 1990; Jackman and Miller 1995, Franklin 1996; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998; Norris 2004. 
6
 A complete list of countries and years for each study can be found in Appendix D. 
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democracies (1987), Jackman chose to confine his analysis to 19 industrial democracies in the 
1970s. Jackman’s list of countries is the same as Powell’s (1986), except that Jackman 
excludes Spain in view of the fact that “Franco did not die until late 1975, and the subsequent 
transition to democracy was neither smooth nor immediate” (Jackman 1987: 409).  
 
Blais and Carty, in their European Journal of Political Research article Does proportional 
representation foster turnout? (1990), rely on Mackie and Rose’s International Almanac of 
Electoral History (1982) as updated by the European Journal of Political Research to 1985. 
Of the 24 countries included there, they exclude Greece, Portugal and Spain because of their 
interrupted electoral history along with the United States, and end up with 20 countries to 
include in their analysis. Franklin’s study, Electoral participation (1996), includes 29 
countries in his analysis, mostly European countries along with Japan, India, the United 
States, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand Venezuela, and Costa Rica. He relies on Mackie and 
Rose’s International Almanac of Electoral History (1991) and Katz (1996).  
 
Blais and Dobrzynska, in Turnout in electoral democracies (1998) argue in favour of the 
importance of including all democratic elections: “if we wish to arrive at comprehensive 
understanding of the sources of cross-national variations in turnout, we should look at as 
many cases as possible and exploit the richness of data provided by the process of 
democratization” (240). Using data from Freedom House to classify regimes, they are able to 
study turnout in 324 democratic elections held in 91 different countries between 1972 and 
1995. Since Blais and Dobrzynska relies on the judgement of one standard source as to 
whether a country is democratic or not and include all democratic elections, their study 
constitutes a major improvement over previous studies.  
 
In Electoral engineering (2004), Norris relies on multiple sources of data. The most important 
one concerns survey research drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES) and includes Module I, which allows her to compare surveys of a representative 
cross-section of the electorate in 37 legislative and presidential elections in 32 countries. 
 
Notwithstanding the impressiveness of the studies considered here, a challenge for new 
research would be to expand the range of cases even further, incorporating a wider range of 
regions, states, and years. I will address this issue in chapter 3, where I provide a rigorous 
justification for the inclusion of more cases. Let us now examine the findings that the studies 
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above have come up with. I have organised the findings along the lines of Powell (1982) and 
Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) who both distinguish different kinds of factors that influence 
political performance in general and voting participation in particular: institutional 
determinants, the socio-economic environment and the party system.  
 
2.2 Institutional variables 
Institutional variables are important determinants of cross-national variation in voter turnout 
because, as Jackman (1987) argue, voting is everywhere systematically governed by laws and 
institutional arrangements. Legal rules, social and political structures, and configurations of 
partisanship varies cross-nationally and all present the individual with conditions that shape 
his or her choices. The following section presents the institutional variables from the 
literature. 
 
Compulsory voting 
The use of compulsory voting laws can be expected to have an impact on turnout. As Tingsten 
(1975) demonstrated quite clearly over seventy years ago, the imposition of relatively small 
fines or other penalties can have a major impact on voting turnout. Jackman (1987) estimates 
that compulsory voting increases turnout by about 13 percentage points. Blais and Carty 
(1990) find that compulsory voting increases turnout by “twelve percentage points” (176). 
Franklin (1996) estimates that countries that make voting obligatory experience an increase of 
seven percentage points on voter turnout (226). Blais and Dobrzynska’s (1998) findings 
support the trend: “compulsory voting boosts turnout by 11 points” (246) and so does Norris’s 
(2004): “a turnout increase of almost 8 percentage point is expected” (169).7 Although these 
findings are hardly surprising, it is important to take account of this factor before we can 
assess the impact of other institutional and social conditions. “Compulsory voting increases 
turnout” can be construed as a well-established proposition (Blais 2006: 113).  
 
Nationally competitive districts and PR  
It has frequently been suggested that voting participation is or would be enhanced by the 
introduction of proportional representation and multimember legislative districts, as opposed 
to single member district plurality or majority representation. The obvious argument in favour 
of this suggestion is that with single member districts, “it is likely that some districts will be 
                                                 
7
 This applies only to older democracies, see Norris 2004: 169. 
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non-competitive, giving citizens less incentive to vote; parties, less incentive to campaign 
there” (Rose 1980: 12). According to incentive-based explanations, the electoral formula can 
be expected to affect voter turnout, as citizens are faced with differential rewards under 
alternative electoral arrangements. PR-systems should generate higher turnout than 
majoritarian systems as supporters of minor and fringe parties in the latter system “may 
believe that casting their votes will make no difference to who wins in their constituency, still 
less to the overall composition of government and the policy agenda” (Norris 2004: 162). In 
constituencies where the incumbent party is unlikely to lose, the wasted vote argument travels 
well. In contrast,  
 
PR elections with low thresholds and large district magnitudes … increase the 
opportunities for minor parties with dispersed support to enter parliament with only a 
modest share of the vote, and, therefore this could increase the incentives for their 
supporters to participate (Norris 2004: 162). 
 
Jackman’s (1987) four-category ordinal variable takes into account the electoral formula and 
the size of the districts. The same variable, or dummy variables that distinguish electoral 
formulas, or a summary disproportionality index, has been utilized in further research. Blais 
(2006) writes that the studies that have been confined to advanced democracies (Jackman and 
Miller 1995, Radcliff and Davis 2000) as well as one study of turnout in post-communist 
countries (Kostadinova 2003) “have confirmed that turnout is higher in proportional 
representation (PR) and/or larger districts, whereas research dealing with Latin America 
reports no association (Perez-Linan 2001, Fornos et al. 2004), and an analysis that 
incorporates both established and non-established democracies concludes that the electoral 
system has a weak effect“ (113-14). 
 
These findings provide a basis for interpretation. Is it the case that PR increases turnout except 
perhaps in Latin-America, or is it the case that once one move outside of Europe there is no 
generalized correlation between the electoral system and turnout? Blais (2006) leans towards 
the second, more sceptical interpretation. Even though Jackman’s finding on this variable 
supports Powell (1986), Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) question these findings on the grounds 
of variable specifications. They argue that since both Powell and Jackman rely on a variable 
they call “nationally competitive districts”, which encapsulates the combined effect of the 
electoral formula and of district magnitude; the result is that it is not clear what it measures 
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exactly (245). Blais and Dobrzynska thus claim that it is appropriate to re-examine, with a 
larger sample if elections and a more systematic set of control variables, the impact of 
electoral systems on turnout. They do this by creating dummy variables for PR, plurality, 
majority, and mixed systems (245). Their final model establishes that, all else held equal, 
“turnout is three points higher in PR systems” (248). The difference is small and displays a 
relatively low significance (t-statistic of 1.6). Blais and Carty (1990) find that “turnout is 
seven percentage points lower in a plurality system, and five percentage points lower in a 
majority system, compared with PR” (174-5). Norris (2004) found that “legislative elections 
held during the 1990s in the CSES countries under comparison generated 75% turnout 
(Vote/VAP) under PR systems, 10% higher than under those elections contested in 
majoritarian systems, and a similar pattern was confirmed in a broader comparison of all 164 
nations holding competitive elections worldwide during the 1990s” (161). Because, as Norris 
points out, the type of electoral system is a categorical rather than a continuous variable, she 
provides further details about the impact of different electoral systems on worldwide levels of 
turnout in the 1990s. The results, without any controls, confirm that average turnout was 
highest among nations using PR, namely, party lists and the STV electoral systems. Norris’s 
results indicate that the basic type of electoral systems indeed, shapes the incentives to 
participate, with the key distinction being that between PR systems and all others (161-2).  
 
Electoral Disproportionality  
Most electoral systems produce a degree of disproportionality in favour of the largest party, 
but some systems generate a good deal more than others (Jackman 1987: 407). The greater the 
disproportionality, the more likely are the votes of minor-party supporters to be wasted. 
Jackman’s findings, which are statistically significant, support this but the effect is small. 
Franklin (1996) finds that proportionality is worth “about six tenths of a percentage point in 
turnout for every percent by which the distribution of seats in the legislature approaches 
proportionality with the distribution of votes” (226). Countries vary in terms of the 
proportionality of their electoral systems from a low of 79 in Britain to a high of 99 in 
Germany (numbers from Franklin’s analysis). That is a 20-point difference which (multiplied 
by 0.6) translates into a difference of 12 percent in turnout.  
 
The inclusion of electoral disproportionality as a control variable by Franklin (1996) was only 
made possible by his exclusion of electoral formula (electoral system) as a control variable. 
As the two variables correlate too highly they can not be included in the same model. 
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Jackman (1987) includes a variable called nationally competitive districts that takes into 
account the electoral formula and the size of the districts. (I am surprised that correlation with 
electoral disproportionality did not rule out this variable.)8 
 
Unicameralism  
On unicameralism we follow the argument of Jackman (1987): 
 
….unicameralism is important in producing decisive governments. Where there is no 
second house (as in New Zealand), governments based on the first house do not have 
to compete and compromise with another legislative chamber. In contrast, where there 
is strong bicameralism (as in Switzerland), legislation can only be produced by 
compromise between members of the two houses. This means that elections for the 
lower house play a less decisive role in the production of legislation where 
bicameralism is strong. Unicameralism should therefore foster turnout (408). 
 
The more powerful the body that is being elected, the stronger the incentive to vote. Jackman 
measures unicameralism by using the criteria proposed by Lijphart (1984), which operate with 
four scores, depending on “how unicameral” the system is. The most unicameral system is 
assigned the score of four and the most bicameral system is assigned the score of one (see 
Lijphart 1984, 213, for the scoring system). Jackman estimates that each ‘score’ is worth an 
almost 2 percentage point increase in turnout, meaning that a country with a strong 
unicameral legislature will enjoy an increased turnout at elections of about eight points 
compared with an election for a legislature that is strongly bicameral. The findings about the 
impact of unicameralism on turnout are mixed. While Jackman (1987), Jackman and Miller 
(1995), and Fornos et al. (2004) report positive findings, Blais and Carty (1990), Black 
(1991), Radcliff and Davis (2000), and Perez-Linan (2001) indicate no effect (Blais 2006: 
114).  
 
Decisiveness of elections 
Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) do not include unicameralism as a control variable. Instead they 
include an institutional characteristic that pertains to the decisiveness of elections. As they 
look at turnout for elections of the national lower house, they argue that the more powerful the 
                                                 
8
 Jackman was aware of the possible problem 
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national lower house, the more decisive the election, and thus, the higher the expected 
turnout. In many respect, their variable measures the same phenomenon as the variable that 
takes into account unicameralism. We follow their argument, which: 
 
. . . predict[s] that turnout will be lower if there is an elected upper house or president 
or if the country is a federation. This prediction holds only if subnational, presidential 
or upper house elections are not held at the same time. The presence of an elected 
upper house, for instance, matters only if the lower and upper house elections are not 
held at the same time: in such a context, the lower house election can be construed as 
being less decisive, and turnout could be lower. If the two elections are held at the 
same time, the situation is equivalent to there being one house (245-46: italics in 
original). 
 
By constructing dummy variables, they take into account the presence and timing of 
subnational, upper house, and/or presidential elections. The prediction is that turnout is higher 
when the election is more decisive. The results, which are consistent with Jackman’s (1987) 
findings, indicate that turnout is affected by the decisiveness of elections: all else held equal, 
“turnout is reduced by 6 points when lower house elections are least decisive” (Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998: 246).  
 
Frequency of elections  
Norris (2004) includes a variable that measures the frequency of elections, which proves to be 
strong and statistically significant in a negative direction, arguing that when the frequency of 
elections goes up, the voter is facing increasing costs and possible voter fatigue, which in turn 
affects voter turnout.  
 
District size 
Norris (2004) also includes a variable that take into account the number of electors per 
member of parliament. She argues that the higher the number of electors, the lower the 
turnout because it is more difficult to mobilize many voters than few voters for the 
representative. The possibility for increased information, familiarity and contact between 
voters and their representatives is lower if the number of electors per representative is high. 
Her finding, which supports her assumption, is not statistically significant. 
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2.3 Socio-economic variables 
Socio-economic variables are important determinants of cross-national variation in voter 
turnout because political participation is facilitated by greater socio-economic resources 
(Norris 2004). The following section presents the socio-economic findings in the literature. 
 
Level of development – economic (GNP per capita) and societal (HDI) 
A large body of writing on theories of cross-national participation is the literature on social 
modernization and political mobilization. In Electoral Participation (1980), Powell argues 
that “economic development” has “important consequences for mass political activity, as the 
achievement of higher levels of economic development is associated with major 
transformations of the social and economic structure of society” (21). Powell (1982) posited 
that economic development fosters turnout and Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) confirm this. 
They measure economic development as GNP per capita. As the relationship is logarithmic, it 
implies that the main difference is at the low end of economic development: “everything else 
being equal, turnout increases by 13 percentage points when GNP per capita moves from 163 
American dollars (Malawi in 1994), the lowest in the sample, to the average (7,614) but only 
by 5 points when it moves from the average to the highest, 30,433 (Luxembourg in 1994)” 
(244-43).9 Jackman (1987) leaves out socio-economic variables altogether, perhaps because 
he deals with a small number of cases among which there is little variance in the level of 
socio-economic development. Norris (2004) finds turnout to be slightly higher in more 
developed societies, as gauged by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Human Development Index. The societal changes associated with the modernization process 
do strengthen electoral participation, according to her study.  
 
Literacy Rate 
Even though Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) show that voting is the least demanding 
form of political activity and the one that is least dependent on the possession of civic skills, 
                                                 
9
 After taking the natural logarithm of the independent variable, the estimated regression coefficient is 
interpreted in the following manner.  The coefficient shows the absolute change in the dependent variable that 
results from a given proportional change in the independent variable.  Since the function is nonlinear, the 
absolute impact upon the dependent variable will vary, depending upon whether we are at lower or higher values 
of the independent variable.  Therefore, one can compare the change in the dependent variable that results from 
moving from the minimum value of the independent variable to its average, as compared to the impact that 
results from moving from the average value of the independent variable to its maximum (the actual numbers for 
each variable – minimum value, average, maximum value – can be read directly from the descriptive statistics 
tables, presented in several of the Appendixes). 
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they note that those with little linguistic skills are less likely to vote. A minimum degree of 
literacy is almost a prerequisite to good turnout. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) support this: all 
else held equal, “turnout increases by a hefty 16 points when the illiteracy rate moves from 
the highest level (85%) to the average (12%) but by only one point when it moves from the 
average to the lowest level (2.5%)” (244, emphasis added). 
 
Size of country - population 
The last socio-economic variable to have an impact on voter turnout in Blais and 
Dobrzynska’s study is the size of the country. As this relationship is logarithmic, the 
important difference is between smaller countries and all other countries. All else held equal, 
“turnout is 7 points higher in a country of 100,000 people than in one of 26 million, which is 
the average in the sample; the difference between turnout in a country of 26 million and one 
of 100 million is only 2 points” (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 244). This confirms the view 
that smaller countries are able to arouse a greater sense of community, which itself fosters a 
higher turnout. Blais and Carty’s (1990) data confirm that electoral participation tends to be 
somewhat higher in smaller polities: “the regression indicating that we should expect, 
everything else being equal, electoral turnout to be seven points higher in Luxembourg than in 
Britain" (176).  
 
2.4 Party System 
In legislative elections, voters are offered to make a choice among parties and candidates. 
Turnout depend on the choice offered to the electorate and that choice is very much structured 
by the party system.10 I will now present the findings from the literature on this bloc. 
 
Number of political parties 
The multipartyism-variable follows the arguments of Downs (1957). Downs argues that voters 
in a multiparty system face a fundamental problem: they do not directly select the government 
that will govern them, as the government most likely will be selected by the parties in the 
legislature. The paradox for multiparty systems becomes apparent:  
 
                                                 
10
 Some would argue in favour of placing the party system variables among the institutional variables. This could 
be justifiable (I do it below in my own research) but some (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998) argue that, for example, 
the number of parties are consequences of the institutional setting (electoral system), rather than an institutional 
characteristic per se.  
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The type of political system which seems to offer the voter a more definite choice 
among policies in fact offers him a less definite one. This system may even make it 
impossible for him to choose a government at all. Instead, it may force him to shift this 
responsibility onto a legislature over which he has very little control between elections 
(Downs 1957: 156). 
 
This implies that elections play a less decisive role on government formation within 
multiparty systems. Multipartyism should therefore depress turnout, and does, by three 
percentage points, according to Jackman’s (1987) study. 
  
Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) also include a multiparty-variable as they predict that the 
greater the number of parties, the more choice electors are offered and higher the turnout. 
Still, as they acknowledge, the door swings both ways on this matter. The greater the number 
of parties, the more difficult it can be for electors to make up their minds. Furthermore, the 
greater the number of parties, the less likely it is that there will be a one-party government. 
Thus, they formulate a contrary hypothesis:  the greater the number of parties, the smaller the 
probability of a one-party majority government and the lower the turnout. Blais and 
Dobrzynska’s findings confirm Jackman’s (1987) finding that turnout tends to be reduced 
when the number of parties increases. The relationship is logarithmic: “turnout declines by 4 
points when the number of parties moves from 2 to 6, but by only 2 points from 6 parties to 
10 and from 10 to 15” (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 249).  Almost all empirical research has 
found a negative correlation between the number of parties and turnout (Jackman 1987, Blais 
and Carty 1990, Jackman and Miller 1995, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Radcliff and Davis 
2000, Kostadinova 2003). The only exceptions are Norris (2004), who finds the relationship 
to be positive and small but statistically significant, and studies of turnout in Latin America, 
where there appears to be no relationship at all (Perez-Linan 2001; Fornos et al. 2004).  
 
Party-group linkages 
The party-group linkages enhance turnout because “partisan choice should seem simpler to 
the less involved; cues from the personal environment of the individual (friends, family and 
co-workers) should be more consistent; party organizers can more easily identify their 
potential supporters in making appeals and in helping voters to the polls on election day” 
(Powell 1986: 22). Voting is simpler when and where groups (e.g., unions, churches, 
professional associations) are clearly associated with specific parties (Blais 2006: 1). Powell’s 
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finding on this variable were not replicated by Jackman (1987), and subsequent studies have 
left out this variable, which is the approach that I too will follow.  
 
2.5 Summary of findings 
The survey just discussed is summarized in the table presented below. The explanatory 
variables are ordered just as they were discussed above, divided into three “blocs” of 
variables.  For each of the six studies surveyed (Powell 1982 is left out) and each of the 
independent variables, I indicate the direction of causality (+ or -) as well as whether the 
variable was found to be statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (indicated by a 
*). 
 
Table 1: Literature review - variables, direction and significance 
 
 
Study 
 
   Powell     Jackman     Blais & Carty    Franklin    Blais &                      Norris 
                                                (1986)          (1987)           (1990)             (1996)            Dobrzynska (1998)          (2004) 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Institutional Variables 
 
   Compulsory voting            +*    +*            +*         +*            +* 
   PR      +*          +*            +* 
   Nat. com. districts      +           +*             
   Electoral decisiveness              +* 
   Electoral disproport.            –*           –*         –* 
   Unicameralism             +*             
   Electoral frequency                    –* 
   District size                    + 
    
Socio-economic Variables 
 
   GNP per capita               +* 
   HDI                     +* 
   Literacy               +* 
   Size      –*          –*   
 
Party System Variables 
   
    Multipartyism             –*  –*          –*            +* 
    Party group linkages      +* 
 
 
 *=sig at 0.05 
 
 
 
In Table 1 we see that the variables behind cross-national variation in voter turnout are stable 
in their direction of correlation. The effect of only one variable, multipartyism, varies across 
the studies, with Norris (2004) postulating a positive correlation between number of parties 
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and voter turnout. I will include the variables from Table 1 in my own research and check if 
their significance and direction of correlation changes when included in regression analyses 
conducted across more cases and over a longer time period.  
 
I turn now to Chapter 3, which discusses my sample selection, presents my dependent 
variable, electoral turnout, and identifies my independent variables. 
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III. Sample selection and research hypotheses 
 
In this chapter I will discuss my basis for sample selection as well as identity the variables and 
hypotheses for my analyses. Building upon the discussion from the previous chapter, I will 
argue in favour of including as many cases as possible in the analyses. Furthermore, I will 
include the variables identified in the previous chapter and in addition list the variables 
created specifically for this paper. I start out with a discussion of my sample selection. 
3.1 Sample selection in this thesis  
Recall from the discussion in the previous chapter that the studies concerned with cross- 
national variation in voter turnout had different approaches to the sample selection procedure. 
I argue for including as many cases as possible when studying cross-national variation in 
voter turnout. The rationale is clear: if we wish to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of 
the sources of cross-national variations in turnout, we should look at as many cases as 
possible (see King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). Furthermore, the inclusion of elections in the 
study should rely on one standard source as to whether or not a country is democratic. This 
will give the analyses conducted more credibility and provide opportunity for replication.  
 
 3.1.1 Limitations of previous studies 
Powell’s basis for sample selection in Contemporary democracies (1982) has been criticized, 
as he “relies on the work of others who did not exactly have the same criteria and because 
there is disagreement among authors with respect to a number of cases, the inclusion and 
exclusion of which appear somewhat arbitrary” (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 239). Why 
Powell relies on multiple sources in his sample selection is not clear. In any case, Powell’s 
approach is not the way to go.  
 
Jackman (1987) confines his analysis to industrial democracies only. Why he excluded non-
industrial democracies is not clear. One advantage in comparing countries as similar as 
possible in terms of socio-economic characteristics is that one thereby controls for these 
variables and can more easily isolate the impact of political institutions. One shortcoming, on 
the other hand, is that the number of cases is small, and that the results may not be 
generalizeable to the universe of democracies. Moreover, this approach does not let us 
measure the possible impact upon turnout of interesting explanatory variables like economic 
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and “social” development. I argue in favour of including as many cases as possible, in order 
to measure the impact of as many variables as possible.  
 
Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) use data from Freedom House and their analysis is confined to 
post-1972 (the year first year of data available). By using a different measure of democracy, 
one can maximize the time aspect and thus include more cases in order to effectively test the 
robustness of the findings observed among established democracies.  I turn now to a 
discussion of my basis for sample selection. 
 
3.1.2 My approach 
As I study electoral turnout in democracies it is necessary, in order to establish a basis for 
sample selection, to decide upon ‘what’ democracy is. That is to say, elections takes place in 
many regimes, I am interested in the elections taking place in democratic regimes. I have 
chosen the employ the regime classification data presented in Przeworski et al. (2000) (called 
ACLP for short). Their approach is dichotomous, as they classify every regime in the world 
between 1950-199011 as either a democracy or a dictatorship. They focus on contestation, and 
argue that only regimes, in which those who govern are selected through contested elections, 
that is, the chief executive office and the seats in the effective legislative assembly, can be 
classified as democracies. Contestation takes place when there exists an opposition which can 
assume office as a result of elections. They argue that Przeworski’s dictum, “democracy is a 
system in which parties lose elections” (Alvarez et al. 2000: 16) is taken literally and 
alternation in office constitutes prima facie evidence of contestation they argue. Moreover, 
contestation entails three features: ex-ante uncertainty, ex-post irreversibility, and 
repeatability (on an elaboration of these matters see Alvarez et al. 2000: chapter one). My 
basis for sample selection, drawn from ACLP is clear: “Democracy is a system in which 
incumbents lose elections and leave office when the rules so dictate” (2000: 54).  
 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002), in their review of nine democracy indices on the grounds of 
conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation, highlight ACLP as “particularly insightful 
concerning the selection of indicators and especially clear and detailed concerning coding 
rules” (27). The purpose of Munck and Verkuilen’s paper is to provide a systematic 
assessment of the large-N data sets on democracy that are most frequently used in current 
                                                 
11
 It has been updated to 2002 which is essential for my purpose. 
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statistical research. Even though they conclude that “no single index offers a satisfactory 
response to all three challenges of conceptualization, measurement and aggregation” (28), the 
ACLP is regarded as one of the stronger indices in Munck and Verkuilen's review. As I am 
not in need of a continuous variable to include in my model, only one that makes my sample 
selection easy, the ACLP's dichotomous approach suits my purpose perfectly. 
 
Furthermore, my approach represents a major improvement over previous studies as I, among 
very few, rely only on the judgment of one standard source as to whether a country is 
democratic or not. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) also rely on one source, Freedom House, and 
their analysis is thus confined to post-1972 (the year from which Freedom House provide 
data). Relying on surveyed-based indices of political rights and civil liberties ranging from 1 
to 7, Freedom House averages each pair to determine an overall status of “Free” (1.0-2.5), 
“Partly Free” (3.0-5.0), or “Not Free” (5.5-7.0). The Freedom House index has been harshly 
criticized, not least for its maximalist definition of democracy. The analytical usefulness of its 
index is severely restricted due to the inclusion of attributes such as “socio-economic rights”, 
“freedom from gross socio-economic inequalities,” “property rights, “ and “freedom from 
war”, which are more fruitfully seen as attributes of some other concept (Munck and 
Verkuilen 2002: 9-11). Furthermore, the Freedom House index includes so many components 
under its two attributes “political rights” and “civil rights” (9 and 13, respectively) and does 
so with such little thought about the relationship among components and attributes that it is 
hardly surprising that a large number of distinct or at best vaguely related aspects of 
democracy are lumped together (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 14).  
 
By employing only one democracy measure, my model constitutes a major improvement over 
previous studies. Based on the ACLP indices I have come up with a list of 90 democracies to 
include in my analysis.12 
 
 3.2 Variables and hypotheses 
In the previous chapter I discussed the findings in the literature and identified important 
explanatory variables behind cross-national variation in voter turnout. All of the variables 
identified in that chapter will be included in my analyses alongside some new variables, 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix D for overview of countries and elections included in my analysis. 
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created specifically for this paper. I will turn to an identification of the variables I intend to 
include in this analysis, and I start out with the dependent variable, electoral turnout. 
3.2.1 Dependent variable – electoral turnout 
Electoral turnout has commonly been measured in two different ways. Turnout as a 
proportion of the registered electorate can be calculated as the number of votes divided into 
the number of citizens who are legally registered to vote. This measurement has been utilized 
by many scholars, including Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), Crewe (1981), Blais and Carty 
(1990), Black (1990), and Franklin (1996).  However, as Norris (2001) argues, this method of 
measuring voter turnout can be misleading in situations with a restricted franchise, for 
example if only men or whites (e.g. apartheid South Africa) are eligible to vote, since in these 
countries official estimates of turnout can be relatively high even if the voices of all women or 
ethnic majorities are excluded.  For these reasons, it is more satisfactory to compare turnout as 
a proportion of the voting-age population (VAP), representing the number of valid votes 
divided into the size of the population over the minimal legal voting age, whether 
enfranchised and registered or not. This way of measuring voter turnout has been utilized by 
Powell (1982, 1986) and Jackman (1987) amongst others. However, the measure has one 
major shortcoming, namely the difficulties in estimating the size of the eligible population. 
The eligible population is assumed to be the voting age population at the time of the election. 
As Powell (1986: 40) acknowledges:  
 
    in most democracies voting eligibility is limited to citizens. Population figures…include    
    noncitizens resident for a year or more. Countries vary substantially in the percentage of     
    such     aliens … we do not have good data on percentage of residents…who are aliens of      
    voting age,   and cannot systematically adjust our turnout data to remove them.  
 
Furthermore, Black (1991), who reports such estimations for a small number of countries, 
indicates that “the entire exercise required drawing some overly simplified assumptions” 
(Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 241).   In the end, although this measurement has its 
shortcomings, it has become the standard measure adopted in cross-national research, as it 
provides a more consistent yardstick for comparing countries than the alternative.  
 
In my thesis the dependent variable is voter turnout calculated as the percentage of the eligible 
population that cast a vote. As discussed above, this measure has its shortcomings but I find 
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them less worrying than the shortcomings associated with the alternative. All data on this 
variable are collected from The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, IDEA, available online at www.idea.int.13 IDEA provides the most 
comprehensive record of turnout in national elections that is currently available. They cover 
1620 national-level elections held from 1945 to 2000 in all 193 independent nation-states, 
including 1218 parliamentary and 402 presidential elections. 
 
3.2.2 Which elections? 
Reif and Schmitt (1980) put forward a model explaining the difference in election 
participation and election profits of individual political parties on regional, national and 
European levels. They argue that national parliament elections are more salient, for both 
political parties and the public, and an increased political participation and turnout can thus be 
expected. Reif and Schmitt coined the phrase ‘first-order’ elections to differentiate such 
elections from other, less important, elections. Even though Reiff and Schmitt’s work were on 
elections at the European level, their differentiation of elections based on the relative 
importance of the election is quite useful (Van der Eijk and Franklin: 1996). As I study voter 
turnout cross-nationally, first-order elections will constitute the basis for my dependent 
variable and I will hence study parliamentary elections for the lower house of the parliament.  
3.2.2 Independent variables and hypotheses 
Above I reviewed the literature and reported the most important variables that explain cross- 
national variation in voter turnout. I am interested in checking the significance and robustness 
of those variables in a specification that contains a wider range of control variables. The 
analyses in this thesis will thus constitute a robustness test of these former findings. As 
indicated, I also wish to include some new variables to contribute to our understanding of the 
cross-national variation in voter turnout. I proceed now to an identification of the independent 
variables I will include in my analysis. A brief discussion of measurement will follow each 
variable alongside data source and proposed hypothesis. Some of the independent variables 
are transformed, taking the natural logarithm of each respective variable. The transformation 
serves two purposes; first, the difference between high and low values on the variable are 
reduced as the variable becomes more symmetric, which in turn reduces the possibility of 
heteroscedasticity; second, I am interested in finding the absolute change in Y for a percent 
                                                 
13
 Given the lack of data, I was compelled to exclude four elections from my study; Switzerland 1971; Jamaica 
1983; St. Kitts and Nevis 1993; and Kiribati 1998.  
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change in X.14 The latter point refers to how the variables are measured; it makes more sense 
to interpret them in the terms of percentage changes rather than in unit changes.  
 
I will, inspired by Powell (1982) and Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), organize my variables in 
different categories as I believe it is a fruitful and clear approach. I will operate with a set of 
five categories of variables: institutional; socio-economic; information circulation; activism; 
political legacy. I begin with an identification of the institutional variables. 
 
3.2.2.1. Institutional variables15 
 
 (1) Compulsory voting - COMP 
An inclusion of a compulsory voting variable is self-evident in any study on cross-national 
variation in voter turnout. I expect a higher turnout where compulsory voting laws are in 
practice because the electors are facing varying degrees of punishment if they fail to vote 
under such systems. The measurement however, is not as straightforward as one would 
presume. As a number of countries impose compulsory voting laws on its citizens, the same 
countries vary in how strict these laws are enforced.16 Furthermore, there is also the issue of 
consequences facing the voters if they do not participate. These vary substantially across 
countries, from small fines in Brazil to denial of certain goods and services provided by 
public offices in Peru and Greece. In other words, it is a matter of consequences and chances 
of these consequences actually happening. I have, based on the guidelines of IDEA and by 
consulting Blais et al. (2003) come up with a list of 14 countries to include in my analysis 
(available in Appendix A).  
 
 H1: The presence of compulsory voting increases turnout 
 
(2) Electoral frequency - FREQ 
The frequency of elections is an important determinants for voter participation as it increases 
the costs facing electors and may produce voter fatigue. By calculating the years since the last 
national-level parliamentary or presidential election it is possible to measure the frequency of 
                                                 
14
 Gujarati (2003) refer to such a models as lin-log models, see p. 181 
15
 I include a variable called NUMPART (number of parties – see below) in this bloc acknowledging that it is not 
really an institutional factor, rather, a consequence of the electoral system which itself have an impact on 
turnout. 
16
 Brazil’s voting laws are non compulsory for citizens aged 16-17 and above 70. In Chile, enrolment is 
voluntary. 
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elections quite effectively. However, it is important to note that this estimate is likely to 
represent a conservative estimate as it does not count many other types of contests held during 
the time period under examination, including national and local referenda and initiatives, 
primaries, or European, regional/state, and local contest. It is, however, the most consistent 
and reliable cross-national indicator that is available. Data on this variable are from IDEA. 
 
 H2: The higher the frequency of elections, the lower the turnout 
 
(3) Closed or Open Party List - CLOSED 
If a party list is closed it means that the voter can not express preferences for candidates 
within the list. As this limits the influence on the order in which a party's candidates are 
elected and hence gives the voter less of a choice as of preferences this may give the voter 
less incentives to show up at the polls. Hence, a depressed turnout is expected where closed 
lists are in practise. I will include a dummy variable that assumes the value (1) where closed 
lists are in use and the value (0) where this is not the case. The data for this variable were 
collected from the Database on Political Institutions (DPI) also known as the Beck database 
on political institutions.  
 
 H3: The presence of closed lists depresses turnout 
 
(4) Electoral system – PLUMAJ and PR 
I will measure the electoral system in a different way than has been done in the literature up 
till this point. As the authors of The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System 
Design (1997) note, there are countless electoral system variations, but essentially they can be 
split into nine main systems which fall into three broad categories (see figure below). Usually, 
electoral systems are grouped on the basis of how they translate the electoral vote won into 
parliamentary seats won. In other words, it is a matter of how proportional the system is. 
When the proportionality principle, along with some other considerations such as how many 
members are elected from each district and how many votes the voter has, is taken into 
account the three main families, along with their members and some examples, are illustrated 
in Figure 2 below: 
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Figure 2: Electoral system families 
 
 
 
Source: The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (1997) 
 
I will, based on this framework, classify my cases along the “family lines” proposed, that is, 
either as a Plurality-majority-system, as a Semi-PR-system or as a PR-system. I can easily 
identity the different electoral systems I am interested in (Plurality-majority and PR) by the 
inclusion of two dummy variables, the one called PLUMAJ, indicating that the electoral system 
belongs to the Plurality-majority-family, and one called PR, indicating that the electoral 
system belongs to the Proportional Representation family above. We know that the electoral 
formula can be expected to affect voter turnout, as citizens are faced with differential rewards 
under alternative electoral arrangements. I expect a lower turnout in PLUMAJ systems because 
they are less proportional in their translation of votes into seats, meaning that electors of 
smaller parties are given less incentives to show up at the polls. I expect an increased turnout 
in PR-systems because they increase the opportunities for minor parties with dispersed support 
to enter parliament with only a modest share of the vote, and, therefore this increases the 
incentives for their supporters to participate. 
 
H4: The presence of Plurality-majority-systems depresses turnout 
H5: The presence of PR-systems increases turnout 
 
(5) Unicameralism - UNICAM 
Unicameralism means that the parliament consists on one house only. One would therefore 
expect an increased turnout where unicameralism is present, as it does not have to compete 
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for power against a possible upper house. However, recall that the findings on this variable 
were mixed. Whereas some authors report this variable as having a positive effect upon 
turnout (Jackman 1987), others reported no such effect (Blais and Carty 1990). I will include 
unicameralism as a control variable in my analysis by creating a dummy variable that is 
indicating the presence (1) or the absence (0) of unicameralism. My numbers are from the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 
 
 H6: The presence of unicameralism increases turnout 
 
(6) Legislative effectiveness - LEGEFF 
I will include a variable that takes into account the legislature’s relative power vis-a-vis the 
executive power. The Banks Dataset17 provides data on the relative power of the legislature 
and assigns each case a score according to this rank:  
 
(0) None. No legislature exists  
(1) Ineffective. There are three possible bases for this coding: first, legislative activity may 
be essentially of a "rubber stamp" character; second, domestic turmoil may make the 
implementation of legislation impossible; third, the effective executive may prevent the 
legislature from meeting, or otherwise substantially impede the exercise of its functions.  
(2) Partially Effective. A situation in which the effective executives power substantially 
outweighs, but does not completely dominate that of the legislature.  
(3) Effective. The possession of significant governmental autonomy by the legislature, 
including, typically, substantial authority in regard to taxation and disbursement, and the 
power to override executive vetoes of legislation. 
 
All of the cases included in this paper can be classified as having a legislature that is either 
partially effective (2) or effective (3), according to Bank’s rank. I can very easily measure the 
effectiveness of the legislature by the inclusion of a dummy variable. I will include a dummy 
variable that assumes the value (1) where the legislature is effective and the value (0) where 
the legislature is partially effective. There are fewer incentives to vote if one knows that the 
legislature has lesser power when it comes to important subject as, for example, taxation and 
                                                 
17
 Cross-national time-series data archive: Arthur S. Banks: see below for description. I will refer to this dataset 
as the Banks Dataset throughout the paper. 
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disbursement. The stronger the legislature, the more incentives to vote in parliamentary 
elections and hence, a higher turnout is expected. The data for this variable are collected from 
the Banks Dataset. 
 
 H7: The more powerful the legislature relative to the executive, the higher the turnout 
 
(7) Number of effective political parties - NUMPART 
As the discussion above revealed, the findings in the literature are inconsistent regarding this 
variable. Most authors (Jackman 1987; Blais and Cart 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998) 
report a negative correlation between the number of parties and turnout whereas others report 
a positive one (Norris 2004). Again, others report no relationship at all (Perez-Linan 2001; 
Fornos et al. 2004). Testing the variable in a larger dataset would therefore prove useful in 
order to establish a final argumentation regarding this variable’s effect upon voter turnout. All 
my numbers for this variable are from ACLP, hence, so is my measurement: number of 
effective political parties in the legislature measured by utilizing this formula: 1/ (1-F), where 
F=Party Fractionalization Index as presented in Banks (see Appendix B). Based on the 
‘inconsistent’ direction of this variable’s correlation with turnout, I am compelled to create 
two hypotheses. 
 
 H8a: The higher the number of parties, the higher the turnout 
 H8b: The lower the number of parties, the higher the turnout 
 
(8) District size – DISTRICT (log) 
The population size of the electoral district can be expected to have an impact on voter 
turnout. The linkages between voters and their representatives are affected by the number of 
electors per member of parliament. If a district is small, the possibility for increased 
information, familiarity and contact between voters and their representatives is present. As 
Norris (2004) notes: “…..the smaller the number of electors for members of parliament, the 
greater the potential for constituency service and for elected representatives to maintain 
communications with local constituents, and, therefore, the higher the incentive to turnout, 
based on any “personal” vote” (163). I therefore expect a higher turnout in countries with 
smaller districts. I will measure district size by dividing the number of seats in the lower 
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house of the parliament into the total population in each country.18 The variable is expressed 
through its natural logarithm.  
 
H9: The larger the district size, the lower the turnout 
 
3.2.2.2 Socio-economic variables 
 
Any study on cross-nationally variation in voter turnout should take into account socio-
economic variables and the following section identifies which variables I will include in my 
analyses. 
 
(9) Economic development – GDP per capita (log) 
Economic development correlates positively with voter turnout (Powell 1980; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998). Economic development in this thesis is indicated by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, as defined in The Penn World Table. There are three real-GDP-per-
capita measures in the data: RGDP, CGDP, and RGDPCH. RGDP is real GDP per capita, based on 
1985 price levels. According to Feng (2003) RGDP is suitable for studies that involve 
relatively “short” time series close to 1985. CGDP is current-year real GDP per capita and is 
ideal for cross-country, single-year analysis. RGDPCH is real GDP per capita that uses a price 
chain index with the base year changed from year to year. Of the three, this thesis focuses on 
RGDPCH, which is adjusted both annually to capture price changes and cross-sectionally to 
reflect purchasing-power parity. By design, “it is the best indicator of long-run economic 
growth” (Feng 2003: 4). All my numbers are taken from Penn World Table 5.6 and 6.2 and 
the variable, which is expressed through its natural logarithm, will simply be called GDP.  
 
 H10: The higher the level of economic development, the higher the turnout 
 
(10) Level of income inequality - GINI 
The level of income inequality can be expressed in a numerous of ways. The most 
comprehensive summary measure, used to compare changes in one society over time or, more 
importantly in my case, two or more at a given moment, is known as the GINI Index (or 
coefficient or ration). The GINI is a number between 0 and 1, with 0 representing a society 
                                                 
18
 This measurement does not technically measure the number of voters per member of parliament but as the 
relationship between population, voters and countries are relatively stable I feel confident that the validity of the 
measurement is preserved. Norris (2004) utilizes the same procedure (163). 
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where all members have the same income, and 1 representing perfect inequality, where one 
member takes all the income. The data for this variable were collected from Human 
Development Report 2003 and World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank. 
Because data were sparse on this variable my analysis on this variable’s impact on turnout is 
confined to the 1990s model only. We know from Downs (1957) that voting is associated 
with costs (time, money, energy etc) for the elector. In a society were not everybody is 
secured at least a minimum of resources (income), less people can “afford” to vote. I therefore 
expect a decreased turnout in countries that enjoy a more unequal distribution of income. 
 
 H11: The more unequal the distribution of income in society, the lower the turnout 
 
(11) Literacy rate - LITERACY 
Literacy is the ability to read and write and involves “a continuum of learning to enable an 
individual to achieve his or her goals, to develop his or her knowledge and potential, and to 
participate fully in the wider society" (UNESCO). Participation in the wider society would 
also implicate voting at elections and taking part in other political activity. The data for this 
variable was collected from two sources; the Banks Dataset and UNESCO’s Institute for 
Statistics.19 The numbers reflect the literacy rate of the population aged 15 years and over, in 
percentage points. Voting is the least demanding form of political activity and the one that is 
least dependent on the possession of civic skills. Those with little linguistic skills are however 
less likely to vote as studies show that a minimum degree of literacy is almost a prerequisite 
to good turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). I therefore expect a higher turnout in countries 
that enjoy a higher literacy rate. 
 
 H12: The more literate the population, the higher the turnout 
 
(12) Human Development Index - HDI 
HDI measures the level of well-being in a country at a given time, taking into account four 
dimensions; literacy, life expectancy, standard of living and education. The index very 
effectively measures the level of development a country enjoys by ranking each country on a 
scale that goes from 0 (least developed) to 1 (most developed). A higher turnout is expected in 
                                                 
19
 As data was difficult to collect for this variable I had to interpolate the data for some missing cases. The logic 
was this: If, say, Spain had a literacy score of 70 in 1970 and 80 in 1980, then it would receive the score of 70 
from 1966 through 1975 and the score of 80 from 1976 through 1985.  
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more developed countries. The data for this variable were collected from Human 
Development Report 2006.20 Due to lack of data on this variable my analysis on this 
variable’s impact on turnout is confined to the 1980s- and 1990s-models only. Norris (2004) 
argues that the societal changes associated with the modernization process strengthen 
electoral participation (174). I therefore expect a higher turnout in more developed countries. 
 
 H13: The higher the level of development, the higher the turnout 
 
 (13) Population size – POP (log) 
The size of the population correlates negatively with voter turnout (Blais and Carty 1990; 
Blais and Dobrzynska 1998) as smaller countries are able to arouse a greater sense of 
community which itself fosters a higher turnout. I therefore expect turnout to be lower in 
countries that enjoy a large population versus countries that enjoy a small population. I will 
include a population size variable and call it POP. The variable is expressed through its natural 
logarithm and my numbers are from the Banks Dataset.  
  
 H14: The larger the size of the population, the lesser the turnout 
 
 (14) Population density – POPDEN (log) 
It makes intuitive sense to believe that the more densely populated people are, the easier they 
are to mobilize, that is, they are easier to find and it takes less resources to inform them. I 
therefore expect an increased turnout the more densely populated a country is. Population 
density can easily be measured by dividing the population of a country by the size of the 
country. As I utilize the same measurement as the Banks Dataset, I operate with square miles 
as indicator of country size. All my numbers are from the Banks Dataset and the variable is 
expressed through its natural logarithm. 
 
 H14: The more densely populated the population, the higher the turnout 
 
 (15) Catholic - CAT 
I want to see if turnout can be predicted along religious lines. What know that some religions 
work better along the democratic lines than others21 and that democratic regimes are more 
                                                 
20
 Same logic about interpolation applies as to the LITERACY variable. 
21
 See Haynes (2001) for a discussion on this issue 
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frequent in countries that can be classified as belonging to the Christian cultural heritage. My 
dataset consists of 90 countries of which about 95% belong to this heritage. Of these 
countries, the majority are either of a catholic of protestant orientation. To identify the 
catholic orientation, I simply employ a dummy variable that is assigned the value (1) in cases 
where the catholic population exceeds 50% of the total population and (0) otherwise. All my 
numbers for this variable are from ACLP. Since I have no clear cut expectation regarding the 
direction of this variable’s correlation, I am compelled to create two competing hypotheses. 
  
 H15a: An increased turnout can be expected in countries that enjoy a catholic majority 
 H15b: A decreased turnout can be expected in countries that enjoy a catholic majority 
 
3.2.2.3 Information circulation variables 
 
(16) Information circulation – RADIOS, TVS, NEWSPAPER and INFO (all logged) 
I will include a variable that takes into account the flow of information in society. It makes 
good intuitive sense to believe that the higher the flow of information, the greater the turnout 
at elections. It is difficult to measure this flow precisely, but by taking into account the means 
by which this information flows, that is, the media, it is possible to get an impression of the 
phenomenon. I will therefore include four media variables: RADIOS, TVS, NEWSPAPER and 
INFO. I will measure the three former variables as the Banks Dataset does: radios, TVs and 
newspaper circulation per capita. The INFO variable is a compilation of the three different 
variables, meaning that the value of the three are summed and then divided by three. All my 
numbers are from the Banks Dataset and the variables are expressed through their respective 
natural logarithm. I expect an increased level of turnout in countries that enjoy an increased 
level of either of these media variables. As no study previously has included variables that 
take into account the flow of information in society it will be very interesting to check its 
explanatory power on cross-national differences in voter turnout.  
  
 H16: The higher the flow of information, the higher the turnout 
 
3.2.2.4 Activism variables 
 
I want to include variables that measure the level of political mobilization and activism in 
society. As a result, I have created four variables that measure the phenomenon in different 
ways. 
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(17) Number of peaceful demonstrations - DEMO  
The first ‘activism’ variable deals with peaceful demonstrations. Banks Dataset provides data 
on the number of peaceful demonstrations in a country in a given year. As these 
demonstrations are peaceful, it makes intuitive sense to believe that the higher the number of 
peaceful demonstrations, the more political awareness and mobilisation the country’s citizens 
enjoy. It is therefore possible to expect a higher turnout where these demonstrations are more 
frequent. However, an increased number of demonstrations could also mean that a country’s 
citizens are frustrated and feel that the best way to influence governmental policies are not 
going through the polls. I will therefore be aware of this variable’s possibility to swing both 
ways. The variable is measured as in the Banks Dataset: any peaceful public gathering of at 
least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. 
 
 H17a: The higher the number of demonstrations, the higher the turnout 
 H17b: The higher the number of demonstrations, the lower the turnout 
 
 (18) Number of riots - RIOTS 
The second ‘activism’ variable, RIOTS, is included to measure the level of conflict. The reason 
is this: if the level of conflict is high, it could be because going to the polls is not regarded to 
be the most “meaningful” way to express one’s political beliefs. I hence expect a decreased 
turnout where the number of riots is higher. All my numbers are from the Banks Dataset and 
indicate the number of riots in a country in a given year. The variable is measured as in the 
Banks Dataset: any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use 
of physical force.  
 
 H18: The higher the number of riots, the lower the turnout 
 
 (19) Governmental crisis - GOVCRIS 
The third variable in this block, GOVCRIS, deals with the state of the government/regime. The 
more unstable the regime, a decreased turnout is expected on my part. Again, I expect people 
to discredit the polls as a way of influencing policy formation because of the unstable political 
climate. My measurement follows Banks: Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to 
bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such 
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overthrow. My numbers are also from the Banks Dataset and indicate the number of 
governmental crises in a country in a given year.  
 
 H19: The higher the number of governmental crises, the lower the turnout 
 
(20) Weighted Conflict Index – WCI (log) 
The last variable in the activism-block, WCI, is included for the same reasons as the RIOTS- 
and the GOVCRIS-variable, differing only in the complexity of the measurement.22 
  
In and of themselves, the different factors constituting the WCI could have an effect upon 
turnout, in a negative direction. I intend, as shown above, to include three of these factors, 
namely DEMO, RIOTS and GOVCRIS. I expect that the higher the score on the weighted conflict 
index, the lower the turnout. Again, my numbers are from the Banks Dataset and indicate the 
score a country is assigned in a given year, expressed through its natural logarithm. 
 
 H20: The higher the level of conflict, the lower the turnout 
  
3.2.2.5 Political legacy 
(21) Eastern Europe - EASTERN 
I have also included a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the country under 
analysis is a former Soviet Union satellite. I have called this variable EASTERN, as most of the 
former Soviet satellites identified in my dataset are found in Eastern Europe. I wish to see if 
the historical legacy of former authoritarian rule has had an impact on voter turnout. We know 
from the landmark book by Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (1963) that people, given 
the historical political legacy of their country, vary in terms of their political participation. 
Almond and Verba distinguish between participants, subjects and parochials. My interest lies 
in the subjects and parochials, the former identified as a person having experienced a regime 
of an authoritarian character, and the latter being identified by a person having experienced 
one-party rule for a long time. As a result, they are both characterised by a low level of 
political participation because they could see politics as a dangerous thing to get involved in. 
Based on this, I expect that the countries associated by former Soviet rule, are characterized 
                                                 
22
 The weighted conflict index is calculated (by Banks) in the following manner: Multiply the value of the 
number of Assassinations by 24, General Strikes by 43, Guerrilla Warfare by 46, Government Crises by 48, 
Purges by 86, Riots by 102, Revolutions by 148, Anti-Government Demonstrations by 200. Sum the 8 weighted 
values and divide by 9.  See Appendix B for a description of the different factors. 
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by a lower turnout as they have both experienced long term relationship with one-party rule 
and regimes of an authoritarian character.  
 
 H21: Soviet-type authoritarian political legacy decreases turnout 
 
 3.2.2.5 Summary of variables 
All the variables discussed above, have been included in the table below. The table provides 
an overview of the different variables and their expected correlation with turnout.  
 
Table 2: Hypothesized effect of each independent variable on turnout 
 
 
Variable    Hyp. relation   Variable  Hyp. relation 
______________________________________________________________________  
 
Institutional      Information circulation 
COMP    +   RADIOS   +  
FREQ       –   TVS    +  
CLOSED   –   NEWSPAPER   + 
PLUMAJ   –   INFO    +  
PR    +        
UNICAM   +   Activism    
LEGEFF   +   DEMO    +/– 
NUMPART   +/–   RIOTS    +/–  
DISTRICT   –   GOVCRIS   +/–  
       WCI    +/–  
Socio-economic        
GDP    +   Political legacy    
POP    –   EASTERN    –  
POPDENS   +        
GINI    +     
LITERACY   +        
HDI    + 
CAT    +/–         
 
 
 
3.3 Quality of measurement 
The major criteria to judge the quality of measurements are validity and reliability.  The 
validity of measurement is defined as the degree to which one actually measures whatever 
concept the measurement procedure purports to measure. It refers to the closeness of the 
correspondence between the measurements and the concept being measured (Pennings et al. 
2006). Regarding the validity of the measurements above, I feel confident that the variables 
that I have defined are measuring the phenomenon/concept that I am interested in analysing. 
Keep in mind that the majority of the variables included in this paper are replicates of 
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variables included in previous research (see chapter 2). I am, however, aware of the 
possibility that perhaps some of my measurements represent a conservative estimate (FREQ) 
or the opposite (DISTRICT). The validity however, is preserved.  
 
As for reliability, measurements are reliable to the extent that measurements with respect to 
the same units deliver consistent results. The measurements are reliable if they are 
trustworthy, that is, they measure what they are supposed to measure. I will address the issue 
of reliability by briefly describing the data sources used in the collection of the data for this 
paper. All the data sources below are well known and regarded as highly reliable by social 
scientists studying voting behaviour in general and voter turnout in special.23 
 
I turn now to a presentation of my methodological approach and research strategy.
                                                 
23
 The ACLP dataset is a culmination of ambitious efforts to collect a vide variety of variables put forward in the 
landmark book Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990. The 
dataset has been updated to 2002, making it suitable for my purposes. The unit of analysis in the ACLP dataset is 
a given country in a given year, and the over 100 variables included represents one of the most comprehensive 
sources of post-World War II indicators for “large-N” cross-sectional time-series studies.  The Banks Dataset, 
also known as The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, abbreviated CNTS, provide a wide range of 
variables and excellent coverage. It was a product of the State University of New York, launched in the fall of 
1968 by Arthur S. Banks (hence the name). The numbers I use from the Banks dataset come from the 2004 
version. IDEA provides the most comprehensive record of turnout in national elections that is currently 
available. They cover 1620 national-level elections held from 1945 to 2000 in all 193 independent nation-states, 
including 1218 parliamentary and 402 presidential elections. The Inter-Parliamentary union is an international 
organization of parliaments of sovereign states. They provide comprehensive data on political variables through 
their PARLINE database (a derivative of Parliaments on-line). UNESCO is a specialized agency of the United 
Nations, established in 1945. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics regularly updates and disseminates literacy 
estimates and projections for more than 100 countries. My numbers are from 2000. The Human Development 
Report (HDR) is an annual milestone publication from the United Nation Development Programme. HDR is an 
independent report and is commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It is the 
product of a selected team of leading scholars, development practitioners and members of the Human 
Development Report Office of UNDP. In this paper I used the HDR 2003 and 2006. The World Bank also 
provides annual publications on development, called World Development Indicators. As of 2006, it covers more 
than 150 economies over 900 indicators. Regarding political variables, the World Bank provides a large cross-
country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). As one of the creators of 
this dataset is named Thorstein Beck, the dataset is also known as Beck database. Finally, the Penn World Table 
provides purchasing power parity and national income accounts converted to international prices for 188 
countries for some or all of the years 1950-2004. In this paper I have utilized the Penn World Table 5.6 and 6.2. 
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IV. Methodological approach and research strategy 
 
In this chapter I will outline my methodological approach and research strategy. By utilizing 
the quantitative method, specifically the regression analysis of cross-sectional data, I will test 
my research hypotheses. I begin with a presentation of my methodological approach. 
 
 4.1 Methodological approach 
 
4.1.1 Quantitative method 
In social science, a variety of approaches can be taken to test hypotheses. These approaches 
have traditionally been divided into two research methods, the quantitative (variable-oriented) 
and the qualitative (case-oriented), where the former generally refers to studies of a large 
number of units and the latter referring to detailed analysis of one or a few cases. The 
different methods are used to answer different questions and vary accordingly in their ability 
to produce findings upon which one can make generalizations: the quantitative method gives 
broader and more general answers based on a larger number of cases, suitable for 
generalizations, while the qualitative method focuses its attention on a narrower scale, 
answering questions on a small number of cases (Ragin 1987; Ragin and Zaret 1983; Ringdal 
2001; Skog 2004).   
 
The goal of most comparative social science is to produce explanations of macro-social 
phenomenon that are general but also show an appreciation of complexity (Ragin 1987). As 
we recognize that a good social scientific explanation is relevant to a variety of cases, and, at 
the same time, take into account the complexity of social phenomenon we realize that a 
general explanation is a partial explanation at best. Generality and complexity compete, and 
an appreciation of complexity sacrifices generality; an emphasis on generality encourages a 
neglect of complexity. As Ragin put it: “It is difficult to have both” (1987: 54). In the study of 
cross-national variation of voter turnout, generality is given precedence over complexity 
because it is a variable-oriented study. By specifying the hypotheses to be tested and then 
delineating the widest possible population of relevant observations, it is possible to generalize 
upon findings. The wider this population the better, because a wide population provides a 
basis for a more exacting test and, in addition, gives the investigator the opportunity to 
demonstrate the breadth of an argument (Ragin 1987: 55).  In my study I include, based on the 
indices proposed by ACLP, 90 countries. Recall that the studies I reviewed in Chapter 2 
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(studies which represent the tradition found within this field of research) operate with a 
number of cases ranging from 19 to 32.24 I find it problematic that the same studies, given 
their low number of cases, generalize upon their findings. As my study includes 90 countries 
(96 cases), it represents a major improvement over previous research as it allows me to 
generalize more confidently, based upon my findings.  
 
Since the emphasis of the quantitative strategy is on general features of social structure 
(variables), it has allowed importations of quantitative methods, especially multiple regression 
techniques, from mainstream social science. On the basis of relatively small data sets, these 
techniques allow investigators to make broad statements about cross-societal patterns, such as 
voter turnout variations. Thus, in the study of cross-national variation in voter turnout, 
quantitative methods are utilized, and the dominant approach is to use a multiple regression 
technique, namely Cross Sectional Analysis (CS).  
 
I proceed next to a brief description of the technique at hand.  
 
4.1.2 Multiple regression analysis  
In a multiple regression model, more than one independent variable is assumed to have an 
impact on the dependent variable. By incorporating more than one independent variable into 
the equation, we accomplish two things. First, since few phenomenona are products of a 
single cause, a multivariate model offers a fuller explanation of the dependent variable. 
Second, the effect of a particular independent variable is made more certain, for the 
possibility of distorting influences from the other independent variables is removed (Lewis-
Beck 1980: 47). The value for case i on the dependent variable, iY , is assumed to be a linear 
combination of the values of case i on the independent variables, iX 1 , iX 2 , … , kiX , except 
for a residual, iε , that is not accounted for by the independent variables (Pennings et al 2006: 
153). The residual for case i is the difference between the value of the dependent variable, iY , 
and the predicted value, Ŷ i : 
 
ikikiii XbXbXbbY ε+++++= Λ22110  
 
                                                 
24
 Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) being the exception. See Appendix D for an overview. 
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In the case of k independent variables, 1X , 2X , …, kX  the predicted value of case i, Ŷ i , is a 
linear function of iX 1 , iX 2 , … , kiX  multiplied by their respective regression slope 
coefficients 1b , 2b , … , kb , and the regression constant 0b  
 
  Ŷ i  = kikii XbXbXbb ++++ Λ22110  
 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to estimate the regression coefficients 0b , 1b , 2b , 
… , kb  prescribes that the sum of all squared residuals, 
2
iε , also denoted as SSR, should be 
minimized: 
  Minimize SSR, where SSR = 2)(∑ −
i
ii YY    (Pennings et al 2006). 
In other words: the central goal in the OLS-method is to find the regression line that best fits 
the sample data. The OLS-method, which I will use in this paper, is a widely used technique 
within linear regression analysis and has become, due to the possession of some attractive 
statistical properties, one of the most powerful and popular methods of regression analysis. It 
rests, however, on certain assumptions (see Appendix C). Violating one of more of the 
assumptions can seriously harm the accuracy of the OLS-estimates. Some of these 
assumptions, like the absence of perfect multicollinearity and the absence of 
heteroscedasticity, are more important than others. In the discussion of this paper’s analyses, 
in chapter 5 and 6, I will specifically discuss these assumptions and explain how they are dealt 
with in a manner which minimizes the bias and maximizes the efficiency of the estimated 
regression coefficients. 
 
4.1.3 The ‘Krieckhaus approach’  
As indicated above, the dominant approach in cross-national voter turnout research has been a 
Cross Sectional Analysis of variation. This approach is appropriate for sorting out the effects 
of variables that tend to be stable over time, such as the socio-economic environment, the 
electoral system, compulsory voting and other institutional factors (Blais 2006:121). Two 
recent articles (Krieckhaus 2004, 2005) which survey and analyze the recent literature on the 
effects of political regimes upon economic growth prove to be very useful for the purposes of 
my interest in cross-sectional variation in voter turnout.  Krieckhaus shows how the effects of 
regimes upon growth vary across time.  Therefore, the general cross-sectional findings may in 
fact vary and not be constant across time.  Following the insights of Krieckhaus, I propose to 
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make an additional contribution to our knowledge of the determinants of voter turnout in the 
following manner. In order to be sensitive to variation of variable effects across time, it is 
necessary to conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses. If I want the robustness of the results 
across time to come forward I will have to examine shorter time periods. To allow 
comparison across periods, I intentionally examine each cross-section separately rather than 
employ a pooled analysis. By averaging the data on each variable for, say, every decade, it is 
possible to employ cross-sectional analysis quite effectively.  This approach will allow me to 
compare the decade-specific results to each other as well as to the results based upon the 
entire time period. 
 
4.2 Research strategy 
 
 4.2.1 Research strategy outlined 
As part of the preliminary analysis for this paper’s research, I will start out by focusing only 
on those explanatory variables that have been studied in previous research, as identified in my 
literature review above.  It will be interesting to test the robustness of these variables from the 
literature when included in regression models based on a dataset that covers many cases 
across a long time period. For this purpose I will utilize a dataset that I have compiled, called 
“Grand Dataset” (see below). Recall that a number of the findings reported in the literature 
review chapter have come about as a result of regression analyses conducted across relatively 
few cases (19-32) over a relatively short time period (10-20 years).25 Only when included in 
regression models conducted on the basis of a dataset that incorporates as many democratic 
elections as possible can the true explanatory power of the variables come forward. 
 
The next step in my research strategy will be to go on to build a “grand model” that explains 
cross-national variation in voter turnout in general. The regression analyses for this model 
will be conducted on the basis of the same dataset as the literature model above, namely the 
Grand Dataset. In addition to variables identified in the literature review chapter, I intend to 
include some new variables which have never before been included in research on cross-
national variation in turnout. The new variables that I have prepared for this thesis were 
discussed above and include: LEGEFF, POPDENS, GINI, CAT, EASTERN, RADIOS, TVS, 
NEWSPAPER, INFO, DEMOS, RIOTS, GOVCRIS and WCI. I will begin the analysis by running 
                                                 
25
 See Appendix D for an overview of samples and time period of the different studies. 
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simple bivariate regression models for each independent variable and present the variables 
that have effects that are the most statistically significant. I can thus generate some 
preliminary assessments of the variables’ effects and statistical significance.  
 
Based on these preliminary results, I will go on to build a general model. I will do so by 
identifying a core of central variables to which I will add one or two variables at a time. As 
the model continues to expand, I will continue to add additional variables to the model 
specification and test their significance in the larger multivariate model.  This process will 
continue until the final model is complete. By running regression models on the Grand 
Dataset I will determine the “average” effects of each independent variable across the entire 
population of countries for which data exist. (These “aggregate” or “overall” effects will later 
be compared to the decade-specific results.) 
 
Thirdly, I will check for time-specific variance in the explanatory variables on my dependent 
variable, by running separate cross-sections for each decade. By averaging every variable for 
each decade, and running all countries, it is possible to see how the effect of each variable 
varies across time. The time-specific analyses will be called Decade Models, and conducted 
on the basis of a dataset I have compiled specifically for this purpose. The dataset, which is 
discussed below, will be called Decade Dataset. I will first run bivariate regression models on 
each variable, across each decade to see if any patterns emerge. The bivariate regressions will 
serve the purpose as preliminary assessment for the variables, and those which turn out to be 
significant will be included in multivariate regression models across each decade. Only by 
including the variables in multivariate regression models can the effect of each individual 
variable be determined.26 
 
Only by checking the robustness of the explanatory variables across time can we be certain of 
their importance for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout. By conducting a 
comprehensive research strategy like this, it is possible to test our hypotheses more 
thoroughly, and make a unique contribution to our knowledge of why countries differ in voter 
turnout.  
 
                                                 
26
 In my analysis of the 1990s decade I will extend my analysis to building a final, “best” model.  This will allow 
me to fully exploit the potential for studying the impact of additional independent variables for which data exist 
only for the 1990s. 
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4.2.2 Datasets 
 
In the preparations for this thesis I was compelled to create two datasets, one dealing with the 
grand cross-sectional analysis, called ‘Grand Dataset’, and one dealing with the time-specific 
analysis, called ‘Decade Dataset’. There are some points worth mentioning regarding the 
creation of the datasets, and I begin with the Grand Dataset.  
 
In order for the analyses to be sensitive to institutional changes in the cases under review, 
some of the cases had to be divided into sub-cases. In other words, some countries 
experienced fundamental institutional changes over the time period covered and I had to 
account for that in the creation of the dataset. For example, Sweden changed from a bicameral 
to a unicameral legislature in 1970 meaning that for Sweden I had to create two sub-cases, 
Sweden I and Sweden II, the former referring to Sweden when it had bicameralism (1950-
1970) and the latter to when it had unicameralism (1970-2000). New Zealand is another 
example, as it changed its electoral system in 1993. I created two sub-cases, New Zealand I, 
referring to the Plurality/majority period (1950-1993), and New Zealand II, referring to the 
Proportional Representation period (1993-2000). Four countries also changed their mandatory 
voting laws during the time period under analysis. These include: Chile (changed from non-
compulsory to compulsory in 1962), Uruguay (changed from non-compulsory to compulsory 
in 1970), Venezuela (changed from compulsory to non-compulsory in 1993), and the 
Netherlands (changed from compulsory to non-compulsory in 1970). This implied that sub-
cases had to be created taking into account the presence or absence of mandatory voting laws 
for the different countries. By creating the sub-cases for Sweden, New Zealand, Chile, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and the Netherlands, my cross-sectional analysis is sensitive to the 
institutional changes, and hence, the results are more robust. This also implies that the number 
of cases under comparison is 96, even though only 90 countries are included in the analysis.  
 
As noted, I have also created a dataset for the time-specific regression analyses called Decade 
Dataset. By averaging each variable for each decade across each country, I can run 
regressions on my data that are time sensitive. The dataset is sensitive to institutional changes, 
as the dataset above, because of the timing of the institutional changes across my countries. 
Sweden, Uruguay and the Netherlands all experienced institutional changes in 1970s (see 
above). Hence Sweden was bicameral in the decades of 1950 and 1960, and unicameral in the 
following three decades; the same logic applies to Uruguay and the Netherlands regarding 
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their compulsory voting laws. Chile changed from non-compulsory to compulsory in 1962. I 
therefore classified Chile as non-compulsory in the 1950s decade and compulsory from the 
1960s decade and onwards. Finally, New Zealand and Venezuela experienced institutional 
changes in 1993, as New Zealand changed their electoral system and Venezuela abolished 
compulsory voting. The same logic as above applies to these two cases making their 1990s 
decades differ from the other decades on the respective institutions. 
 
4.2.3 Software 
As for statistical software, I will use Limdep version 8.0, which is an integrated program for 
estimation and analysis of linear and nonlinear models, with cross-section, time series and 
panel data. It has interesting properties, like for instance the possibility of running the 
regression models implementing White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent variances and standard 
errors. Because the hypothesized effects of a number of the variables included in this paper 
are uncertain regarding the direction of their correlation, all of my regression models are two-
tailed. Furthermore, unless otherwise explicitly mentioned, whenever I refer to a variable 
being significant or not, I mean at the 0,05 level (significant at a 95% confidence interval). 
 
I turn now to the analyses, beginning with the building of a general model which pertains to 
explain why countries vary in voter turnout. By utilizing the Grand dataset I will engage in an 
extensive model building procedure which will result in a model that best explain cross- 
national variation in voter turnout between 1950 and 2000. 
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V. Aggregate empirical patterns 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explain cross-national variation in voter turnout. As we saw 
from the literature review chapter above, the different variables were associated with different 
effects and significance across the different studies. We do know that some variables matter 
more than others, like for instance compulsory voting and economic development. The 
problem is, however, that the different studies associated with the research question differ in 
their sample selection, number of cases, time period included and level of sophistication. This 
thesis addresses those shortcomings by expanding the number of cases and extending the time 
period covered. By creating a dataset that covers more countries over more years than any 
previous study, and by including variables that have not yet been included in previous models, 
I hope to make a unique contribution to our knowledge of why we see cross country 
differences in voter turnout. 
 
I will start out, as elaborated above, by running multiple regression models on the Grand 
Dataset. The purpose of these regression models will be to detect any general patterns in the 
determinants of cross-national variation in voter turnout between 1950 and 2000. Before I 
turn to the general model building procedure using both variables from the literature review 
chapter and variables that are unique to this study, I will run some preliminary analyses, 
including the ‘Literature model’ and bivariate regression models. But first, we will have a 
look at the descriptive statistics, the presence of outliers and the issue of collinearity.  
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The operationalization of the dependent variable in this study, electoral turnout, is calculated 
as the percentage of the voting age population (VAP) that cast a vote. As we see from Table 3 
below, our dependent variable, TURNOUT, goes from a minimum value of about 21 to a 
maximum value of about 94 percent. The average turnout for the sample is 67 percent. The 
minimum value of 21 percent turnout reflects the case of Mali. Given the low level of turnout, 
Mali will be regarded as an outlier in this dataset (discussed below). Seven of my variables 
are dummy variables and another eight are transformed by taking their natural logarithm. The 
descriptive statistics for the variables from the Grand Dataset are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics – all variables in Grand Dataset 
 
 
     Mean         St.dev.     Min.          Max.       Cases 
Variables  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
TURNOUT       67.9292970      15.3504818      21.6100000      93.9500000      96 
 
COMP          .145833333      .354791760      .000000000      1.00000000      96 
FREQ          3.99471242      1.62862696      1.66666667      14.0000000      96 
CLOSED        .611940299      .490986141      .000000000      1.00000000      67 
PLUMAJ        .312500000      .465945558      .000000000      1.00000000      96 
PR            .541666667      .500876425      .000000000      1.00000000      96 
UNICAM        .541666667      .500876425      .000000000      1.00000000      96 
LEGEFF      .552083333      .499890339      .000000000      1.00000000      96 
NUMPART       3.69659473      2.70693783      1.00000000      19.7286350      94 
DISTRICT*     86.2034318      159.485550      2.21500000      1298.00000      91 
DISTRICT(log) 3.68234035      1.25581024      .795252403      7.16857990      91 
 
GDP           8350.72844      5359.14003      793.555950      21553.6682      94 
GDP(log)      8.76951167      .800674764      6.67652405      9.97830130      94 
POP*          27127.4734      77693.7883      30.5000000      693331.292      95 
POP(log)      8.44114723      2.18725954      3.41772668      13.4492632      95 
POPDEN        3278.57398      4391.54879      44.8000000      28647.0000      95 
POPDEN(log)   7.27378215      1.46279532      3.80220814      10.2628040      95 
LITERACY      85.4991207      19.0274550      20.4000000      99.8000000      83 
CAT           .427083333      .497251216      .000000000      1.00000000      96 
 
RADIOS**      4401.21395      2752.91660      384.000000      15823.7200      94 
RADIOS(log)   8.13766028      .797691637      5.95064255      9.66926536      94 
TVS***        21611.6449      15471.0757      12.6666667      54509.0000      94 
TVS(log)      9.36736498      1.64894513      2.53897387      10.9061211      94 
NEWSPAPER**   1705.12466      1431.44510      10.0000000      5541.50000      83 
NEWSPAPER(log)6.92497463      1.25377698      2.30258509      8.62002050      83 
INFO          3188.45662      2198.21737      96.8333333      8825.41667      95 
INFO(log)     7.66566695      1.10463514      4.57299129      9.08539110      95 
 
DEMO          .604192145      1.08300417      .000000000      5.92000000      95 
RIOTS         .537093889      1.09129802      .000000000      7.08333333      95 
GOVCRIS       .278455573      .398898099      .000000000      2.08333333      95 
WCI           2903.63708      4379.28435      .000000000      20741.0000      95 
WCI(log)      5.61658645      3.49693948      .000000000      9.93986770      95 
 
EASTERN       .145833333      .354791760      .000000000      1.00000000      96 
 
 
* scaling 1000 
** scaling 0.0001 
*** scaling 0.00001 
 
 
 5.1.1 Outliers 
An outlier is a single case which affects the slope of the complete regression line 
disproportionately (Pennings et al 2006). By inspecting the partial regression plots I detected, 
beside Mali at 21 percentage points turnout, another two outliers, namely, Chile I (Chile pre-
compulsory 1950-62) at 25 percent turnout and Guatemala at 27 percent turnout. There are 
different ways to deal with outliers. Some argue in favour of dropping the cases at hand 
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completely from the model. A technical alternative to dropping the outliers completely, which 
is the approach I will follow, is to create a dummy variable for each outlier, coded 1 for the 
outlier case, 0 for all other cases. The slope coefficient for such a dummy variable indicates 
the difference between the value of the outlier on the dependent variable and the prediction 
for the outlier produced by the regression equation based on the remaining cases (Pennings et 
al. 2006). It indicates precisely how different the outlier is from the remaining cases, but it can 
not tell the story as to why this is so.  (Dummy variables indicating different outliers will be 
included in all of the regression models presented in this thesis.)  
 
 5.1.2 Collinearity 
An important assumption in multivariate regression analysis is that the effect of each of the 
independent variables, x, on the dependent variable, y, should be independent of the effects of 
the other independent variables. High correlation between two or more of the independent 
variables indicates that there is a problem of collinearity in the data which makes the 
estimation of each independent variable’s effect upon the dependent variable difficult. By 
conducting a correlation analysis, resulting in a correlation matrix (available in Appendix E), 
the degree of association between the variables is measured. Several of the pair-wise 
correlations are quite high, suggesting that there may be a collinearity problem. As a rule of 
thumb, if two variables show a correlation coefficient of 0,7 or higher they should not be 
included in the same model. However, even if no high values are found, one can not yet 
conclude that multicollinearity is not a problem in one’s data. When specifying my final 
model for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout below, more sophisticated 
methods of checking for multicollinearity (and heteroscedasticity) will be conducted. For 
now, it is sufficient to look at the correlation matrix, as a guide to which variables not to 
include in the same regression model. A close inspection of the correlation matrix reveals that 
a number of variables should not be included in the same model. They are presented in Table 
4. 
 
Table 4: Collinear variables in Grand Dataset 
 
NEWSPAPER-INFO  (r = .85)  INFO-RADIO       (r = .83)     GDP-TV                (r = .72) 
NEWSPAPER-RADIO (r = .77)  INFO-TV       (r = .88)     GDP-LITERACY           (r = .75) 
NEWSPAPER-TV  (r = .75)  INFO-LITERACY       (r = .85)     POP-DISTRICT              (r = .92) 
NEWSPAPER-LITERACY (r = .84)  INFO-GDP       (r = .82)  
NEWSPAPER-GDP (r = .82)  RADIO-LITERACY   (r = .83) 
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Based on this, I know which independent variables not to include in the same regression 
model. As a consequence I am compelled, when conducting my analyses below, to run 
separate analyses for the variables that are correlated.   
 
5.2 Preliminary assessment 
 
First of all, I will test the findings presented in chapter 2, the literature review chapter. They 
will be included in regression analyses, called “literature models,” conducted on the basis of 
my Grand Dataset. As this dataset consists of a large number of cases, over a long time 
period, it will be interesting to see whether or not the different findings from Chapter 2 turn 
out to be robust.  
 
5.2.1 ‘Literature model’ 
These analyses will provide some preliminary assessments of how significant the variables 
from the literature review chapter are. I am however, aware of the likelihood that any of these 
variables can change effect and significance when I include them in a model containing a 
wider range of control variables.  
 
Since the different studies in the review chapter deal with different approaches, alongside the 
likelihood of multicollinearity, the different variables from the literature have never before 
been included in the same model. Recall from above, that some of the independent variables 
correlate too much to be included in the same regression model, including GDP-LITERACY (r = 
0,75) and POP-DISTRICT (r = 0,92). I am therefore compelled to run a number of regression 
models to see whether or not the variables from the literature are significant in a dataset that 
contains more cases over more years. Table 5 below presents the hypothesized direction of 
effect of each variable as well as the results of my estimations, displaying the “best showing” 
of each of the respective “literature” variables. It is important to note that the variables 
showed consistency regarding direction, effect and significance across the different models. 
Variables that were significant have t-statistics presented in bold. 
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Table 5: Variables from the literature, best showing27 
 
 
       Hyp. effect             b                   T-statistic 
 Variables ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
COMP     +   10.1    2.8  
PR     +    2.3    0.9  
UNICAM            +/none    1.8    0.7  
FREQ        –        –1.6   –2.1  
NUMPART         –/+   –0.3   –0.7  
DISTRICT(log)   –   –3.0   –2.3  
GDP(log)    +     6.0    2.8 
LITERACY    +    0.2    1.4 
POP(log)    –   –1.2   –1.5  
  
 
5.2.1.1 Brief discussion of findings 
 
All of the variables, except FREQ, show expected direction in its correlation with electoral 
turnout. Only four of the ten variables included in the regressions were statistically significant 
at a 95% confidence interval level.28  
 
Not surprisingly, COMP had a positive and significant effect with an expected increase, all else 
held equal, of about 10 percentage points on voter turnout, when present. Recall from the 
literature review chapter that an increase ranging from 7 percentage points (Franklin 1996) to 
13 points (Jackman 1987) are expected when compulsory voting is present so my finding is 
consistent with the findings in the literature. My finding on this variable is also highly 
significant with a t-statistic score of almost 3. As with PR, we see that an election taking place 
under PR-systems are expected to enjoy, all else held equal, an increased turnout of 2,3 
percentage points. This finding is consistent with Blais and Dobrzynska’s (1998) finding but 
the effect is not statistically significant in my regression. Unicameralism also have a positive 
effect upon turnout according to the literature (Jackman 1987), even though some report no 
correlation at all. My finding is consistent with Jackman (1987); all else held equal, an 
increase of 2 percentage points is expected with the presence of unicameralism. The effect 
however, is not statistically significant. The frequency of elections is expected to influence 
turnout in a negative direction (Norris 2004). However, my finding on this variable does not 
                                                 
27
 In every regression, MALI, GUATEMALA and CHILE I were included as dummy variables. 
 
28
 All the regressions in this paper are two-tailed 
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support this assumption. Recall that I measure FREQ as the number of years since the last 
national election. Hence, if the impact of this variable is to affect turnout in a negative 
direction, the coefficient ought to have a positive sign. To the contrary, it has a negative sign 
meaning that there will be an increasingly negative effect on turnout the more years since the 
last election. This is quite interesting. What my numbers indicate is that each year since the 
last election is, all else held equal, worth 1,6 percentage points of decreased turnout. The 
finding is highly significant, displaying a t-statistic score of 2,1. 
 
The findings in the literature regarding the NUMPART variable were mixed. My finding 
supports Jackman (1987) and Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) which report a negative 
correlation between the number of parties and turnout. The effect, which is not statistically 
significant, is worth about 1 percentage point decrease in turnout for every 3 new parties 
present in the legislature, given that all else is held equal. DISTRICT also affects turnout 
negatively, as expected from Norris (2004). The relationship is logarithmic, implying that the 
main difference is at the lower end of the district size: all else held equal, turnout decreases by 
10,8 percentage points when the district size goes from 2221 voters per member of parliament 
(Andorra), the lowest in the sample, to 86 200 voters per member of parliament (about the 
size of Italy), which represents the average. The decrease in turnout is at 2,85 percentage 
points, all else held equal, when district size goes from the average to the highest, 1,3 million 
voters per member of parliament (India). The finding is statistically significant with a t-
statistic score of 2,3. 
 
The level of economic development, measured by the GDP variable, correlates positively with 
electoral turnout. This relationship is also logarithmic which again implies that the main 
difference is at the low end of economic development: everything else being equal, turnout 
increases by 1,9 points when GDP per capita moves from 793 American dollars (Central 
African Republic), the lowest in the sample, to the average, 8350 American dollars (about the 
GDP level of Slovakia), but only 0,8 points when it moves from the average to the highest, 
21554 (Luxembourg). The effect, which is statistically significant, is very modest compared 
to the findings reported in the literature chapter above. According to Blais and Dobrzynska 
(1998), the effect is over 10 percentage point on turnout when one moves from the lowest 
level of economic development to the average level in their sample. LITERACY also correlates 
positively with turnout, as expected from the literature. For every extra percentage points in 
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increased level of literacy we see an increased level of turnout, by 0,2 percentage points. 
Again, we note that the effect, which is not statistically significant, is smaller than the effect 
one would expect from the literature findings.  
 
The last variable to be included from the literature chapter is the size of the population, 
measured through the POP variable. It correlates, as expected, negatively with turnout. As with 
DISTRICT and GDP, the relationship is logarithmic. All else held equal, turnout decreases by 
1,8 points when the population size moves from 30 500 (Lichtenstein), the lowest in the 
sample, to the average (27 127 000), but only 0,7 points when moving from the average to the 
highest, 693 331 000 (India). Yet again, the effect is more moderate than one would expect 
from the literature review. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) report a finding of 7 points on 
turnout when moving from the low to the average in population size in their sample.  
 
The robustness of the findings surveyed in Chapter 2 is strengthened as a result of the 
literature model-regressions. By running multiple regressions on my dataset I was able to test 
the variables and can determine their relative importance in explaining the cross-national 
variation in voter turnout. Every variable, except FREQ, showed expected direction in their 
correlation with voter turnout. The downside is of course the lack of significance that most of 
the variables show. I would have expected that more than four variables (COMP, FREQ, 
DISTRICT and GDP) were significant at a 95 percent confidence interval, the level at which my 
own analysis below will be conducted. Furthermore, I am struck by the modest effect each 
variable has upon turnout, given the positive impression they gave when they were discussed 
above. I will leave the discussion at that, turning next to a more thorough testing of the 
different variables. If I wish to test the different variables’ explanatory power on voter turnout 
differences, I will have to build a new model, from scratch. By including the variables from 
the literature, alongside the new variables I have created in the preparations for these 
analyses, I can thoroughly analyze and test which variables have an impact on cross-national 
variation in voter turnout. It is to this model building I now shall turn. 
 
5.3 Cross-national variation in voter turnout – building a model 
 
Based on the above I now have a good platform from which I can build a model that best 
explains cross-national variation in voter turnout between 1950 and 2000. I will begin by 
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running simple bivariate regression models between my dependent variable and the 
independent variables. 
 
5.3.1 A second preliminary assessment: Bivariate regressions 
A feeling for the data precedes any serious data analysis (Pennings et al 2006). I will therefore 
run simple bivariate regressions between the dependent variable and the different independent 
variables. The bivariate regressions will suggest which Xs are correlated with Y and if this 
correlation is in the expected direction. As I have 22 independent variables, amounting to 22 
bivariate regressions, I will only present the variables that have the highest significance in 
their correlation with turnout. A complete list of every variable’s bivariate regression is 
available in Appendix G. It is important to keep in mind that the effects of the different 
variables are likely to change when the variables are included in a multivariate regression 
model. The variables that display significant correlation with voter turnout have t-statistics 
presented in bold. 
 
Table 6: Bivariate regressions – most significant variables29 
 
 
               Coefficient  T-statistic 
Variable  _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Institutional 
COMP       9.1    2.7 
PR       5.4    2.0  
LEGEFF      7.4    2.7  
DISTRICT(log)    -2.2   -2.2   
Socio-economic 
GDP(log)      6.7    3.8  
LITERACY      0.2    2.6   
Information circulation 
RADIOS(log)      4.0    2.2   
TVS(log)      1.1    1.5   
NEWSPAPER(log)     0.8    1.4 
INFO (log)      3.0    2.1   
  
 
 
Table 6 lists the most significant variables, and shows that the variables possess the expected 
direction in its correlation with the dependent variable. Only eight out of 22 variables I ran 
bivariate regressions on are significant at a 95 % confidence interval. Of the eight variables 
that turned out to be significant, four variables stand out. Two of these are institutional, COMP 
                                                 
29
 In every regression, MALI, GUATEMALA and CHILE I were included as dummy variables. 
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and LEGEFF and two are socio-economic, namely GDP and LITERACY. The latter two variables 
correlate, as noted above, too much (r = 0,75) to be included in the same model. Each will 
have to be tested thoroughly in multivariate regressions to check whether or not they should 
be included in the final model. All of the INFORMATION-variables also did well in the 
bivariate regressions, with RADIOS and INFO standing out.  
 
 5.3.2 Building a model 
Given the results in the preliminary assessments alongside theoretical considerations 
discussed in the literature review chapter, I am compelled to include COMP (the presence of 
compulsory voting laws), in my final model. I will therefore run two-variable regressions with 
COMP, adding one independent variable at a time, starting with the most significant variables 
from the bivariate regressions, listed above. The variables that stay significant, when run 
along COMP in the two-variable regressions, will be added to the model and taken to the 
‘second round’. Again, variables will be tested against this ‘new’ final model, and the one’s 
that matter, will be added. By conducting a comprehensive statistical strategy like this, I will 
end up with the final model that explains cross-national variation in voter turnout the best.  
 
The two-variable regressions, including COMP and the other independent variables added one 
at a time, are presented below, in Table 7. The variables displaying significant correlation 
with turnout have t-statistics presented in bold. 
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Table 7: Two-variable regressions – COMP plus one ind. variable added at a time30 
 
 
Variable  T-statistic  Variable  T-statistic 
__________________________________________________________________________
          
FREQ     -1.6     RADIOS(log)    2.1  
CLOSED    0.9     TVS(log)    1.8 
PLUMAJ   -0.4   NEWSPAPER(log)   2.9  
PR     1.5   INFO(log)    2.1   
UNICAM    0.1        
LEGEFF    2.6   DEMO     -0.5  
NUMPART    0.03  RIOTS    -0.9  
DISTRICT(log)  -3.5   GOVCRIS   -0.2  
 WCI(log)   -0.2  
GDP(log)    3.6     
POP(log)   -1.5   EASTERN   –0.04  
POPDENS(log)   1.5     
LITERACY    2.4  
CAT    -1.3        
 
 
 
In the two-variable regression models, seven variables (specified alongside COMP) are 
significant, among which DISTRICT and GDP stand out. We know that GDP correlates too much 
with the other significant variables from the two-variable regressions (LITERACY, RADIOS, 
NEWSPAPER and INFO) to ever be included in the same model. DISTRICT on the other hand, 
only correlates with population size (POP) and since this variable does not seem to possess 
significant correlation with voter turnout, the exclusion of POP from future regression models 
is justifiable. I will, based on the above, include DISTRICT in the two-variable regression 
model, proceeding next to expand this to include three independent variables. The other 
independent variables will be run against this model, one at a time, to check each independent 
variables significance in explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout.  
 
The multivariate regressions, including COMP, DISTRICT and the other independent variables 
added one at time, are presented below, in Table 8. The variables displaying significant 
correlation with voter turnout have t-statistics presented in bold.  
                                                 
30
 In every regression, MALI, GUATEMALA and CHILE I were included as dummy variables. 
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Table 8: Multivariate regressions – COMP, DISTRICT plus one ind. variable added at a time31 
 
 
Variable  T-statistic  Variable  T-statistic 
__________________________________________________________________________
          
FREQ     -2.5     RADIOS(log)    1.5  
CLOSED    1.8     TVS(log)    2.0 
PLUMAJ   -0.9   NEWSPAPER(log)   3.0  
PR     1.3   INFO(log)    1.8  
UNICAM   -0.5        
LEGEFF    2.8   DEMO     1.2  
NUMPART    0.8   RIOTS     1.4  
  GOVCRIS    0.9  
GDP(log)    3.2   WCI(log)    1.3 
POPDENS(log)   2.0    
LITERACY    1.6   EASTERN   –0.4  
CAT    -1.6       
 
 
Going from bivariate to multivariate regression models resulted in five of the variables 
changing direction in their correlation with voter turnout. UNICAM went from a positive to a 
negative correlation while all of the Activism-variables changed correlation in the opposite 
direction, from negative to positive. As none of those variables are even close to possessing 
any significance in their correlation with turnout I will not address the issue of direction 
change. A couple of variables did, however, change the significance of their correlation with 
voter turnout. RADIOS lost its significance while population density (POPDENS) appears to 
possess significance in its correlation with voter turnout.  
 
As for the three-variable regression models above, we see that GDP again stands out in its 
significant correlation with voter turnout in the multivariate regression model. NEWSPAPER 
also displays a highly significant correlation. Including both GDP and NEWSPAPER in the same 
model is impossible due to multicollinearity. Hence, I will have to make a choice regarding 
which of the two variables I want to include in my final model.  Including GDP has 
fundamental implications for which other variables to include in the model (see above). 
 
Given the specification constraints I face, I choose to include NEWSPAPER instead of GDP, as 
the former captures a specific causal phenomenon, while the latter is a broader, less specific 
gauge of many other phenomena related to income.  Due to collinearity issues, including 
                                                 
31
 In every regression, MALI, GUATEMALA and CHILE I were included as dummy variables. 
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NEWSPAPER rules out both LITERACY (r = 0,84) and GDP (r = 0,82) from the next regression 
models. Other variables that correlate significantly with turnout include, LEGEFF, POPDENS 
and TVS. One of these variables will be included in the model for the next regressions, 
alongside NEWSPAPER. As none of the socio-economic variables have yet been specified in 
my models, I will include POPDENS, even though LEGEFF displays a higher significance in its 
correlation with turnout. 
 
Based on the above, I will include NEWSPAPER and POPDENS in an expanded regression 
model and run it against the other variables one at a time. The results are presented below, in 
Table 9. The variables displaying significant correlation with voter turnout have t-statistics 
presented in bold.  
 
Table 9: Core of final model – COMP, DISTRICT, NEWSPAPER and POPDENSITY plus one ind. 
variable added at a time32 
 
 
Variable  T-statistic  Variable  T-statistic 
__________________________________________________________________________
          
FREQ     -1.6     DEMO      0.8  
CLOSED    1.5     RIOTS     1.2 
PLUMAJ    0.1   GOVCRIS    1.2  
PR     0.2   WCI(log)    1.4 
UNICAM    0.6        
LEGEFF    1.6   EASTERN   –0.5 
NUMPART    1.1     
   
CAT    -2.1    
 
 
The inclusion of more variables into the regression model has again led some variables to 
change the direction of their correlation with voter turnout. UNICAM is again correlating 
positively with turnout but as for the other regression model, the correlation does not display 
significance. Recall from the literature review chapter above, that there were mixed findings 
regarding the correlation of unicameralism. As Jackman (1987), Jackman and Miller (1995), 
and Fornos et al. (2004) report a positive effect, Blais and Carty (1990), Black (1991), 
Radcliff and Davis (2000), and Perez-Linan (2001) indicate no effect. Based on the regression 
models so far, with unicameralism going back and from in the direction of its correlation, I 
                                                 
32
 In every regression, MALI, GUATEMALA and CHILE I were included as dummy variables. 
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support the conclusion of the latter studies, namely the one indicating that unicameralism has 
no effect upon turnout.  
 
Only CAT, the dummy variable indicating a catholic majority, is significant. CLOSED and 
LEGEFF have also displayed a relatively high significance through the model building 
procedure, with LEGEFF standing out. Based on this have I decided to include both CAT and 
LEGEFF in the multivariate model, and see if their significance is robust. If their significance is 
robust when included in the same model, they will be added to the final model. 
 
The significance of CAT is robust, when included in the multivariate regression model, 
displaying a t-statistic score of over two. I will thus add CAT to my final model. I 
subsequently added LEGEFF and NUMPART to this expanded five-variable model (COMP, 
DISTRICT, POPDENS, CAT and NEWSPAPER) and they performed well, displaying t-statistics of 
between 1,3 and 1,5. As a result of this, they will both be added to the final model, which now 
is complete. The final model for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout between 
1950 and 2000 is presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Determinants of cross-national variation in voter turnout – 1950-2000  
 
 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression               | 
| Model was estimated May 07, 2007 at 05:04:16PM     | 
| LHS=TURNOUTC Mean                 =   68.05178     | 
|              Standard deviation   =   16.06015     | 
| WTS=none     Number of observs.   =         80     | 
| Model size   Parameters           =         11     | 
|              Degrees of freedom   =         69     | 
| Residuals    Sum of squares       =   9195.295     | 
|              Standard error of e  =   11.54405     | 
| Fit          R-squared            =   .5487270     | 
|              Adjusted R-squared   =   .4833251     | 
| Model test   F[ 10,    69] (prob) =   8.39 (.0000) | 
| Autocorrel   Durbin-Watson Stat.  =  1.7863293     | 
|              Rho = cor[e,e(-1)]   =   .1068353     | 
| White heteroscedasticity robust covariance matrix  | 
| Br./Pagan LM Chi-sq [ 10]  (prob) =   3.35 (.9721) | 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant       53.8182012     8.70476631     6.183   .0000 
 COMP           13.1800157     3.59715654     3.664   .0005     .17500000 
 DISTRICT(log) -4.05827247     1.13410168    -3.578   .0006    3.84761389 
 LEGEFF         5.04759720     2.71193734     1.861   .0670     .55000000 
 NUMPART         .57270107      .33621105     1.703   .0930    3.87067172 
 POPDENS(log)   1.61481780      .71058105     2.273   .0262    7.14785371 
 CAT           -6.09368434     2.66228897    -2.289   .0252     .45000000 
 NEWSPAPER(log) 2.16804345     1.12758584     1.923   .0586    6.90068298 
 CHILE         -39.4494735     3.08059846   -12.806   .0000     .01250000 
 GUATE         -28.0832260     2.93459618    -9.570   .0000     .01250000 
 MALI          -29.4654792     5.95151316    -4.951   .0000     .01250000 
 
 
 
5.3.2.1 Interpretations of findings 
 
Four institutional, two socio-economic and one information variable, alongside three country 
dummies, constitute the model that best explains cross-national variation in voter turnout 
between 1950 and 2000. Not surprisingly, compulsory voting laws are significant for 
explaining voter turnout, yielding an effect of over 13 percentage points, all else held equal. 
The effect is highly significant, with a t-statistic of 3,6. My finding supports the study of 
Jackman (1987), which also estimates an increase of 13 points in turnout due to compulsory 
voting laws. Why does COMP foster turnout? An obvious reason for this is that under such 
systems, the electors are likely to be punished if they do not vote at elections. I say likely, 
because the punishment for not complying with these laws varies between the different 
countries. Some countries have very strict implementation of the laws, ranging from fines to 
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imprisonment,33 while in other countries the implementation is enforced more loosely. Also, it 
has often been overlooked that fines and sanctions are just one aspect of compulsory voting: 
systems that employ it usually reciprocate by reducing the cost of turnout for its citizens, via 
weekend voting, simple registration procedures, and the creation of a centralized, professional 
bureaucracy concerned with all aspects of election administration. In short, if a country 
imposes compulsory voting on its citizens, it follows through in every aspect, not just the one 
dealing with fines and sanctions.  
 
The next institutional variable to have an impact on voter turnout is the district size measured 
by the DISTRICT-variable. The relationship is logarithmic, implying that the main difference is 
at the low end of district size: all else held equal, turnout decreases by over 14 percentage 
points when the district size goes from 2221 voters per member of parliament (Andorra), the 
lowest in the sample, to 86200 voters per member of parliament (about the size of Italy), 
which represents the average. The decrease in turnout is only 3,8 percentage points, all else 
held equal, when the district size goes from the average to the highest, 1,3 million voters per 
member of parliament (India). The effect, which is formidable, is highly significant with a t-
statistic score of 3,5. My finding supports the study of Norris (2004), even though her 
DISTRICT-variable did not turn out significant. Why would the size of the district affect 
turnout? As noted in the measurement chapter, the smaller the number of electors for member 
of parliament, the greater the potential for constituency service and for elected representatives 
to maintain communications with local constituents.  If the voter “knows” the representative, 
or party in PR-system, the higher the incentive to turnout based on any “personal” vote.  
 
The relative power of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive power, measured by LEGEFF, also 
has an impact on turnout. An election for a legislature that possesses significant governmental 
autonomy, including, typically, substantial authority in regard to taxation and disbursement, 
and the power to override executive vetoes of legislation can expect a turnout that is five 
percentage points higher, all else held equal, than an election taking place in a situation in 
which the effective executives power substantially outweighs, but does not completely 
dominate that of the legislature. The effect is highly significant, yielding a t-statistic score of 
almost 1,9. The more powerful the body that is being elected, especially on important issues 
                                                 
33
  In cases where the non-voter does not pay the fines after being reminded or after refusing several times, the 
courts may impose a prison sentence. This is usually classified as imprisonment for failure to pay the fine, not 
for failure to vote. Examples include Australia and Cyprus. 
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like taxation and disbursement, the higher the turnout.  
 
The last institutional variable to be included in my final model is effective number of parties, 
NUMPART. It correlates positively with turnout, yielding an effect of about, all else held equal, 
one point for every two parties added to the legislature. My finding supports Norris (2004) but 
contradicts almost all other empirical research on this variable, which posts a negative 
correlation between the number of parties and turnout (Jackman 1987, Blais and Carty 1990, 
Jackman and Miller 1995, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Radcliff and Davis 2000, Kostadinova 
2003). That is quite interesting. It appears to be the case, that the higher the number of parties, 
the richer the choice offered the electorate which in turn leads to a higher turnout. The notion 
that the greater the number of parties, the more difficult it can be for voters to make up their 
minds (Blais and Dobrzynska) and the greater the number of parties, the less likely it is that 
there will be a one-party government which in turn will depress turnout (Jackman 1987 and 
Blais and Carty 1990) seems to be farfetched. In this regard it is important to note that 
NUMPART has displayed a positive correlation with voter turnout in every regression model it 
has been included in, except for the ‘literature model’ above. The effect of NUMPART on my 
data also displays a relatively high significance with t-statistic score of over 1,7. 
 
Population density correlates positively with voter turnout because the more densely 
populated the voters are, the easier they are to mobilize for the different political parties. The 
relationship is logarithmic, implying that the main difference is at the low end of population 
density: all else held equal, turnout increases by about 1,5 points when density goes from 45 
inhabitants per square mile (Australia), the lowest in the sample to the average (3278 
inhabitants per square mile) but only 0,6 points when going from the average to the most 
densely populated country, at 28 647 inhabitants per square mile (Malta). Population density 
displays a fairly modest effect on voter turnout. One of the reasons for this could perhaps be 
due to cases like Australia, which enjoy a highly urbanized population (91% as of 2004)34 but 
still come out as a low-density country due to the size of the country relative to size of 
population. My point is: Australia is densely populated where people actually live, along the 
coast to the east, southeast and southwest, it is just that when one take the entire country into 
consideration, it is not densely populated at all. The effect of POPDENS, however moderate, is 
highly significant, with a t-statistic score of almost 2,3. 
                                                 
34
 World in Figures (2004) The Economist. 
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CAT, indicating a catholic population of over 50%, correlates negatively with voter turnout. I 
included this variable because I wanted to see if turnout could be predicted along religious 
lines, and it appears it can. The effect upon turnout, by a predominantly catholic electorate, is 
quite astonishing. An election taking place in a ‘catholic country’, all else held equal, can 
expect a decreased turnout of about six percentage points. The effect is also highly 
statistically significant, with a t-statistic score of over 2,2. Why catholics vote at a lesser rate 
than others is not clear. Maybe catholics are more difficult to mobilize for the democratic 
‘institution’ because of their commitments to other ‘institutions’. A more plausible 
explanation for the lower turnout observed in catholic countries could be due to a spurious 
correlation. The ‘catholic’ democracies in my sample, with the majority coming from Latin 
America, have an authoritarian past. Turnout could be depressed in these countries for the 
same reasons as why it is depressed in the former Soviet satellites, measured through my 
EASTERN-variable. People that have experienced authoritarian rule and one-party government 
are characterised by a low level of political participation (Almond and Verba: 1963). 
Practically all of my ‘catholic’ democracies have such a political legacy which in turn could 
explain the depressed turnout we observe in such countries.  
 
The last variable to be included in my final model deals with the flow of information in 
society, namely NEWSPAPER. The correlation is positive and logarithmic: all else held equal, 
turnout increases by 6,6 points when the newspaper circulation per capita goes from 0,001 
newspaper per inhabitant (Central African Republic), the lowest in the sample, to the average 
(0,17 newspaper per inhabitant) but only 0,5 points going from the average to the highest (0,5 
newspaper per inhabitant), the level of which Czechoslovakia was at between 1990 and 1993. 
As we see, the effect at the low end of newspaper circulation increase is quite formidable. The 
flow of information, measured through the distribution of newspapers, is important for the 
political mobilisation of the electorate, as information and political propaganda is more easily 
distributed by the political parties. NEWSPAPER is also statistically significant with a t-statistic 
score of over 1,9.  
 
As for the dummy variables included to control for the three outliers, the effect is striking: all 
else held equal, an election taking place in Chile between 1950 and 1962 can expect a 
decrease in turnout of almost 40 percentage points. For Guatemala and Mali the numbers are 
28 and 29 respectively.  
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5.3.2.2 Other interpretations 
 
When building my final model for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout I had to 
exclude a number of variables that did not ‘fit’ the model. Some of these variables were 
thought to be important and their exclusion merits attention. I start out with the two dummy 
variables dealing with electoral system, PR and PLUMAJ, which based on the literature review 
chapter above, were expected to yield high significance in their correlation with turnout. Both 
PR and PLUMAJ show the expected directions in their correlation with voter turnout. An 
election taking place under PR-systems, including Mixed Member Proportional, Single 
Transferable Vote and List PR, can expect an increase of about three percentage points, all 
else held equal. The finding, however, is not statistically significant. Elections taking place 
under Majority-Plurality-systems, including First Past The Post, Block Vote, Alternative 
Vote35 and Two Round System, can expect a decrease of about 2,1 percentage points, all else 
held equal. As with PR, PLUMAJ is not statistically significant either. Why does not electoral 
system seem to matter? An answer to this question could lie in my basis for sample selection. 
Recall from the literature review chapter, that the studies that reported a positive and 
significant correlation between electoral system and turnout based their studies on established 
democracies.36 Research dealing with Latin America reports no association between electoral 
system and turnout, and an analysis that incorporates both established and non-established 
democracies (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998) report a weak effect which yields a relatively low 
significance (t = 1,6). Hence, the reason why my electoral system variables are not significant 
must be found in my sample selection criteria (ACLP), which allows me to include 90 
countries (96 cases) of which many are not established and many are found in Latin America.  
 
The frequency of elections can not explain cross-national variation in electoral turnout, 
according to my regression models. The reason for this could be the conservative estimate I 
employ when measuring FREQ. As I calculate the electoral frequency by taking into account 
national level elections (parliamentary and presidential), my measurement does not count 
many other types of contests held during the time period under examination, including 
national and local referenda and initiatives, primaries, or European, regional/state, and local 
contests which in and of themselves could result in voter fatigue. We know that among 
western democracies, the cases of Switzerland and the United States are commonly cited as 
                                                 
35
 Also known as Instant runoff voting (IRV). 
36
 Sample selection of each study is available in Appendix D. 
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exemplifying nations with frequent elections for office at multiple levels as well as with 
widespread use of referenda and initiatives, and, at the same time are characterized by 
exceptionally low voter participation.  
 
The inclusion of NEWSPAPER had collinearity implications, which forced me to drop GDP 
from my final regression models. By running an additional version of the final model, 
replacing NEWSPAPER with GDP, I can check GDP’s impact (logarithmic) on voter turnout: all 
else held equal, turnout increases by 1,6 points when GDP per capita goes from 793 American 
dollars (Central African Republic), the lowest in the sample, to the average (8350) but only 
0,6 points when it goes from the average to 21 554 American dollars (Luxembourg). The 
effect is statistically significant, yielding a t-statistic score of almost two. 
 
As for the variables dealing with political activism, they all correlated positively with turnout 
in the final multivariate regression models. Their correlations, however, were not statistically 
significant. My political legacy variable (EASTERN), correlated, as hypothesized, negatively 
with turnout but the correlation did not prove significant in any of my multivariate regression 
models.37  
 
5.3.3 Methodological considerations 
 
As noted in the methodology chapter, regression analysis rests on certain assumptions. Two of 
these assumptions, the absence of heteroscedasticity and the absence of perfect 
multicollinearity, are of particular importance, and I will address them here. The other 
assumptions are dealt with in Appendix C. 
 
5.3.3.1 Heteroscedasticity 
Violating the assumption of the homoscedasticity is serious. Homoscedasticity and 
heteroscedasticity are antonyms that refer to the correspondence of the spread of residuals 
with the independent variable. The residuals are homescedastic if they have a constant 
variance and heteroscedastic if their variance is variable. Heteroscedasticity impairs the 
efficiency of OLS estimators of the regression coefficients, but these coefficients are still 
                                                 
37
 Out of curiosity I ran F-tests to decide which of the two categories, institutions or socio economic variables, 
was the better predictor of cross-national variation in voter turnout. Institutional variables came out as the better 
predictor. Multicollinearity issues as well as limitations in scope and time of this thesis forced me to drop the 
issue from further inquiries.   
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unbiased (Pennings et al. 2006: 161). By saving the unstandardized residuals for the final 
model, and plotting them against each individual explanatory variable I visually checked the 
pattern to see whether or not heteroscedasticity could pose a problem. I found none. 
Nonetheless, I run my models implementing White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Variances 
and Standard Errors, also known as robust standard errors.  Since White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators of the variances are available in established 
regression packages, it is recommended that the reader report them. As noted in Gujarati 
(2003): 
 
Generally speaking, it is probably a good idea to use the WHITE option routinely, 
perhaps comparing the output with regular OLS output as a check to see whether 
heteroscedasticity is a serious problem in a particular set of data  (418). 
 
I ran my final model both with and without the White estimator and by comparing the output 
of the two models I can safely conclude that heteroscedasticity poses no problem in my 
model.  
 
5.3.3.2 Multicollinearity  
One of the assumptions of the ordinary least squares estimation method is the absence of 
perfect multicollinearity, which is the phenomenon of highly correlated independent variables. 
If ones models suffer from perfect multicollinearity, it is impossible to arrive at a unique 
solution for the least squares parameter estimates. Even though X is actually associated with 
Y in the population, our estimated regression coefficient may be so unstable that it fails to 
achieve statistical significance. Our parameter estimates also become unreliable, as the 
magnitude of the partial slope estimate varies considerably from sample to sample. For a 
diagnosis of multicollinearity we must look directly at the correlations between the 
independent variables. The correlation matrix provided useful preliminary checks for 
multicollinearity as I could examine the bivariate correlations. While suggestive, this 
approach is not satisfactory, for it fails to take into account the relationship of one 
independent variable with all the other independent variables. It is possible that one of the 
independent variables is a perfect linear combination of the other variables, even though the 
bivariate correlations were low. Hence, we need a better measure of multicollinearity. A 
widespread measure is referred to as the tolerance. The tolerance is defined as one minus the 
explained variance in one independent variable j due to the other independent variables in the 
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regression equation (1- 2jR ). In other words, the procedure is to regress each respective 
independent variable on the full set of other independent variables.  In research based on data 
from official statistical agencies, as my data are, tolerance between 0,01 and 0,25 may still be 
acceptable, since these data are not prone to measurement errors (Pennings et al 2006). In 
general we can say that the closer the tolerance is to one, the greater the evidence that Xj 
(regressor under inspection) is not collinear with the other regressors. By running the 
tolerance test on my model the tolerance scores presented in Table 11 were obtained: 
 
Table 11: Tolerance test – general model 
_____________________________ 
 
Variable  Tolerance 
 
COMP             0.78 
LEGEFF         0.60 
DISTRICT        0.99 
NUMPART        0.88 
POPDENS        0.99 
CAT         0.80 
NEWSPAPER        0.54 
 
MALI         0.88  
GUATEMALA        0.99 
CHILE I         0.99 
_____________________________ 
 
I can safely conclude, on the basis of the tolerance tests conducted, that multicollinearity 
poses no problem in my model.  
 
 5.3.3.3 How good is my model? 
How good is my final model for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout? The 
multiple coefficient of determination, 2R , could tell us this. An important property of 2R  is, 
however, that it is a nondecreasing function of the number of explanatory variables; as the 
number of variables goes up, 2R  almost invariably increases and never decreases (Gujarati 
2003: 217). I therefore rely on the adjusted 2R , denoted by . The term adjusted means 
adjusted for the df (degrees of freedom) associated with the sums of squares entering into the 
regression. The  does not give an overly optimistic picture of the fit of the regression, 
particularly when the number of explanatory variables is not very small compared with the 
number of observations. My model explains close to 50% of the variation in voter turnout 
observed cross-nationally. Given the wide range of explanatory variables I have included in 
this thesis, the explained variance may appear to be low. Remember, however, that in a 
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regression analysis, our objective is not to get an as high an  as possible; rather, it should be 
to obtain dependable estimates of the true population regression coefficients and draw 
statistical interferences about them. As Gujarati (2003) notes: “the researcher should be more 
concerned about the logical and theoretical relevance of the explanatory variables to the 
dependent variable and their statistical significance” (222). If a model’s  is low, it does not 
mean the model is necessarily bad.38 Based on the logical and theoretical relevance of the 
explanatory variables included in my final model, I conclude that my model is quite solid and 
insightful for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout between 1950 and 2000.  
 
 
I turn now to a time-specific analysis of cross-national variation in voter turnout. By 
examining shorter time periods (decades) and comparing the findings across time, I can check 
whether or not the determinants behind cross-national variation in voter turnout varies or stay 
the same across time. 
                                                 
38
 See Gujarati (2003: chapter 7) for a discussion on the topic and Lieberson (1985) for a critique of methods that 
use proportion of explained variation as a fundamental criterion for evaluating models. 
 72 
VI. Time-specific empirical patterns 
 
In the previous chapter, the regression analyses were conducted on the basis of a dataset that 
covered the entire time period, from 1950-2000, and provided a general model for explaining 
cross-national differences in voter turnout, including the following variables: COMP, DISTRICT, 
LEGEFF, NUMPART, POPDEN, CAT, and NEWSPAPER. 
 
In this chapter I am interested in checking for time-specific variance in the explanatory 
variables. Are the variables from the general model robust in their effects across shorter time 
periods? Did the same variables matter in the 1950s as in the 1990s? Are some variables 
significant across each decade? Questions like this motivate the following analyses. In this 
chapter I will therefore utilize the Decade Dataset I created in the preparations for this thesis. 
It allows me to run regressions across the independent variables for each decade. By running 
regressions that are sensitive to time, I am able to identify time-specific patterns in the 
explanatory variables behind the cross-national variation in voter turnout.  
 
My research strategy in this chapter will differ from the one utilized in chapter 5, as I will not, 
except for the 1990s, build a final model for each decade. I will start out, as I did for the 
general model, by running simple bivariate regressions for each decade and present their 
findings. After a brief discussion of the bivariate findings I will go on to include the 
significant variables from the bivariate regressions in multivariate regression models. The 
multivariate regression models will constitute the basis from which the discussion of the 
different variables can be conducted. As many of the variables correlate too much to ever be 
included in the same model I will be compelled to run a great number of multivariate 
regression models. (Every model that includes a finding presented in this paper was checked 
for the presence of heteroscedasticity39 and multicollinearity.) 
 
6.1 Preliminary assessment  
As for the general model above, I wish to run some simple bivariate regression models to get 
a feel for the data. The bivariate regressions will suggest which Xs are correlated with Y 
across each decade and whether this correlation is in the expected direction. 
                                                 
39
 As with the analyses above, the White estimator was included in every model. 
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Before we turn to the bivariate regression analyses a note on outliers is in place. 
 
6.1.1 Outliers 
The descriptive statistics tables for each decade are available in Appendix F. As for the 
general model above, I visually checked the partial regression plots on the dependent variable 
to see if there were any outliers across the decades. A number of cases were identified as 
outliers and will accordingly be included in every regression model as dummy variables so 
that they are controlled for. The outliers I identified are: 
 
1950s: Brazil, Chile and Ecuador 1960s: Guatemala and Panama  1970s: Guatemala 
1980s: no outlier identified  1990s: Mali 
 
 6.1.2 Bivariate regressions 
Table 12 presents the t-statistic score for each independent variable when included in bivariate 
regression models across each decade. Also included, for the purpose of comparison, is the 
score for each variable in the bivariate regressions conducted when the general model was 
built above (indicated by GM). The variables that display significance in their correlation 
have t-statistics presented in bold. 
 74 
Table 12: Bivariate regressions – t-statistic score for each variable 
 
Decade 
    _________________________________ 
  
       50s             60s          70s             80s      90s  GM 
Variable               _____________________________________________________________ 
 
COMP          0.7     0.6     3.6     2.4     3.9     2.7 
CLOSED        2.2     1.1     1.0    0.9    -0.2     1.0 
FREQ         -2.1     0.8    -0.3   -0.1    -0.7   -1.3 
PLUMAJ       -0.4    -0.8    -2.3    -1.4    -1.1    -1.0 
PR            1.1     1.9    3.0    1.6     2.1     2.0 
UNICAM       -0.1     1.1     1.3     2.4    -0.06    -0.3 
DISTRICT(log)-0.3    -2.7    -1.6   -1.9    -3.4    -2.2 
LEGEFF        2.0     1.8     1.5    2.8     2.2     2.7 
NUMPART       0.7    -0.7     1.3    0.5    0.2    -0.1 
 
GDP(log)      2.1      2.9     2.1    2.4     2.8     3.8 
LITERACY      2.7     2.8     2.4    2.4     2.3     2.6 
CAT          -0.5    -1.0     0.8   -0.06    0.4    -0.3 
POP(log)     -0.1    -1.2    -0.3   -1.2    -1.6    -1.0 
POPDEN(log)   0.1     0.6  -0.01   0.02    0.8    1.0 
HDI            -    -     -      2.6     3.1      - 
GINI           -    -    -    -  -2.2      - 
 
RADIOS(log)   2.1     2.7     1.7    1.8     1.6     2.2 
NEWSPAPER(log)2.8     3.0    2.6    2.5     2.2     1.4 
TVS(log)       -     -    2.6    2.3     1.5     1.5 
INFO(log)     2.3     2.8     2.8    2.4     1.9     2.1 
  
DEMO       -0.1    -3.0    -0.8    -0.2    -0.3    -0.6 
RIOTS       0.1    -4.5    -0.1   -0.8    -0.03   -1.0 
GOVCRIS      1.4    -0.06    0.5    1.6    -0.1    0.1 
WCI(log)   0.3  -1.2   1.3  -1.0  -0.6   0.2 
   
Note: Outliers for each decade was included as dummy variable in each bivariate regression. Outliers include the 
following countries for each decade: 50s: Brazil, Chile and Ecuador; 60s: Guatemala and Panama; 70s: 
Guatemala; 90s: Mali. 
 
 
6.1.3 Brief discussion of bivariate results across decades 
 
Before I turn to a more detailed interpretation of the findings for each decade, which also 
include multivariate regression models, a general discussion of the patterns (from Table 12) 
across the decades are in place.  
 
None of the institutional variables are significant across the entire time period. Compulsory 
voting laws (COMP) are not significant in the 1950s and 1960s but from 1970 and onwards the 
variable displays a strong significance in its correlation with voter turnout. As for the electoral 
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systems, both PLUMAJ and PR show the expected direction in their correlation with voter 
turnout across every decade. The effect, however, is only significant for the 1970s for PLUMAJ 
and for the 1970s and 1990s for PR. DISTRICT is, from the 1960s and onwards, highly 
significant and the effect, which is negative, is of expected direction across the decades. 
LEGEFF shows strong significance in its positive correlation with voter turnouts, but the t-
statistic score is greater than two only for the 1950s and 1980s.  
 
Two socio-economic variables are significant across all five decades, namely GDP and 
LITERACY. HDI and GINI are also significant but numbers on these variables are limited, the 
former only covering the last two decades, the latter only the last decade. The circulation of 
newspaper’s (NEWSPAPER) correlation with turnout, which is positive, is also strongly 
significant across all decades. The other information circulation variables (RADIOS, TVS and 
INFO) are also highly significant across all decades but NEWSPAPER stands out. Interestingly 
enough, RADIOS seem to play a more dominant role in the 1950s and 60s, when the 
competition from television was not present. In the 1970s and 80s we observe that TVS is 
significant, RADIOS not, but TVS’s significance eventually fades in the 1990s. As of variables 
dealing with mobilization and activism, we see that DEMO and RIOTS are the only variables 
that display significance and only for the 1960s. That is interesting and I will address those 
particular findings when discussing the 1960s model. 
 
6.2 Decade models 
 
The variables were also included in multivariate regression models across each decade. I will 
now present the findings and I begin with the first decade in the analysis, namely the 1950s. 
 
6.2.1 The 1950s40 
A number of variables are significant in the bivariate regressions for the 1950s. As for 
institutional variables they are: CLOSED (closed or open party list), FREQ (frequency of 
elections) and LEGEFF (legislative effectiveness). What is striking about the CLOSED variable, 
given that it is significant, is the direction of its correlation with voter turnout. Where closed 
lists are in practise, voters can not express preferences for candidates within the list. As this 
limits the influence on the order in which a party's candidates are elected and hence gives the 
                                                 
40
 Brazil, Chile and Ecuador were, due to relative low turnout, identified as outliers and included in every 
regression model as dummy variables. N = 30. 
 76 
voter less of a choice as of preferences I expected a lower turnout where closed lists are in 
practise. The opposite is in fact the case. When included in multivariate regression models, 
CLOSED is still significant and worth about eight percentage points on voter turnout. Why 
CLOSED is positively correlated with voter turnout is not easy to explain. It could perhaps be 
the case that the ballot forms used in closed list-systems are easier to interpret and use for the 
voter which in turn will lead to higher turnout. A more plausible explanation is perhaps that 
there are factors associated with closed list-system which increase turnout and that my 
measurement is not finely grained enough to capture what I am interested in measuring, 
namely the lack of preference expression for the voter on the ballot form. Since CLOSED is 
only significant for the 1950s, its significance could also be due to the nature of the particular 
data for that decade. 
 
FREQ is also significant in the bivariate regression and this variable too has an unexpected 
direction in its correlation indicating an increased turnout as frequency goes up. I expected the 
opposite effect of frequency, associating it with increased costs for the elector which in turn 
could lead to voter fatigue. I measure frequency as number of years since last national level 
election. It is important to note that my estimate is likely to represent a conservative estimate, 
as it does not count many other types of contest held during the time period under 
examination, including national and local referenda and initiatives, primaries, or European, 
regional/state, and local contest. If the frequency of election at national level is not positively 
correlated with elections at lower level, referenda and such, I have no reason to believe that 
FREQ should increase turnout, but it does, according to the multivariate regression model for 
the 1950s: all else held equal, turnout decreases by three points for every extra year since last 
national election. As with CLOSED, FREQ is only significant for the 1950s, making me wonder 
if it is the particular data at hand for that decade that produce such interesting results.  
 
The relative power of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive power (LEGEFF) is also significant 
for the 1950s. It loses, however, its significance when included in multivariate regression 
models. All the other institutional variables show, when included in bivariate regressions, 
expected direction in their correlation with voter turnout, but none are significant.  
 
Not even compulsory voting, COMP, is significant in the 1950s. It may come from the fact that 
only eight cases had mandatory voting laws in the 1950s and two of these, Brazil and Costa 
Rica, had poor turnout at 31,8% and 49,8% respectively.   
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As for socio-economic variables, two are highly significant, namely GDP and LITERACY. GDP 
is also highly significant when included in multivariate regression models with a coefficient 
of about six. The relationship is logarithmic, implying that the main difference is at the low 
end of economic development: everything else being equal, turnout increases by 2,5 points 
when GDP per capita moves from 806 American dollars (India), the lowest in the sample, to 
the average, 6609 American dollars, but only by 1,4 points when it moves from the average to 
the highest, 13551 American dollars (Switzerland). LITERACY is also highly significant in 
multivariate regression models, with an effect of about 0,3 percentage points increase in 
turnout for every point increase in literacy. None of the other socio-economic variables are 
significant for 1950s bivariate and multivariate regression models.  
 
All of the variables dealing with the flow of information are significant, including RADIOS, 
NEWSPAPER and INFO. When included in different multivariate regression models, it is the 
circulation of newspaper per capita (NEWSPAPER) that yields the highest significance. The 
correlation is positive and has the expected effect, which is logarithmic: all else held equal, 
4,5 points increase in turnout when the circulation of newspaper increases from the level of 
India (0,008 papers per inhabitants), the lowest in the sample, to the average (0,25 papers per 
inhabitants) but only one point when it moves from the average to the highest level, which is 
the level of United Kingdom (0,5 papers per inhabitants). 
 
None of variables dealing with mobilization and activism were significant for the 1950s 
regression models. 
 
We thus observe the following overall tendency: socio-economic variables are important for 
explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout for the 1950s. The level of economic 
development and literacy are the two most significant variables. Important are also the 
variables dealing with the flow of information in society, with the distribution of newspapers 
standing out. Institutional characteristics do not seem to matter much, not even compulsory 
voting.  None of the variables in the activism bloc matter either for explaining cross-national 
variation in voter turnout for the 1950s. 
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6.2.2 The 1960s41 
The bivariate regressions for the 1960s also produced some interesting results. None of the 
institutional variables, except the district size (DISTRICT), were significant even though PR 
came close. DISTRICT correlates negatively with voter turnout, as expected, but the 
significance from the bivariate regression is not robust in the multivariate regression models. 
PR, when included in multivariate regression models, yields an effect of about four points on 
voter turnout, but the effect is not statistically significant. COMP was not significant for the 
1960s either. Ten countries had mandatory voting laws in the 1960s, including two low-
turnout countries, Brazil at 36,9% and Chile at 42,6% and one with relatively low turnout 
given the laws at hand, Luxembourg at 70%, which could perhaps explain why COMP did not 
turn out as significant. 
 
As for the 1950s, GDP and LITERACY are statistically significant for the 1960s when included 
both in the bivariate and multivariate regression models. The latter analyses tell us that the 
effect of GDP is slightly stronger in the 1960s than it was in the previous decade: all else held 
equal, turnout increases by 2,6 points when GDP per capita moves from 959 American dollars 
(Sri Lanka), the lowest in the sample, to the average 7898 American dollars  and by 1,2 points 
when it moves from the average to the highest, 17807 American dollars, which is the level of 
Switzerland. The effect of literacy is also a bit stronger in the 1960s compared to the 1950s: 
all else held equal, turnout increases by 0,5 points when literacy increases by one point.  
 
All of the variables dealing with the flow of information are significant for the 1960s, 
including RADIOS, NEWSPAPER and INFO. When included in different multivariate regression 
models, RADIO and NEWSPAPER stand out as the most significant, with RADIO yielding the 
largest effect: all else held equal, turnout increases by 4,8 points when the number of radios 
goes from the level of India (at 0,001 radios per inhabitant), the lowest in the sample, to the 
average (0,3 radios per inhabitants) and 1,6 points when it moves from the average to the 
highest, 1,1 radios per inhabitants, which is the level of the US.  
 
What is particularly interesting regarding the 1960s regression models is the significance 
displayed by two of the Activism-variables, namely DEMO (number of peaceful 
demonstrations a year) and RIOTS (number of riots a year). They are both highly significant in 
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 Guatemala and Panama were, due to relative low turnout, identified as outliers and included in every 
regression model as dummy variables.  N=39. 
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the bivariate regressions, only DEMO for the multivariate regression models. Recall from the 
measurement chapter that DEMO was included to measure the level of peaceful political 
mobilisation.  As I did not have a clear cut expectation regarding the direction of the 
correlation between DEMO and turnout, I hypothesised both a positive and negative 
correlation between turnout and the number of peaceful demonstrations. For the 1960s this 
correlation is negative, yielding an effect of about 2,5 points decrease in turnout for every 
peaceful demonstration, all else held equal. The reason for this could be that people see 
demonstrations as a more powerful tool in influencing governmental policies than that of 
going through the polls. When the voter does not get what he or her wants by going through 
the polls, he utilizes different means to achieve his or her political ends.  
 
We thus observe the following tendencies:  socio-economic variables were important in the 
1960s, just as they were in the previous decade, and again is it the level of economic 
development and the level of literacy that stand out. The effect they display is also slightly 
higher in the 1960s compared to the 1950s. The information-variables are also important for 
the 1960s, only this time it is the number of radios that stand out. As for the activism-
variables, we see that the number of demonstrations play a significant role in explaining 
cross-national variation in voter turnout. Again, institutional variables seem to play no role in 
determining turnout.  
 
6.2.3 The 1970s42 
A number of institutional variables are significant in the bivariate regressions for the 1970s, 
including COMP, PR, and PLUMAJ. When included in multivariate regression models, COMP is 
highly significant, yielding an effect of about nine points on voter turnout, all else held equal. 
As for electoral system variables, both PLUMAJ and PR are significant in the bivariate 
regression. In the multivariate regression models however, only PR’s significance is robust, 
yielding an effect upon turnout of about 8,6 points, all else held equal. The relative 
importance of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive power (LEGEFF) yields an effect of, all 
else held equal, about ten points. That is quite a formidable effect. The finding is, however, 
not statistically significant with a t-stat of 1,6. The size of the district correlates, as expected, 
negatively with turnout, yielding an effect (logarithmic), of about four points when moving 
from the smallest district (Iceland) to the average district, but only two points going from the 
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 Guatemala was, due to relative low turnout, identified as an outlier and included in every regression model as 
a dummy variable. N=43. 
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average to the largest district (India). The effect, however, is not statistically significant with a 
t-stat of 1,5. UNICAM, meaning that the legislature consists of only one house, is significant (t 
= 2,5) when included in the multivariate regression models, yielding an effect of about five 
points on turnout, all else held equal.  
 
GDP and LITERACY were again significant in the bivariate regressions but unlike the previous 
two decades, none were significant when included in multivariate regression models. None of 
the other three socio-economic variables were significant in the multivariate regression model 
either. That is quite interesting. Also taking into account that none of the variables dealing 
with neither the flow of information in society, nor any of the variables dealing with political 
activism were significant in any regression models for the 1970s makes the institutional 
variables stand out when examining the explanatory factors behind cross-national variation in 
voter turnout in the 1970s.  
 
We thus observe the following tendency: the patterns from the two previous decades are 
reversed, with institutional variables replacing the socio-economic variables in explaining 
cross-national variation in voter turnout. The dominant role of institutions stands out when 
taking into account that none of the information- or activism-variables seems to matter either. 
 
6.2.4 The 1980s43 
Three institutional variables were significant in the bivariate regressions for the 1980s, 
namely COMP, UNICAM and LEGEFF. When included in multivariate regression models, their 
significance proved to be robust. Compulsory voting laws increase turnout by almost 9 points, 
all else held equal. That is the same effect as COMP displayed in the 1970s model. UNICAM is 
positively correlated with turnout and yields an effect of 8,1 points, all else held equal. This 
finding, which is highly significant (t = 2,9) is consistent with Jackman (1987). He estimates 
that the presence of unicameral legislatures in countries like Finland and Norway produces a 
turnout increase of about eight points over the rate that prevails with strong bicameralism 
(414-415). LEGEFF also yields an effect of about eight points, all else held equal. The effect, 
which is slightly more moderate than in the 1970s, is statistically significant in the 1980s, 
with a t-statistic score of over two. When included in the multivariate regression models, a 
fourth institutional variable proved significant for the first time, namely DISTRICT, yielding a 
t-statistic score of 2,3. The negative effect of district size is logarithmic with the main 
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 No outlier identified (N=60). 
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difference at the low end of district size: all else held equal, turnout decreases by 5,4 
percentage points when the size of the district goes from 3575 voter per member of parliament 
(Dominican Republic), the smallest district size in the 1980s, to the average (100 544 voters 
per member of parliament), but only 2,7 percentage points going from the average to the 
largest district size (1 383 413 voters per member of parliament), the level at which India 
were in the 1980s. 
 
GDP, LITERACY and HDI (introduced for the first time) were all significant in the bivariate 
regression models for the 1980s. However, when included in multivariate regression models, 
their significance did not prove to be robust. This makes the institutional variables stand out 
as they did in the 1970s model. This impression is strengthened when looking at the other 
variables. None of the variables dealing with the flow of information prove to be significant 
when included in multivariate regression models. The only non-institutional variable that 
proves to be significant is the GOVCRIS-variable (t = 2,1) indicating that turnout will increase 
with seven percentage points for every rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime (excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow).  
 
We observe the following tendency: as was the case for the 1970s, institutional variables 
mattered the most for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout during the 1980s.  
The socio-economic variables were not important for the 1980s, continuing their poor 
showing from the previous decade. The information-variables alongside the activism-
variables, except GOVCRIS, did not play a role in determining the cross-national variation in 
voter turnout.  
 
6.2.5 The 1990s44 
 
As the 1990s is the decade from which I have the most data and variables, and I will thus 
systematically build a model that explains cross-national variation in voter turnout for that 
decade. 
 
Four institutional variables were significant for the 1990s bivariate regression models, namely 
COMP, PR, DISTRICT and LEGEFF. As correlation between these variables poses no problem, 
my intention was to let them constitute the core of my explanatory model for the 1990s. When 
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 Mali was, due to relative low turnout, identified as an outlier and included in every regression model as a 
dummy variable. N=89. 
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run against the other significant variables however, PR and LEGEFF completely lost 
significance, persuading me drop them from the model altogether. Four socio-economic 
variables are significant in the bivariate regressions, including GDP, LITERACY, HDI and GINI. 
When added to the institutional core above, HDI displays the highest significance of the four 
and will be added, alongside POPDENS to the model. I will also include NUMPART and CAT, 
and thus the final model for the 1990s includes seven variables. None of the information-
variables seem to play a role in determining voter turnout in the 1990s, as they all displayed a 
poor significance when included in the final model.45 When the activism-variables were added 
to the final model one at a time, DEMO stood out, displaying a high significance in its 
correlation with voter turnout (t = 2,3). I will hence include it in my final model which now is 
complete. It is presented in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Determinants of cross-national variation in voter turnout – 1990s  
 
 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| Ordinary    least squares regression               | 
| Model was estimated May 23, 2007 at 01:09:49PM     | 
| LHS=TURNOUTC Mean                 =   67.47602     | 
|              Standard deviation   =   16.14341     | 
| WTS=none     Number of observs.   =         71     | 
| Model size   Parameters           =          9     | 
|              Degrees of freedom   =         62     | 
| Residuals    Sum of squares       =   10728.76     | 
|              Standard error of e  =   13.15464     | 
| Fit          R-squared            =   .4118869     | 
|              Adjusted R-squared   =   .3360013     | 
| Model test   F[  8,    62] (prob) =   5.43 (.0000) | 
| Autocorrel   Durbin-Watson Stat.  =  2.1777595     | 
|              Rho = cor[e,e(-1)]   =  -.0888798     | 
| White heteroscedasticity robust covariance matrix  | 
| Br./Pagan LM Chi-sq [  8]  (prob) =   6.24 (.6208) | 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant      49.1373041     10.4841131     4.687   .0000 
 COMP          16.1611832     5.06650377     3.190   .0022     .15492958 
 DISTRICT(log)-5.31071329     1.71588105    -3.095   .0030    4.01006716  
 NUMPART        .55971374      .34603385     1.618   .1108    4.24886286 
 HDI           27.4568878     11.3071729     2.428   .0181     .77679577 
 POPDENS(log)  1.91709987      .97164456     1.973   .0530    7.31772622 
 CAT          -4.31066011     3.24675894    -1.328   .1892     .46478873 
 DEMO          2.88638587     1.23069436     2.345   .0222     .60328638 
 MALI         -24.2774262     6.72352385    -3.611   .0006     .01408451 
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 Correlation between HDI and the information-variables are: NEWSPAPER (r = 0,6), RADIO (r = 0,5), TV (r = 0,7) 
and INFO (r = 0,7). 
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6.2.6 Interpretation of findings 
 
Three institutional, three socio-economic and one activism variable, alongside one country 
dummy variable, constitute the final model for explaining cross-national variation in voter 
turnout in the 1990s. Compulsory voting laws are (as in the general model above) strongly 
correlated with voter turnout, displaying an even stronger effect than for the general model: 
all else held equal, compulsory voting increases turnout by over 16 percentage points. The 
effect is highly significant, displaying a t-statistic score of 3,2. The reasons why compulsory 
voting has a substantial impact on voter turnout are straightforward: in countries were 
compulsory voting is in use, the electors are likely to be punished if they do not vote at 
elections. Furthermore, countries that employ compulsory voting laws are also engaged in 
reducing the cost of turnout for its citizens, via weekend voting, simple registration 
procedures, and the creation of a centralized, professional bureaucracy concerned with all 
aspects of election administration.  
 
The next institutional variable to have an impact on voter turnout in the 1990s is the district 
size measured by the DISTRICT-variable. The relationship is logarithmic, implying that the 
main difference is at the low end of district size: all else held, turnout decreases by about 24 
percentage points when the district size goes from 2215 voters per member of parliament 
(Andorra), the lowest in the sample, to 100 653 voters per member of parliament, the average. 
The decrease in turnout is only 5,3 percentage points, all else held equal, when the district size 
goes from the average to the highest, 1,7 million voters per member of parliament (India). The 
effect of the district size is quite formidable and also highly significant (t = -3). Recall the 
effect of DISTRICT in the general model above: 14 points when going from minimum to 
average and almost four points when going from average to maximum. The district size is an 
important explanatory factor behind voter turnout because the linkages between voters and 
their representatives are affected by the number of electors per member of parliament. If a 
district is small, the possibility for increased information, familiarity and contact between 
voters and their representatives is present which in turn will increase turnout.  
 
The last institutional variable to have an impact in the 1990s is the number of parties, 
measured through the NUMPART-variable. The positive effect, all else held equal, of one point 
for every two parties is the same as for the general model above. The correlation however is 
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not as significant as it was above, displaying a t-statistic score of 1,6. What is interesting 
about the finding is that NUMPART once again, as in the general model above, displays a 
positive correlation with voter turnout. My finding thereby contradicts the findings of 
Jackman (1987), Blais and Carty (1990) and Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) among others 
which all report a negative correlation between the number of parties and turnout. In this 
paper NUMPART has displayed a positive correlation in every multivariate regression model it 
has been included in making its positive correlation with turnout robust. It appears to be the 
case that the higher the number of parties, the richer the choice offered the electorate which in 
turn leads to a higher turnout. As Norris (2004) notes: “ … that wider electoral choices across 
the ideological spectrum mean that all sectors of public opinion and all social groups are more 
likely to find a party to represent their views, preference and interests” (166). My findings on 
the NUMPART-variable throughout this paper support the argument of Norris.  
 
The level of well-being in a country, calculated on the basis of the literacy rate, life 
expectancy, standard of living and education have a positive impact on voter turnout. It is 
measured through my HDI-variable and increase turnout, all else held equal, by 2,7 percentage 
points for every 0,1 point increase on the HDI (which runs from 0,3 to 0,95). The finding is 
highly statistically significant, displaying a t-statistic score of over 2,4. My finding supports 
that of Norris (2004). Why would a higher level of development, measured through the HDI, 
result in a higher turnout? Recall that HDI compromises four dimensions: literacy, life 
expectancy, standard of living and education. The literacy dimension of HDI’s correlation with 
turnout follows the same argument as the LITERACY variable created for this paper. Those 
with little linguistic skills are less likely to vote and studies (Blais and Dobrzynska: 1998) 
show that a minimum degree of literacy is almost a prerequisite to good turnout. The life 
expectancy dimension deals with the well being of the population. Alongside the standard of 
living dimension it effectively measures the quality and quantity of goods and services 
available to people also taking the distribution of such goods and services into account. 
People have basic needs and these needs must be met before the majority can engage in 
political participation. The last dimension is education and it follows the same logic as the 
literacy dimension. Education enhances civic skills, which in turn enhance turnout.  
 
Population density correlates positively with voter turnout in the 1990s, as it did in the general 
model above. The relationship is logarithmic, implying that the main difference is at the low 
end of population density: all else held equal, turnout increases by about 1,6 points when 
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density goes from 60 inhabitants per square mile (Australia), the lowest in the sample to the 
average (3687 inhabitants per square mile) but only 0,7 points when going from the average 
to the most densely populated country, at 31 010 inhabitants per square mile (Malta). The 
effect, which is as moderate for the 1990s model as it was for the general model, is 
statistically significant, displaying a t-statistic score of almost two. CAT, indicating a catholic 
population of over 50%, correlates negatively with voter turnout for the 1990s as it did in the 
general model above. The effect, which does not display a high significance (t = -1,3), is 
worth about 4,3 percentage points of depressed turnout. The effect is smaller in the 1990s than 
for the entire time period covered by the general model above.  
 
The last variable to be included in the 1990s model was an activism-variable, namely DEMO. 
In the multivariate regression models for the 1960s, DEMO displayed a negative correlation 
with voter turnout. For the 1990s however, the correlation is a positive one, displaying an 
effect of almost three percentage points on voter turnout for every demonstration, all else held 
equal. Whereas people in the 1960s saw demonstrations as an alternative channel for 
expressing political views, people in the 1990s saw demonstrations as a supplement to that of 
showing up at the polls. The finding on this variable is highly statistically significant, 
displaying a t-statistic score of over 2,3. 
 
As for the dummy variable indicating the outlier case of Mali, the effect is formidable: all else 
held equal, an election taking place in Mali in the 1990s can expect a decreased turnout of 
over 24 percentage points.  
 
 6.2.7 Other interpretations 
The inclusion of HDI in my model had collinearity implications for two other variables, GINI 
and GDP, which in turn had to be dropped from the final model. By substituting HDI in the 
final model with GDP and GINI respectively, the following effects were obtained. 
 
All else held equal, turnout increases by 1,2 percentage points when GDP per capita goes 
from 793 American dollars (Central African Republic), the lowest in the sample, to the 
average (10 839) but only 0,6 points when it goes from the average to 40 583 American 
dollars (Luxembourg). The effect is statistically significant, yielding a t-statistic score of 
almost two. Interestingly enough, the effect of economic development in determining cross-
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national variation in voter turnout for the 1990s is identical both in terms of effect and 
significance as the effect of economic development in the general model above.  
 
The level of income inequality, measured through GINI, displays a highly significant 
correlation with voter turnout (t = -3,5). The effect is, all else held equal, 0,5 percentage 
points of decreased turnout for every 0,1 point increase on the GINI-index. In other words: the 
more unequal the distribution of income in a society is, the lower the turnout. My finding is 
consistent with my expectations. If people’s basic needs are not met, the majority can not 
“afford” or have not the means to engage in political participation. 
 
6.2.8 Methodological considerations  
All the regression models run in this paper have been done so implementing White’s 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Variances and Standard Errors. By comparing the output of my 
final model for the 1990s run both with and without the White’s estimator and comparing the 
output of the two, I can safely conclude that heteroscedasticity does not pose a problem in my 
model.  
 
As of multicollinearity, I ran a tolerance test on my model, as I did for the general model 
above, and the results are presented in Table 14: 
 
Table 14: Tolerance test – 1990s model 
_____________________________ 
 
Variable  Tolerance 
 
COMP             0.79 
DISTRICT        0.71 
NUMPART        0.99 
HDI         0.77 
POPDENS        0.90 
CAT         0.82 
DEMO                0.77 
 
MALI         0.80  
_____________________________ 
 
All of the variables in my model appear to possess a low level of collinearity with the other 
regressors. I can firmly conclude that multicollinearity poses no problem in my model. As of 
other assumptions, see Appendix C. 
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6.3 Cross-time variance in the determinants of voter turnout 
The regression analyses conducted across the decades from 1950 to 2000 revealed that some 
variables are time-specific whereas other variables are more consistent across time. By 
consistent I mean both in the direction and significance of their correlation with voter turnout. 
I will begin by identifying the most consistent variables, as the identification of such variables 
constitutes the primary purpose of these analyses. When discussing the cross-time-specific 
determinants of voter turnout it can be fruitful to keep in mind the findings from the general 
model above. Recall that the variables behind cross-national variation in voter turnout 
between 1950 and 2000 are the following: COMP, LEGEFF, NUMPART, DISTRICT, POPDENS, 
CAT and NEWS. Are these variables consistent in their correlation with voter turnout across 
shorter time periods as well? Some of them are more consistent than others and I turn now for 
an identification of the most consistent variables. Table 15 below provides an overview of the 
different variable’s direction and significance (* sig. at 0.10; ** sig. at 0.05; *** sig. at 0.01). 
 
Table 15: Direction and significance of correlation – multivariate regression models 
       
Decade 
    _________________________________ 
  
       50s             60s          70s             80s      90s          GM 
Variable               _____________________________________________________________ 
 
COMP           +     +        +**     +**     +***  +*** 
CLOSED         +**     +        +       +       -     + 
FREQ           -***     +        -       -       -     + 
PLUMAJ         -     -        -       -       -     - 
PR             +     +        +**     +       +     + 
UNICAM         +     +        +***    +***    +     + 
DISTRICT       -     -        -       -**     -***  -*** 
LEGEFF         +     +        +       +**     +     +* 
NUMPART        +     -        +       +       +     +* 
 
GDP            +***     +**      +       +*      +**   +** 
LITERACY       +**     +***     +       +       +     + 
CAT            -     -        +       -       -     -** 
POP            -     -        -       -       -     - 
POPDEN         +     +        -       +       +**   +** 
HDI                                   +       +***     
GINI                                          -***     
 
RADIOS         +*     +***     +       +       +     + 
NEWSPAPER      +**     +**      +       +       +     +* 
TVS                         +       +       +     +* 
INFO           + *    +**      +       +*      +     + 
  
DEMO         -     -**      -       -       -     + 
RIOTS        +     +        -       -       -     + 
GOVCRIS       +*     -        +       +**     -     + 
WCI       +     -        +       -       +     + 
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6.3.1 Consistent variables 
Compulsory voting laws increase turnout. COMP has correlated positively with turnout in 
every regression model it has been included in so its direction of correlation is undisputed. 
The significance of COMP’s correlation has also been undisputed, except for the 1950s and 
1960s regression models. As discussed above, the lack of significance displayed by COMP for 
those decades probably comes from the cases that both enjoyed compulsory voting laws and 
low turnout. Based on the regression analyses conducted in this paper, alongside evidence on 
the variable presented in the literature review chapter, compulsory voting stands out as an 
important explanatory factor behind cross-national variation in voter turnout.  
 
The flow of information in society, measured through the circulation of newspaper 
(NEWSPAPER), number of radios per capita (RADIOS), number of television sets per capita 
(TVS) or as a compilation of the three (INFO) are also correlating positively with voter turnout. 
As of significance, NEWSPAPER and INFO stand out.  NEWSPAPER displays a high significance 
in its correlation with voter turnout in every regression model it has been included in, except 
for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s models.  INFO does even better, displaying significance in all 
regression models, except in the 1970s and general model.46 The relatively consistent 
significance displayed by NEWSPAPER and INFO emphasizes their importance when cross-
national variation in voter turnout is being studied. The flow of information does increase 
turnout. 
 
Three more variables stand out as of stability in the direction and significance of their 
correlations with voter turnout, namely GDP, DISTRICT and GINI. The level of economic 
development correlates positively with voter turnout, both when included in the general model 
above, as well as when included in the time-specific multivariate regression models. The 
correlation is also significant across each and every regression model, except for the 1970s 
and 1980s model. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) also reported a positive and significant 
correlation between economic development (GNP per capita) and voter turnout, making it 
clear that economic development increases turnout. 
 
                                                 
46
 It was not included in the final 1990s model due to collinearity issues with HDI. When HDI was substituted 
with INFO, the latter came out as significant. 
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The district size is also stable in the direction of its correlation with turnout, displaying a 
negative correlation throughout this paper. The significance however, has been limited to the 
general model plus the 1980s and 1990s model. Norris (2004) was right when she found 
district size to correlate positively with turnout. Her finding, which was in fact not significant 
even though she list it as being significant,47 came about partly as a result of the time period 
she covered in her study, namely the 1990s. Based on the regression analyses conducted in 
this paper, district size does stand out as an important explanatory factor behind cross-national 
variation in voter turnout.  
 
The level of income inequality (GINI) has, due to the lack of data, only been included in one 
regression model, namely the 1990s model. The correlation, which was negative, was highly 
significant. Further research is needed before we can conclude anything final on this 
variable’s explanatory power on cross-national variation in voter turnout but for now we can 
say that the level of income inequality does seem to decrease turnout.  
 
I turn now to an identification of the inconsistent variables.  
 
 6.3.2 Inconsistent variables 
 
The majority of the variables in this paper, including four from the general model (LEGEFF, 
NUMPART, POPDENS and CAT), are consistent in the direction of their correlation but seem to 
display a time-sensitive significance in their correlation with voter turnout. Their correlation’s 
inconsistence as of significance makes them unreliable as determinants of cross-national 
variation in voter turnout.  
 
- LEGEFF. Legislative effectiveness correlates positively with turnout throughout this paper 
but the correlation is only significant in the 1980s model.  
 
- NUMPART. Multipartyism correlates positively with voter turnout (except in the 1960s 
model) but not once in my study is the correlation significant. Its best showing is in the 
general model (t = 1,7) and in the 1990s model (t = 1,6). My findings on NUMPART support, 
as noted above, the finding of Norris (2004). She is one, of only a few, to have found a 
positive correlation between voter turnout and number of parties. Her finding is also 
                                                 
47
 With a coefficient of -0,001 and standard error of 0,035, her district size variable is far from significant (p. 
158). 
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statistically significant. Recall that she studied cross-national variation in the 1990s, the 
decade from which my finding on the variable came close to significance.  
 
- POPDENS. Population density has a similar pattern: positive correlation throughout the paper; 
significant, however, only for the general model and in the 1990s model.  
 
- CAT. The variable taking into account catholic majorities is also stable in its correlation with 
voter turnout, displaying a negative correlation in every regression model it has been included 
in. The significance of its correlation however, is limited to the general model.  
 
- LITERACY. Literacy has displayed a positive correlation with voter turnout throughout this 
paper. Its significance however, has been limited to the 1950s and 1960s models. 
 
- HDI. The level of well being has only been included in two models, the 1980s and 1990s 
model. The correlation with turnout was positive in both decades but only significant in the 
1990s model. Hence, Norris (2004) was right about HDI’s impact on turnout, but her finding 
came out significant only because she studied turnout in the 1990s; HDI’s impact on turnout is 
time-specific. 
 
- PR and PLUMAJ. From the literature review chapter, we know that elections taking place in 
PR-system are associated with higher turnout and elections taking place in PLUMAJ-systems 
are associated with lower turnout. Both my PR and PLUMAJ variables  correlate according to 
theory, positively for PR and negatively for PLUMAJ, but only PR displays a significant 
correlation, and only for the 1970s model. Hence, Jackman (1987) was right about the impact 
that electoral disproportionality (the main criteria behind my PR-variable) has on voter 
turnout, but only in his 1970s model. I have also speculated on the possibility that my 
electoral system variables are suffering as a result of my sample selection criteria (ACLP), 
which allows me to incorporate both established and non-established democracies. From the 
literature review chapter we know that PR’s impact on turnout in established democracies is 
undeniable. If one takes non-established democracies into account as well, my regression 
analyses show that PR’s impact on voter turnout is time-specific. 
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- UNICAM. If the legislative body consists of only one house, this will increase voter turnout 
according to Jackman (1987). My regression analyses support this assumption but the 
correlation is only significant for the 1970s and the 1980s models.  
  
6.3.3 What are the implications of these findings? 
 
The most interesting result that has emerged from the time-sensitive regression analyses 
conducted above is the fact that a number of the variables that were thought to be important 
determinants of cross-national variation in voter turnout generally, are in fact time-specific. 
These variables, which include LEGEFF, NUMPART, POPDENS, CAT, LITERACY, HDI, PR/PLUMAJ 
and UNICAM, are still important determinants of voter turnout, albeit their impact is time-
specific. This means that one has to take the time dimension into account whenever discussing 
the variable’s impact on turnout.  
 
As much as the comprehensive research strategy implemented in this paper has “discredited” 
a number of variables, it has also reinforced other variables. A number of variables, including 
COMP, DISTRICT, GDP, NEWSPAPER, INFO and GINI, have proved to be relatively robust and 
consistent in their effects across time. Based on my study, we know that turnout is likely to be 
highest in rich countries which implement compulsory voting, where the distribution of 
income is more equal, the district size small, and the flow of information is at a relatively high 
level. Furthermore, we know these variables matter, irrespective of time. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
This thesis was motivated by the desire to understand and explain variation in voter turnout in 
democratic regimes cross-nationally. I set out to answer a question that has been receiving 
increasing interest over the last quarter of a century, namely: Why do countries vary in terms 
of voter turnout? By utilizing cross-sectional data and the OLS-method, this thesis has 
provided some interesting answers. Some of them are in line with previous research; others 
seem to indicate that previous research has been a bit hasty in its conclusions, especially with 
respect to generalizations across time and space.  
 
This concluding chapter has two goals. First, it provides an overview of the findings the thesis 
has produced. Second, it considers how the thesis can serve as a basis for future research on 
cross national variation in voter turnout.  
 
7.1 Cross-national variation in voter turnout  
Following Chapter 1, where I presented the research question and my overall research 
strategy, Chapter 2 outlined previous research on the topic by focusing on seven studies that 
represent major contributions to this field of research, presenting the key explanatory 
variables, and organizing them in blocs.  Chapter 3 proceeded to include the findings from the 
literature alongside new variables created specifically for this thesis, and derived hypotheses 
about each variable’s anticipated association with voter turnout. Chapter 4 outlined my 
methodological approach and research strategy. 
  
By running extensive preliminary analyses alongside a comprehensive step-by-step model-
building procedure I proposed, in Chapter 5, a model that explains cross-national variation in 
voter turnout for the time period between 1950 and 2000. A country that is heavily populated, 
enjoys compulsory voting, multipartyism and relatively small district magnitude, is non-
catholic, and where the flow of information is at a relatively high level can expect an 
increased turnout at elections.  
 
The time-sensitive models however, conducted on the basis of my Decade Dataset and 
presented in Chapter 6, show that the majority of determinants behind cross-national variation 
in voter turnout are indeed time-specific. By conducting regression analyses across shorter 
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time periods (decades), I was able to show that even though some variables (such as 
compulsory voting and level of economic development) are more robust across time than 
others, the majority are dependent upon time. This is quite interesting and has implications for 
how we think regarding determinants of cross-national variation in voter turnout. The risk of 
generating unreliable and non-robust findings is very high when we simply study (as the 
majority of research on variation in voter turnout has done) turnout variation across a limited 
number of countries based on shorter time periods, and then proceed to use these findings to 
generalize across time and space. Only by conducting comprehensive research strategies, like 
the time-sensitive regression analyses utilized in this thesis, can we assess each explanatory 
variable’s impact on the variation in turnout that we observe across regimes. 
 
7.2 Contributions of this thesis 
By conducting a comprehensive step-by-step model building for the general model, and then 
estimating and comparing a variety of time-specific models, this paper has shown that the 
majority of determinants behind cross-national variation in voter turnout really are time-
specific. What are the implications of my findings? 
 
For one, these findings mean that Jackman (1987) was “right” in his findings. He was right 
because he studied turnout in the 1970s; but it also means that Jackman was right only for the 
1970s model. Variables that mattered in the 1970s do not necessarily matter in the 1990s. A 
case in point is unicameralism. According to Jackman, unicameralism has a strong and 
significant impact on turnout. My finding supports this, but our common finding regarding 
the effects of unicameralism cannot be generalized: the effect of unicameralism is time-
specific. 
 
Furthermore, Norris (2004) was “right” about how societal development, measured by the 
HDI-variable, has a positive impact on turnout. She was right, because she studied variation in 
turnout in the 1990s. But, again, HDI’s impact on turnout is time-specific and, according to my 
study, limited to the 1990s. 
 
We can not discuss what determines cross-national variation in voter turnout without taking 
the time dimension into account. My extensive analyses have shown that the majority of 
determinants behind cross-national variation in voter turnout are in fact time-specific. Only a 
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very few determinants, like compulsory voting, economic development, flow of information 
and equality in the distribution of income can be said to systematically influence variation in 
turnout across countries, irrespective of time.  
 
7.3 Suggestions for future research 
Whereas some steps have been taken to answer the research question(s) put forth in this 
thesis, there are related questions that this thesis does not address as well as questions raised 
as a result of the conclusions reached by this thesis. Although this thesis has adopted a rather 
involved research methodology alongside a comprehensive model-building procedure in order 
to answer the research question(s), the time and scope of the thesis rendered necessary the 
omission of a more detailed approach to the topic. 
 
For example, research on cross-national variation in voter turnout in Latin America indicates 
that other variables explain the variation in voter turnout for that region, as compared to 
Europe (Perez-Linan 2001 and Fornos et al. 2004). Does this hold across time as well? What 
about other regions? By constructing datasets that take into account the different regions one 
can easily check for region-specific variance behind voter turnout, also across time.  
 
It is also important that we move beyond established democracies (“Western world”) and 
check whether the patterns we observe among them hold in new democracies (Eastern 
Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia). My study indicates that, for instance, the electoral 
system has an impact on cross-national variation in voter turnout only when established 
democracies are taken into account. If some variables, like electoral system, appear to have an 
impact only in some subset of countries, we have to develop a more complex theory which 
explains when and where they matter more or less.  
 
Furthermore, the conclusion by this thesis, that the majority of determinants behind cross-
national variation in voter turnout are time-specific, raises an interesting follow up question, 
namely: Why are they time-specific?  
 
As noted above, institutions seem to matter more than socio-economic variables for 
explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout. Jackman (1987) noted the same 20 years 
ago, but further research is needed in support of these assumptions. If institutions matter more 
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than socio-economic variables, we need to check whether or not this is a time-specific and/or 
a region-specific phenomenon and develop a theory accordingly.  
 
Finally, with the advent of datasets such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES), utilized by Norris (2004), it is possible to examine the conditional impact of 
institutions on different types of voters. Multilevel analyses which link institutional variables 
with individual voter characteristics are needed because, as a result of an important habit 
component in voting, contextual factors have a greater impact on new cohorts. This opens up 
a fascinating avenue of research. 
 
This thesis has, through its comprehensive research strategy, employed a new approach to 
contribute to our knowledge of why countries vary in electoral turnout. The time-sensitive 
regression models can be used as a basis for future research perhaps combined with a region-
specific approach and one that employs a multi-level analysis. My basis for sample selection, 
which allowed me to compare 90 countries across 50 years, is also a fruitful approach to 
follow. Only through the inclusion of as many cases as possible (both established and 
nonestablished democracies), and by running regression models that are sensitive to possible 
coefficient variation over time, can any general findings be generalized across time and space. 
With the abovementioned suggestions for future research, the approach and structure of this 
thesis can be used as a baseline model for a more comprehensive exploration of the 
determinants behind cross-national variation in voter turnout. The search for new ways to 
approach the study of cross-national variation in voter turnout does not end here. 
 96 
VIII. Bibliography 
 
8.1 Books and articles  
 
Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
 Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
 
Black, J. 1991. Reforming the context of the voting process in Canada: Lessons from other 
 democracies. In H. Bakvis (ed.), Voter turnout in Canada. Toronto: Dundurn Press. 
 
Blais A. 2000. To Vote or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice. Pittsburgh:
 University Pittsburgh Press. 
 
―——. 2006. What effects voter turnout? Annual Review Political Science 9. 
 
Blais A. Gidengil E, Nevitte N, Nadeau R. 2004. Where does turnout decline come from? 
 European Journal of Political Research 43. 
 
Blais A, Aarts K. 2005. Electoral system and turnout. Presented at Int. Expert Meet. 
 “Changing the Electoral System: The Case of Netherlands”, Amsterdam, Sept. 14-15. 
 
Blais, Andre and Ken Carty. 1990. Does proportional representation foster voter turnout? 
 European Journal of Political Research vol. 18: pp. 167-81. 
 
Blais, Andre and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. 1998. Turnout in electoral democracies, European 
 Journal of Political Research vol 33: 239–61. 
 
Crewe I. 1981. Electoral participation. In D. Butler, H.R. Penniman & A. Renney (eds.), 
 Democracy at the polls: A comparative study of competitive national elections. 
 Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
 
Dahl, R., 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 
 
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. 
 
Economist, The. Pocket World in Figures - 2004 edition  
 
Fornos CA, Power TJ, Garand JC. 2004. Explaining voter turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 
 2000. Comp. Polit. Stud. 37(8):909-40. 
 
Franklin Mark N. 1996. Electoral participation. In Comparing Democracies: Elections and
 Voting in Global Perspective, ed. L Leduc, RG Niemi, P Norris, pp. 216-35. Beverly
 Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
―——. 2004. Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established 
 Democracies Since 1945. Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gujarati, Damodar N. 2003. Basic Econometrics, forth edition. New York. McGraw-Hill
 Higher Education. 
 97 
 
Haynes, Jeff. 2001. Democracy in the Developing World. Oxford, UK. Blackwell Pub. 
 
Jackman, Robert. 1987. Political institutions and voter turnout in industrial democracies,
 American Political Science Review, vol. 81, no. 2. 
 
Jackman, Robert and Ross A. Miller. 1995. Voter turnout in the industrial democracies 
 during the 1980s. Comp. Polit. Stud. 27(4):467-92. 
 
Katz, Richard. 1996. Party organization and finance. In Comparing Democracies: Elections
 and Voting in Global Perspective, ed. L Leduc, R. G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. 
 Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing social inquiry. Scientific
 Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 
 
Kostadinova T. 2003. Voter turnout dynamics in post-Communist Europe. European Journal 
 of Political Research 42(6):741-59. 
 
Krieckhaus, J. 2004. The Regime Debate Revisited: A Sensitivity Analysis of Democracy’s
 Economic Effect. B.J.Pol.S 34, 635-655. 
 
―——. 2005. Democracy and Economic Growth: How Regional Context Influences
 Regime Effects, B.J.Pol.S 35. 
 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1980. Applied regression: An introduction. Sage University Paper
 Series on Quantiative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-022. Newbury Park, CA:
 Sage.  
 
Lieberson, Stanley. 1985. Making it count: The Improvement of Social Research and Theory.                                                                             
 Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose. 1991. International Almanac of Electoral History.
 Third edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
Milbrath, L. W. 1965. Political Participation, Chicago, Rand McNally. 
 
Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen, 2002. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy:
 Evaluating Alternative Indices, Comparative Political Studies 35,1 (February) 5-34. 
 
Norris, Pippa. 2001. Democratic Phoenix: Political Activism Worldwide Chapter 3. 
 
―——.  2004. Electoral Engineering, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Pateman, Carole. 1970. Participation and democratic theory, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pennings, Paul, Hans Keman and Jan Kleinnijenhuis. 2006. Doing Research in Political 
  Science, second edition. London. Sage Publications.  
 
 98 
Perez-Linan A. 2001. Neoinstitutional accounts of voter turnout: moving beyond industrial
 democracies. Elect. Stud. 20(2):281-97. 
 
Poe, Steven, Neal Tate and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. Repression of Human Rights to 
 Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 
 1976-93. International Studies Quarterly 43: 291-313. 
 
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1980. Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partican, Legal, and
 Socio-Economic Influences. In R, Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation, SAGE 
 publications, London. 
 
―——.1982. Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. 
 Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
 
―——. 1986. American voter turnout in comparative perspective, American Political Science
 Review, vol. 80, no. 1. 
 
Przeworski A., S. Stokes and B. Manin. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and  
 Representation. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. 
 Democracy and development, New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Pye, Lucian W., and Sidney Verba 1965. Political Culture and Political Development. 
 Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
 
Radcliff B, Davis P. 2000. Labour organization and electoral participation in industrial 
 democracies. American Political Science Review 44. 
 
Rae, Douglas. in "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems", 
 Comparative Political Studies, 1 (October 1968), 413-418. 
 
Ragin, Charles. 1987. The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative
 Strategies. University of California Press. Berkeley Los Angeles. 
 
Ragin, Charles & David Zaret. 1983. “Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two
 Strategies”. Social Forces 61(3): 731-754. 
 
Reif, K. and H. Schmitt. 1980. Nine Second-order National Elections: A Conceptual 
 Framework for the Analysis of the European Election Results. European Journal of 
 Political Research. 8:3-44.  
 
Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. 1997. The international IDEA Handbook of Electoral
  System Design. Stockholm.  
 
Ringdal, Kristen. 2001. Enhet og mangfold: Samfunnsvitenskapelig forskning og kvantitativ
  metode. Bergen, Fagbokforlaget. 
 
 99 
Skog, Ole Jørgen. 2004. Å forklare sosiale fenomener: En regresjonsbasert tilnærming. Oslo.
 Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. 
 
Tingsten, H. 1975. Political Behaviour: studies in election statistics. New York: Arno Press. 
 
Van der Eijk, Cees, and Mark Franklin. 1996. Choosing Europe. University of Michigan
 Press. 
 
Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jao-on Kim. 1978. Participation and Political Equality:
  A Seven-Nation Comparison. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and equality: Civic
  voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
 
 
8.2 Data sources 
 
IDEA database  
Available online at www.idea.int (01.06.07) 
 
Inter-Parliamentary Union 
Available online at: www.ipu.org/english/home.htm (01.06.07) 
 
Penn world tables 
PWT 5.6 The Penn World Table (Mark 5.6)--denoted PWT 5.6-- is a revised 
and updated version of the proceeding (Mark 5) version that was described in "The Penn 
World Table (Mark5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988" by 
Robert Summers and Alan Heston, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1991.   
 
PWT6.2 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. 
 
Banks dataset 
Cross-national time-series data archive : Arthur S. Banks [electronic resource]. - Binghamton, 
N.Y. : Databanks International. 2004 
 
Beck’s Database on Political Institutions 
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. "New 
tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 
(September), World Bank Economic Review. 
 100 
IX. Appendixes 
 
9.1 Appendix A – Countries with compulsory voting laws 
 
Table 16: Countries with compulsory voting laws 
 
 
Code  Country  Year* 
 
Latin America &  
the Caribbean 
02  Argentina 
07  Brazil 
08  Chile   From 1962 onwards 
10  Costa Rica  
18  Honduras  
22  Peru 
28  Uruguay   From 1970 onwards 
29  Venezuela  Until 1993 
 
Europe 
33  Belgium 
42  Greece 
46  Italy 
50  Luxembourg 
53  Netherland   Until 1970 
 
Other 
66  Australia 
 
 
* Entire sample period if empty 
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9.2 Appendix B – Variable coding 
 
Numpart 
Number of effective parties is based on the following: 
Field S20F5 (code utilized in Banks dataset) is a party fractionalization index, based on the 
formula proposed by Douglas Rae in "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European 
Party Systems", Comparative Political Studies, 1 (October 1968), 413-418.  The index is 
constructed as follows: 
                                m 
                      F = 1 - sum (ti)2 
                               i=l 
where ti = the proportion of members associated with the ith party in the lower house of the 
legislature. 
 
WCI 
The Weighted Conflict Index is based on the following factors (including code from Banks 
dataset): 
S17F1 Assassinations. Assassinations. Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder 
of a high government official or politician. 
S17F2 General Strikes. Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves 
more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority. 
S17F3 Guerrilla Warfare. Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present 
regime. 
S17F4 Government Crises. Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow. 
S17F5 Purges. Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition 
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition. 
S17F6 Riots. Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use 
of physical force. 
S17F7 Revolutions. Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at 
such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence 
from the central government. 
S18F1 Anti-Government Demonstrations. Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 
people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government 
policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. 
 
The Weighted Conflict Index is calculated in the following manner: 
Multiply the value of the number of Assassinations by 24, 
General Strikes by 43, 
Guerrilla Warfare by 46, 
Government Crises by 48, 
Purges by 86, 
Riots by 102, 
Revolutions by 148, 
Anti-Government Demonstrations by 200. 
 
Sum the 8 weighted values and divide by 9. The result is the value (with decimal) stored as 
the Weighted Conflict Index. 
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9.3 Appendix C – Assumptions of the OLS 
 
9.3.1 Assumptions of OLS estimation method48 
 
1. No specification error 
a. The relationship between iX  and iY  is linear.  
b. No relevant independent variables have been excluded. 
c. No irrelevant independent variables have been included. 
2. No measurement error 
a. The variables X and Y are accurately measured. 
3. The following assumptions concern the error term, iε : 
a. Zero mean: E( iε ) = 0 
i. For each observation, the expected value of the error term is zero.  
b. Homoscedasticity 
i. The variance of the error term is constant for all values of iX . 
c. No autocorrelation 
i. The error terms are uncorrelated. 
d. The independent variable is uncorrelated with the error term. 
e. Normality. 
i. The error term, iε , is normally distributed. 
4. No multicollinearity 
a. Absence of perfect multicollinearity. 
 
9.3.2 About the assumptions 
When assumption one through 3d are met in a bivariate regression, desirable estimators of the 
population parameters, α and β, will be obtained. Technically speaking, they will be the “best 
linear unbiased estimates”, BLUE. However, for a multiple regression to produce BLUE, it 
must meet the bivariate regression assumptions, plus assumption four; absence of perfect 
multicollinearity. Let us examine the assumptions in more detail.  
 
The absence of specification error is critical as it asserts that the theoretical model embodied 
in the equation is correct. The assumption of linearity asserts that the functional form of the 
relationship is actually a straight line. As with the exclusion and inclusion of independent 
variables, the logic is self-evident. If we wish to arrive at a more complete explanation of a 
give social phenomenon it is important to include the necessary explanatory variables, and 
exclude the irrelevant variables, in the equation. To evaluate the relevance of each variable, 
we perform tests for statistical significance.  
 
                                                 
48
 From Lewis-Beck (1980). 
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The second assumption deals with the issue of measurement errors. It goes without saying that 
for us to arrive at accurate estimates, our variables must be accurately measured. Validity and 
reliability of the measurement is essential in this regard. In my paper I have addressed the 
issue of reliability and validity in chapter 3. 
 
The third set of assumptions involves the error term.  A zero mean of the error term is not 
critical as it will only bias the intercept estimate. As this estimate is of secondary interest in 
social science research, and as long as the least square estimate of the slope is unchanged, we 
need not worry too much about this assumption (Lewis-Beck 1980: 28). The assumption of 
homoscedasticity (or absence of perfect heteroscedasticity) has been discussed above (both 
for the General Model and the 1990s model) and will hence not be addressed here. I will 
however remind the reader again, that I run my regression models implementing the White 
Estimator.  
 
Autocorrelation may be defined as “correlation between members of series of observations 
ordered in time (as in time series data) or space (as in cross-sectional data)” (Gujarati 2003: 
442). Autocorrelation, which appears more frequently with time-series variables than with 
cross-sectional variables, invalidates the significance tests, by indicating significance when in 
fact that’s not the case. The least square estimates, however, are unbiased (Lewis-Beck 
1980:28).  
 
The next assumption, that the independent variable is uncorrelated with the error term, can be 
difficult to meet in non-experimental research. If our X, which we observe in society and can 
only account for, is related to the error term, than the least squares parameter estimates will be 
biased. As the error term really is a collection of excluded variables, the remedy would be an 
incorporation of missing explanatory variables into the model. I feel confident that my thesis 
includes the majority of the important explanatory variables. The last assumption regarding 
the error term is that it is normally distributed. We need only worry about the distribution of 
iY as it is the same as the distribution of iε  (only their means are different) (Lewis-Beck 1980: 
29). Figure 3 and 4 below present some evidence that the residuals in my two main models 
are normally distributed. 
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Figure 3: Residuals – General model 
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Figure 4: Residuals – 1990s model 
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The final assumption of the ordinary least squares estimation method is the absence of perfect 
multicollinearity. I will not discuss it here as I discussed it thoroughly in previous chapters. 
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9.4. Appendix D – Sample selection  
9.4.1 Democratic elections and turnout rate – cases in my study 
 
Table 17: Democratic elections and turnout rate 
 
 
Country and  Turnout  Country and  Turnout  Country and     Turnout 
election year  rate (%) election year   rate (%) election year     rate (%) 
 
 
Latin America 
& the Caribbean 
 
Antigua and   Chile 1957     22,0  Ecuador 1979        42,5 
Barbuda 1980    60,6  Chile 1961     32,1  Ecuador 1984        56,1 
Antigua and   Chile 1965     50,0  Ecuador 1986        64,9 
Barbuda 1984    49,7  Chile 1969     45,7  Ecuador 1988        67,0 
Antigua and    Chile 1993     81,9  Ecuador 1990        64,7 
Barbuda 1989    72,5  Chile 1997     73,1  Ecuador 1994        66,3 
Antigua and   Colombia 1958     65,0  Ecuador 1996        67,8 
Barbuda 1994    85,6  Colombia 1960     42,8  Ecuador 1998        48,5 
Antigua and   Colombia 1962     49,8  El Sal.1985        48,3 
Barbuda 1999    72,3  Colombia 1964     35,7  El Sal.1988        43,5 
Argentina 1983    77,5  Colombia 1966     38,5  El Sal.1991        44,0 
Argentina 1985    77,8  Colombia 1968     30,71  El Sal.1994        51,5 
Argentina 1987    80,1  Colombia 1970     46,0  El Sal.1997        82,2 
Argentina 1989    82,1  Colombia 1974     48,4  Grenada 1984        68,8 
Argentina 1991    89,4  Colombia 1978     30,81  Grenada 1990        78,9 
Argentina 1993    78,1  Colombia 1982     38,7  Grenada 1995        84,0 
Argentina 1995    79,8  Colombia 1986     41,1  Grenada 1999        80,1 
Argentina 1998    78,1  Colombia 1990     40,0  Guatemala 1966        23,71 
Argentina 1999    79,4  Colombia 1991     25,61  Guatemala 1970        25,91 
Bahamas 1977    61,4  Colombia 1994     29,21  Guatemala 1974        25,61 
Bahamas 1982    64,2  Colombia 1998     40,5  Guatemala 1978        22,91 
Bahamas 1987    63,5  Costa Rica 1953     50,0  Guatemala 1990        41,0 
Bahamas 1992    68,5  Costa Rica 1958     49,6  Guatemala 1994        14,51 
Bahamas 1997    67,9  Costa Rica 1962     71,5  Guatemala 1995        33,4 
Barbados 1966    57,6  Costa Rica 1966     69,8  Guatemala 1999        31,13 
Barbados 1971    70,0  Costa Rica 1970     75,7  Guyana 1992        63,7 
Barbados 1976    66,3  Costa Rica 1974     71,4  Guyana 1997        80,2 
Barbados 1981    74,7  Costa Rica 1978     75,2  Honduras 1985        77,8 
Barbados 1986    80,0  Costa Rica 1982     79,0  Honduras 1989        75,7 
Barbados 1991    67,4  Costa Rica 1986     74,7  Honduras 1993        63,5 
Barbados 1994    66,0  Costa Rica 1990     85,1  Honduras 1997        68,0 
Barbados 1999    68,6  Costa Rica 1994     84,2  Jamaica 1962        73,7 
Belize 1984    65,9  Costa Rica 1998     73,7  Jamaica 1967        54,9 
Belize 1989    66,9  Dominica 1980     80,9  Jamaica 1972        57,3 
Belize 1993    68,7  Dominica 1985     74,7  Jamaica 1976        84,8 
Belize 1998    65,7  Dominica 1990     78,8  Jamaica 1980        74,7 
Bolivia 1985    65,2  Dominica 1995     82,4  Jamaica 1989        59,0 
Bolivia 1989    51,0  Dom. Rep. 1966     80,8  Jamaica 1993        44,7 
Bolivia 1993    50,0  Dom. Rep. 1970     66,3  Jamaica 1997        48,8 
Bolivia 1997    64,5  Dom. Rep. 1986     60,7  Nicaragua 1984        74,1 
Brazil 1950    28,31  Dom. Rep. 1990     45,6  Nicaragua 1990        73,3 
Brazil 1954    31,51  Dom. Rep. 1994     30,61  Nicaragua 1996        76,2 
Brazil 1958    35,7  Dom. Rep. 1996     62,1  Panama 1960        23,13 
Brazil 1962    36,9  Dom. Rep. 1998     45,6  Panama 1994        70,1 
Brazil 1982    63,7  Ecuador 1950     16,91  Panama 1999        76,1 
Brazil 1986    70,4  Ecuador 1952     19,21  Peru 1980        58,0 
Brazil 1990    76,6  Ecuador 1954     25,61  Peru 1985        64,8 
Brazil 1994    79,9  Ecuador 1956     30,71  St. Lucia 1979        68,0 
Brazil 1998    81,0  Ecuador 1958     24,71  St. Lucia 1982        65,8 
Chile 1953    22,91  Ecuador 1962     31,11  St. Lucia 1987        67,5 
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Appendix D (continued) 
 
 
Country and  Turnout  Country and  Turnout  Country and     Turnout 
election year  rate (%) election year   rate (%) election year     rate (%) 
 
 
Latin America 
& the Caribbean (continued) 
 
St. Lucia 1987 72,0  Venezuela 1988  72,7  Denmark 1950    76,6 
St. Lucia 1992 76,8  Venezuela 1993  49,9  Denmark 1953    75,5  
St. Lucia 1997 89,5  Venezuela 1998  42,7  Denmark 1953    78,9 
St. Kitts &        Denmark 1957    82,1 
Nevis 1984 71,7  Europe     Denmark 1960    85,9 
St. Kitts &        Denmark 1964    84,8 
Nevis 1989 66  Albania 1991  98,9  Denmark 1966    88,5 
St. Kitts &   Albania 1992  89,2  Denmark 1968    88,0 
Nevis 1995 69,6  Albania 1996  89,5  Denmark 1971    87,3 
St. Vin. &   Albania 1997  63,4  Denmark 1973    87,4 
the Gren. 1979 58,3  Andorra 1993  80,9  Denmark 1975    86,6 
St. Vin. &   Andorra 1997  81,6  Denmark 1977    87,7 
the Gren. 1984 80,5  Austria 1953  89,0  Denmark 1979    83,3 
St. Vin. &   Austria 1956  89,3  Denmark 1981    86,3 
the Gren. 1989 76,8  Austria 1959  89,7  Denmark 1984    86,0 
St. Vin. &   Austria 1962  90,3  Denmark 1987    85,9 
the Gren. 1994 73,2  Austria 1966  89,8  Denmark 1988    82,7 
St. Vin. &   Austria 1970  89,5  Denmark 1990    80,4 
the Gren. 1998 77,1  Austria 1971  88,2  Denmark 1994    81,7 
Suriname 1991 67,8  Austria 1975  86,6  Denmark 1998    83,1 
Suriname 1996 71,2  Austria 1979  86,8  Estonia 1992    40,9 
Trinidad &    Austria 1983  86,9  Estonia 1995    48,8 
Tob. 1966 67,9  Austria 1986  87,1  Estonia 1999    46,0 
Trinidad &    Austria 1991  80,5  Finland 1951    74,0 
Tob. 1971 25,61  Austria 1994  76,0  Finland 1954    80,3 
Trinidad &    Austria 1995  78,6  Finland 1958    74,7 
Tob. 1976  64,3  Austria 1999  72,6  Finland 1962    85,5 
Trinidad &    Belgium 1950  86,3  Finland 1966    85,1 
Tob. 1981  64,4  Belgium 1954  88,5  Finland 1970    83,6 
Trinidad &    Belgium 1958  89,3  Finland 1972    84,5 
Tob. 1986  80,4  Belgium 1961  88,0  Finland 1975    80,3 
Trinidad &    Belgium 1965  88,0  Finland 1979    81,3 
Tob. 1991  70,4  Belgium 1968  86,2  Finland 1983    81,1 
Trinidad &    Belgium 1971  88,6  Finland 1987    77,2 
Tob. 1995 67,3  Belgium 1974  85,7  Finland 1991    71,9 
Uruguay 1950 51,4  Belgium 1977  89,9  Finland 1995    71,1 
Uruguay 1954 50,9  Belgium 1978  87,8  Finland 1999    65,2 
Uruguay 1958 54,3  Belgium 1981  94,3  France 1951    68,5 
Uruguay 1962 60  Belgium 1985  86,3  France 1956    74,3 
Uruguay 1966 66,9  Belgium 1987  86,5  France 1958    71,1 
Uruguay 1971 88,2  Belgium 1991  85,1  France 1962    61,0 
Uruguay 1989 96,9  Belgium 1995  83,2  France 1967    71,1 
Uruguay 1994 96,1  Belgium 1999  83,2  France 1968    69,4 
Uruguay 1999 94,6  Croatia 1992  74,9  France 1973    70,6 
Venezuela 1963 78,3  Croatia 1995  72,2  France 1978    63,4 
Venezuela 1968 84,6  Czechoslovakia 1990 93,1  France 1981    63,9 
Venezuela 1973 81,1  Czechoslovakia 1992 83,8  France 1986    69,9 
Venezuela 1978 74,5  Czech Rep. 1996  77,6  France 1988    58,1 
Venezuela 1983 77,1  Czech Rep. 1998  76,7  France 1993    61,3 
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Appendix D (continued) 
 
 
Country and  Turnout  Country and  Turnout  Country and     Turnout 
election year  rate (%) election year   rate (%) election year     rate (%) 
 
 
Europe (continued) 
 
France 1997 59,9  Ireland 1965  74,4  Netherland 1952    86,9 
Germany 1953 80,6  Ireland 1969  77,2  Netherland 1956    88,1 
Germany 1957 87,6  Ireland 1973  77,8  Netherland 1959    88,8 
Germany 1961 86,9  Ireland 1977  85,2  Netherland 1963    87,9 
Germany 1965 80,9  Ireland 1981  78,8  Netherland 1967    92,1 
Germany 1969 79,9  Ireland 1982  76,3  Netherland 1971    77,8 
Germany 1972 88,7  Ireland 1987  77,9  Netherland 1972    90,1 
Germany 1976 83,8  Ireland 1989  71,2  Netherland 1977    86,3 
Germany 1980 81,8  Ireland 1992  73,7  Netherland 1981    85,2 
Germany 1983 81,0  Ireland 1997  66,7  Netherland 1982    80,3 
Germany 1987 75,0  Italy 1953  91,5  Netherland 1986    84,2 
Germany 1990 73,1  Italy 1958  93,9  Netherland 1989    78,0 
Germany 1994 72,4  Italy 1963  95,3  Netherland 1994    75,2 
Germany 1998 75,3  Italy 1968  93,2  Netherland 1998    70,1 
Greece 1950 80,1  Italy 1972  94,7  Norway 1953    79,6 
Greece 1951 80,2  Italy 1976  95,4  Norway 1957    76,9 
Greece 1952 73,9  Italy 1979  92,7  Norway 1961    77,7 
Greece 1956 67,9  Italy 1983  91,8  Norway 1965    85,0 
Greece 1958 73,9  Italy 1987  94,4  Norway 1969    85,1 
Greece 1961 86,3  Italy 1992  92,3  Norway 1973    80,1 
Greece 1963 85,3  Italy 1994  90,8  Norway 1977    79,2 
Greece 1964 83,6  Italy 1996  87,3  Norway 1981    82,3 
Greece 1977 82,4  Latvia 1993  57,7  Norway 1985    83,6 
Greece 1981 84,5  Latvia 1995  50,6  Norway 1989    81,5 
Greece 1985 87,4  Latvia 1998  51,9  Norway 1993    74,5 
Greece 1989 85,8  Lichtenstein 1993  55,6  Norway 1997    76,9 
Greece 1989 87,5  Lichtenstein 1997  53,8  Poland 1989    44,4 
Greece 1993 85,6  Lithuania 1993  70,2  Poland 1991    52,0 
Greece 1996 83,9  Lithuania 1997  50,0  Poland 1993    48,8 
Hungary 1994 69,4  Luxembourg 1951  37,3  Poland 1997    47,6 
Hungary 1998 59,0  Luxembourg 1954  73,1  Portugal 1976    83,3 
Iceland 1953 92,1  Luxembourg 1959  74,3  Portugal 1979    88,2 
Iceland 1956 91,9  Luxembourg 1964  72,5  Portugal 1980    87,9 
Iceland 1959 89,4  Luxembourg 1968  67,8  Portugal 1983    77,4 
Iceland 1959 89,7  Luxembourg 1974  73,7  Portugal 1985    79,7 
Iceland 1963 89,4  Luxembourg 1979  68,5  Portugal 1987    78,1 
Iceland 1967 89,0  Luxembourg 1984  66,8  Portugal 1991    77,7 
Iceland 1971 89,4  Luxembourg 1989  64,1  Portugal 1995    79,1 
Iceland 1974 87,6  Luxembourg 1994  60,5  Portugal 1999    69,3 
Iceland 1978 89,6  Luxembourg 1999  56,9  Romania 1992    76,2 
Iceland 1979 90,6  Macedonia 1994  47,8  Romania 1996    78,2 
Iceland 1983 88,2  Macedonia 1999  48,9  Russia 1993    47,2 
Iceland 1987 92,3  Malta 1966  76,7  Russia 1995    62,8 
Iceland 1991 88,7  Malta 1971  77,6  Russia 1999    59,9 
Iceland 1995 87,8  Malta 1976  89,8  Slovakia 1994    75,9 
Iceland 1999 86,2  Malta 1981  86,0  Slovakia 1998    78,9 
Ireland 1951 74,4  Malta 1987  95,6  Slovenia 1992    85,5 
Ireland 1954 75,3  Malta 1992  95,3  Slovenia 1996    75,7 
Ireland 1957 70,4  Malta 1996  98,0  Spain 1977    79,4 
Ireland 1961 71,0  Malta 1998  95,9  Spain 1979    72,3 
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Appendix D (continued) 
 
 
Country and  Turnout  Country and  Turnout  Country and     Turnout 
election year  rate (%) election year   rate (%) election year     rate (%) 
 
 
Europe (continued)   
    Other 
Spain 1982 83,1   
Spain 1986 73,7  Australia 1951  84,9  India 1980    61,9 
Spain 1989 71,3  Australia 1954  81,6  India 1984    64,5 
Spain 1993 77,4  Australia 1955  78,1  India 1989    61,2 
Spain 1996 80,6  Australia 1958  85,6  India 1991    57,2 
Sweden 1952 77,3  Australia 1961  84,0  India 1996    61,1 
Sweden 1956 77,3  Australia 1963  85,1  India 1998    67,1 
Sweden 1958 75,6  Australia 1966  84,7  India 1999    65,5 
Sweden 1960 82,8  Australia 1969  83,9  Israel 1951    72,8 
Sweden 1964 80,8  Australia 1972  85,3  Israel 1955    82,2 
Sweden 1968 86,6  Australia 1974  84,3  Israel 1959    81,8 
Sweden 1970 87,3  Australia 1975  84,7  Israel 1961    80,4 
Sweden 1973 85,8  Australia 1977  84,5  Israel 1965    82,4 
Sweden 1976 88,5  Australia 1980  84,0  Israel 1969    83,0 
Sweden 1979 86,9  Australia 1983  81,2  Israel 1973    81,8 
Sweden 1982 88,6  Australia 1984  84,2  Israel 1977    80,4 
Sweden 1985 86,2  Australia 1987  84,1  Israel 1981    79,9 
Sweden 1988 82,7  Australia 1990  82,1  Israel 1984    80,4 
Sweden 1991 82,8  Australia 1993  83,4  Israel 1988    82,4 
Sweden 1994 83,6  Australia 1996  82,5  Israel 1992    81,7 
Sweden 1998 77,7  Australia 1998  81,7  Israel 1996    84,7 
Switzl. 1951 63,0  Bangladesh 1991  61,5  Israel 1999    84,4 
Switzl. 1955 60,8  Bangladesh 1996  64,6  Japan 1952    77,4 
Switzl. 1959 58,1  Benin 1991  46,5  Japan 1953    70,7 
Switzl. 1963 53,5  Benin 1995  73,7  Japan 1955    73,6 
Switzl. 1967 53,2  Benin 1999  65,9  Japan 1958    72,9 
Switzl. 1975 43,6  Canada 1953  65,4  Japan 1960    71,4 
Switzl. 1979 40,6  Canada 1957  67,9  Japan 1963    68,6 
Switzl. 1983 40,8  Canada 1958  75,4  Japan 1967    73,9 
Switzl. 1987 39,9  Canada 1962  73,3  Japan 1969    73,5 
Switzl. 1991 39,7  Canada 1963  75,1  Japan 1972    73,9 
Switzl. 1995 35,7  Canada 1965  70,7  Japan 1976    73,5 
Switzl. 1999 34,9  Canada 1968  68,3  Japan 1979    68,2 
Ukraine 1994 73,4  Canada 1972  71,3  Japan 1980    74,7 
Ukraine 1999 68,1  Canada 1974  64,2  Japan 1983    67,6 
U K 1950 81,6  Canada 1979  68,4  Japan 1986    71,5 
U K 1951 81,4  Canada 1980  64,5  Japan 1990    74,9 
U K 1955 75,7  Canada 1984  67,9  Japan 1993    66,3 
U K 1959 77,5  Canada 1988  68,3  Japan 1995    44,9 
U K 1964 75,1  Canada 1993  63,9  Japan 1996    59,8 
U K 1966 73,8  Canada 1997  57,1  Kiribati 1982    74,7 
U K 1970 71,2  Cape Verde 1991  71,8  Kiribati 1983    78,0 
U K 1974 77,9  Cape Verde 1995  79,5  Kiribati 1991    62,0 
U K 1974 72,5  Central Af. Rep. 1993 50,3  Korea Rep. 1988    73,8 
U K 1979 75,1  Central Af. Rep. 1998 53,6  Korea Rep. 1992    74,6 
U K 1983 71,7  India 1952  58,9  Korea Rep. 1996    65,3 
U K 1987 75,2  India 1957  62,6  Mali 1992    21,91 
U K 1992 75,4  India 1962  54,4  Mali 1997    21,31 
U K 1997 69,4  India 1967  63,1  Mauritius 1976    84,4 
    India 1971  57,2  Mauritius 1982    91,5 
    India 1977  64,6  Mauritius 1983    77,0 
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Country and     Turnout Country and  Turnout  Country and     Turnout 
election year     rate (%) election year   rate (%) election year     rate (%) 
 
 
Other  (continued)  
 
 
Mauritius 1987    84,6  Pap. N. Gu. 1992     71,0  USA 1956    54,9 
Mauritius 1991    82,4  Pap. N. Gu. 1997     98,8  USA 1968    44,5 
Mauritius 1995    77,1  Philippines 1987  78,2  USA 1960    63,1 
Micron. 1995    63,0  Philippines 1992  65,3  USA 1962    47,3 
Micron. 1999    29,51  Philippines 1995  68,4  USA 1964    61,9 
Nepal  1991    83,6  Philippines 1998  66,8  USA 1966    48,4 
Nepal  1994    82,8  Sol. Island 1980  54,7  USA 1968    60,8 
Nepal  1997    83,6  Sol. Island 1984  53,0  USA 1970    46,6 
Nepal  1999    75,8  Sol. Island 1989  55,8  USA 1972    55,2 
New Zea. 1951    95,1  Sol. Island 1993  60,6  USA 1974    38,2 
New Zea. 1954    91,1  Sol. Island 1997  70,7  USA 1976    53,5 
New Zea. 1957    85,5  Sri Lanka 1952  49,4  USA 1978    37,2 
New Zea. 1960    85,6  Sri Lanka 1956  51,5  USA 1980    52,6 
New Zea. 1963    83,3  Sri Lanka 1960  55,0  USA 1982    39,8 
New Zea. 1966    79,3  Sri Lanka 1965  65,9  USA 1984    53,1 
New Zea. 1969    85,6  Sri Lanka 1970  71,8  USA 1986    36,4 
New Zea. 1972    85,3  Sri Lanka 1989  58,1  USA 1988    50,1 
New Zea. 1975    81,7  Sri Lanka 1994  74,1  USA 1990    36,5 
New Zea. 1978    82,3  Thailand 1992  58,4  USA 1992    55,1 
New Zea. 1981    88,9  Thailand 1995  64,1  USA 1994    38,8 
New Zea. 1984    87,4  Thailand 1996  65,0  USA 1996    49,1 
New Zea. 1987    81,4  Turkey 1961  75,1  USA 1998    34,7 
New Zea. 1990    78,6  Turkey 1969  59,3  Zambia 1991    34,2 
New Zea. 1993    79,6  Turkey 1973  56,7  Zambia 1996    39,8 
New Zea. 1996    83,0  Turkey 1977  66,8 
New Zea. 1999    76,1  Turkey 1983  75,5 
Pakistan 1988    42,9  Turkey 1987  91,8 
Pakistan 1990    43,4  Turkey 1991  79,8 
Pakistan 1993    37,6  Turkey 1995  79,1 
Pakistan 1997    31,51  Turkey 1999  80,4 
Pap. N. Gu. 1977    66,4     USA 1950  42,6 
Pap. N. Gu. 1982    75,7  USA 1952  59,7 
Pap. N. Gu. 1987    76,3  USA 1954  43,1 
 
 
Excluded elections due to lack of data: 
 
Country   Year 
 
Jamaica   1983 
Kiribati   1998 
St. Kitts & Nevis  1993 
Switzerland   1971 
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9.4.2 Countries and years in the literature studies 
 
Powell (1982): Contemporary Democracies. 
29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Phillipines, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, West Germany,  
Time period: 1960s and 70s 
Powell (1986): American voter turnout in comparative perspective. 
20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,  West Germany, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
Time period: 1960s and 70s. 
Jackman (1987): Political institutions and voter turnout in industrial democracies. 
19 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,  West Germany, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Time period: 1960s and 70s. 
Blais and Carty (1990): Does proportional representation foster turnout?. 
20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
Time period: Depends, - 1985 
Franklin(1996): in Comparing democracies. 
29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 
Time period: Unknown 
Blais and Dobrzynska (1998): Turnout in electoral democracies.  
91 countries: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, 
Kiribati, Korea, Rep., Lebanon, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Jamaica, Japan, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome & Principe, 
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, 
Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Zambia, Ukraine, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vanuatu. 
Time period: 1972-1995 
Norris (2004): Electoral engineering.  
32 countries: Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Korea, 
Rep., Iceland, Israel, Lithuania, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United States. 
Time period: 1996-2002 
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9.5 Appendix E – CORRELATION MATRIX – GENERAL MODEL 
 
Table 18: Correlation Matrix – General Model (LG indicating logged variables) 
 
          TURNOUT     COMP  EASTERN       PR   PLUMAJ   UNICAM      CAT     FREQ 
 TURNOUT  1.00000    
    COMP   .24548  1.00000   
 EASTERN  -.06293  -.22291  1.00000   
      PR   .16424   .09261  -.13096  1.00000   
  PLUMAJ  -.04032  -.01707   .04663  -.56729  1.00000   
  UNICAM   .09166  -.10896  -.01546  -.02247  -.20363  1.00000   
     CAT  -.19684   .31763   .07357   .25900  -.21592  -.07708  1.00000    
    FREQ   .06436   .04925  -.16813   .10399  -.14363   .26538   .12694  1.00000 
 
          TURNOUT     COMP  EASTERN       PR   PLUMAJ   UNICAM      CAT     FREQ 
NUMPARTC  -.10031  -.12675   .36769  -.04808  -.13253  -.16840  -.05081  -.05782 
LITERACY   .36807   .05150   .22266   .37360  -.48839   .01859  -.05452  -.13423 
  LEGEFF   .35933   .17124  -.18468   .41465  -.12521  -.12013  -.08958  -.13344 
  CLOSED   .08937  -.02131  -.05404   .08463  -.33371  -.01478   .09033   .01195 
    DEMO   .00469  -.09476   .15670  -.41387   .07587  -.09313  -.14596  -.08386 
   RIOTS  -.05829  -.07706  -.03591  -.38060   .31830  -.12892  -.20690   .03630 
 GOVCRIS  -.07472   .15170   .02303  -.22038   .06816  -.20390  -.03413  -.23006 
   GDPLG   .40463   .12082  -.04480   .37865  -.32982  -.02272  -.05004  -.12213 
 
         NUMPARTC LITERACY   LEGEFF   CLOSED     DEMO    RIOTS  GOVCRIS    GDPLG 
NUMPARTC  1.00000    
LITERACY   .21980  1.00000    
  LEGEFF  -.16262   .46904  1.00000   
  CLOSED   .09471   .18325  -.07514  1.00000    
    DEMO  -.09624  -.17783  -.14279   .16983  1.00000    
   RIOTS  -.15189  -.40436  -.05009   .00592   .74171  1.00000    
 GOVCRIS   .19528  -.14197  -.10817   .07817   .33683   .20814  1.00000   
   GDPLG   .02159   .78010   .69455   .07054  -.15674  -.31538  -.03469  1.00000 
 
          TURNOUT     COMP  EASTERN       PR   PLUMAJ   UNICAM      CAT     FREQ 
   POPLG  -.19296  -.00019  -.01028  -.31675   .28503  -.46106  -.18264  -.18422 
   WCILG  -.08809   .09340  -.26593  -.32438   .15209  -.02825   .11746  -.15994 
POPDENLG   .09406  -.11723   .05289  -.08260   .00966  -.05184   .02512   .02212 
  DISTLG  -.34789   .04303  -.07005  -.41330   .38288  -.48729  -.10383  -.11302 
 RADIOLG   .38212   .05524   .07633   .25017  -.38275   .07386  -.18268  -.05241 
    TVLG   .40886   .06042   .20678   .09823  -.21834   .05238  -.02026  -.18329 
  NEWSLG   .37061   .03519   .05352   .34199  -.37722   .00300  -.22850  -.11107 
  INFOLG   .41069   .01008   .22117   .24426  -.38285   .06615  -.07105  -.17429 
 
         NUMPARTC LITERACY   LEGEFF   CLOSED     DEMO    RIOTS  GOVCRIS    GDPLG 
   POPLG   .23659  -.29849  -.14881   .10116   .47506   .50258   .50727  -.20993 
   WCILG  -.31937  -.41294  -.20824   .23856   .54040   .46067   .42137  -.25619 
POPDENLG  -.00246  -.13449  -.01242  -.11253   .20453   .25779   .08440  -.02254 
  DISTLG   .15628  -.44982  -.24279   .09443   .42187   .50691   .44220  -.35933 
 RADIOLG   .14197   .81801   .38581   .13853  -.12439  -.30385  -.10345   .71579 
    TVLG   .09647   .50017   .30215  -.00833   .06603  -.14167   .10331   .62437 
  NEWSLG   .14025   .82760   .64649   .06224  -.17632  -.25954  -.18928   .85966 
  INFOLG   .17189   .79783   .44189   .09482  -.02983  -.25561  -.00438   .80615 
 
            POPLG    WCILG POPDENLG   DISTLG  RADIOLG     TVLG   NEWSLG   INFOLG 
   POPLG  1.00000    
   WCILG   .49845  1.00000    
POPDENLG   .20458   .15356  1.00000    
  DISTLG   .92474   .50615   .15329  1.00000   
 RADIOLG  -.21161  -.31361  -.12280  -.34436  1.00000    
    TVLG   .03544  -.00608   .21504  -.08967   .60301  1.00000    
  NEWSLG  -.21582  -.38341  -.05153  -.38026   .75761   .54965  1.00000    
  INFOLG  -.11851  -.21923   .05183  -.28187   .87247   .85714   .77676  1.00000 
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9.6 Appendix F – Descriptive statistics – Decade models 
 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics – 1950s  
 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable        Mean         Std.Dev.        Minimum         Maximum      Cases 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TURNOUT     68.7911667      19.3380670      22.4550000      92.7000000       30 
 
COMP        .266666667      .449776445      .000000000      1.00000000       30 
PR          .666666667      .479463301      .000000000      1.00000000       30 
PLUMAJ      .233333333      .430183067      .000000000      1.00000000       30 
UNICAM      .366666667      .490132518      .000000000      1.00000000       30 
CAT         .433333333      .504006933      .000000000      1.00000000       30 
FREQ        3.48333333      1.25533345      1.75000000      7.66666667       30 
NUMPART     3.29122024      1.29316801      1.74000000      7.62000000       28 
LITERACY    87.6262222      18.2066917      22.2500000      98.8000000       30 
LEGEFF      .933333333      .253708132      .000000000      1.00000000       30 
CLOSED      .565217391      .506869802      .000000000      1.00000000       23 
DEMO        .316555556      .485965916      .000000000      2.00000000       27 
RIOTS       .632714693      .963904114      .000000000      3.66666670       27 
GOVCRIS     .479761905      .633598988      .000000000      2.33333333       28 
GDP         6609.82468      3410.35328      806.395000      13551.1000       30 
GDP(log)    8.60372041      .723917853      6.69257370      9.51422300       30 
POP*        34569.4867      77907.9123      164.412500      401539.000       30 
POP(log)    9.02594965      1.75315001      5.10237851      12.9030599       30 
WCI         2544.62037      2856.95102      .000000000      9325.00000       27 
WCI(log)    5.93534729      3.37968454      .000000000      9.14045424       27 
POPDENS     2158.71944      2368.76585      30.5000000      8363.00000       30 
POPDEN(log) 6.77939540      1.62335762      3.41772668      9.03157249       30 
DISTRICT*   81.1179278      146.618203      2.94000000      816.795000       30 
DIST(log)   3.76851814      1.06795404      1.07840958      6.70538815       30 
RADIOS**    2465.60690      1857.87064      24.5000000      7900.20000       29 
RADIO(log)  7.35700944      1.24618651      3.19867312      8.97464335       29 
NEWSPAPER** 2535.52667      1514.15244      86.0000000      5773.75000       30 
NEWS(log)   7.53450427      .964458387      4.45434730      8.66107706       30 
INFO        2459.47333      1450.53806      55.2500000      5667.50000       30 
INFO(log)   7.48334094      1.03406215      4.01186834      8.64250338       30 
 
 
Note: 
* scaling 1000 
** scaling 0.0001 
*** scaling 0.00001 
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Appendix F (continued) 
 
Table 20: Descriptive statistics – 1960s  
 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable        Mean         Std.Dev.        Minimum         Maximum      Cases 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TURNOUT     68.9887265      18.9770725      23.1300000      94.2000000       39 
 
COMP        .256410256      .442359030      .000000000      1.00000000       39 
PR          .615384615      .492864058      .000000000      1.00000000       39 
PLUMAJ      .256410256      .442359030      .000000000      1.00000000       39 
UNICAM      .410256410      .498310235      .000000000      1.00000000       39 
CAT         .461538462      .505035374      .000000000      1.00000000       39 
FREQ        3.66236752      1.39758304      1.75000000      9.50000000       39 
NUMPART     3.03383846      1.17886922      1.46000000      6.87000000       38 
LITERACY    85.3150427      18.7132352      29.6500000      99.1750000       39 
LEGEFF      .871794872      .338688428      .000000000      1.00000000       39 
CLOSED      .586206897      .501230014      .000000000      1.00000000       29 
DEMO        1.03919444      3.07206610      .000000000      18.0000000       36 
RIOTS       1.72803810      3.94595933      .000000000      18.0000000       35 
GOVCRIS     .404228571      .708854548      .000000000      3.50000000       35 
GDP         7898.62030      4627.00028      959.624950      17807.5450       39 
GDP(log)    8.73820718      .777226176      6.86654253      9.78737752       39 
POP*        32822.4414      83962.2206      191.540000      491451.100       39 
POP(log)    8.85562266      1.80385357      5.25509666      13.1051177       39 
WCI         5584.72143      12424.5295      .000000000      68185.0000       35 
WCI(log)    5.92536087      3.72946231      .000000000      11.1299799       35 
POPDENS     3247.35726      4821.50685      37.7500000      25983.0000       39 
POPDEN(log) 7.10908530      1.60397574      3.63098548      10.1651978       39 
DISTRICT*   89.2650812      163.227569      3.19000000      963.630000       39 
DIST(log)   3.82337928      1.09846903      1.16002092      6.87070740       39 
RADIOS**    3159.38889      2378.93819      110.500000      11806.2000       39 
RADIO(log)  7.68564073      1.01322962      4.70501552      9.37638010       39 
NEWSPAPER** 2210.74430      1544.83196      123.000000      4944.66667       38 
NEWS(log)   7.34687253      .966882372      4.81218436      8.50606483       38 
INFO        2692.61118      1841.18803      116.750000      7486.00000       38 
INFO(log)   7.54618806      .985093436      4.76003490      8.92078989       38 
 
Note: 
* scaling 1000 
** scaling 0.0001 
*** scaling 0.00001 
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Appendix F (continued) 
 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics – 1970s  
 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable        Mean         Std.Dev.        Minimum         Maximum      Cases 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TURNOUT     72.0263953      15.8955100      24.8100000      94.2666667       43 
 
COMP        .209302326      .411625091      .000000000      1.00000000       43 
PR          .558139535      .502485517      .000000000      1.00000000       43 
PLUMAJ      .348837209      .482242822      .000000000      1.00000000       43 
UNICAM      .465116279      .504684588      .000000000      1.00000000       43 
CAT         .395348837      .494711791      .000000000      1.00000000       43 
FREQ        3.86666658      1.14500732      1.00000000      6.50000000       41 
NUMPART     3.00908140      1.16713626      1.35000000      5.55250000       43 
LITERACY    86.7600833      17.2790977      34.4000000      99.4000000       40 
LEGEFF      .837209302      .373543684      .000000000      1.00000000       43 
CLOSED      .620689655      .493803974      .000000000      1.00000000       29 
DEMO        .782170550      1.95418556      .000000000      10.5000000       43 
RIOTS       .581007752      1.04091294      .000000000      5.00000000       43 
GOVCRIS     .461627907      .638973785      .000000000      2.66666667       43 
GDP         10835.4431      5884.17195      1219.33000      21887.2550       43 
GDP(log)    9.07712893      .746989316      7.10605681      9.99365978       43 
POP*        33597.8932      97436.0474      97.0100000      607396.600       43 
POP(log)    8.64572445      2.01560979      4.57481407      13.3169372       43 
WCI         3480.36822      6872.27972      .000000000      37693.5000       43 
WCI(log)    5.22011393      3.70966605      .000000000      10.5372429       43 
POPDENS     3820.80659      4926.05922      44.7500000      26844.0000       43 
POPDEN(log) 7.39486190      1.55618499      3.80109144      10.1977976       43 
DISTRICT*   89.8996783      183.170898      3.63750000      1139.83500       43 
DIST(log)   3.71579028      1.20000986      1.29129663      7.03863879       43 
RADIOS**    4540.82868      3328.91824      277.500000      17609.4000       43 
RADIO(log)  8.05814018      1.00552070      5.62582093      9.77618813       43 
TVS***      21060.7439      14245.6816      87.0000000      51160.8000       41 
TV(log)     9.54519920      1.20432944      4.46590812      10.8427289       41 
NEWSPAPER** 2206.41667      1596.26224      90.0000000      5442.50000       39 
NEWS(log)   7.32659460      1.00498540      4.49980967      8.60199379       39 
INFO        9217.20743      6329.86249      177.666667      23890.0667       43 
INFO(log)   8.69867892      1.18296735      5.17990914      10.0812180       43 
 
Note: 
* scaling 1000 
** scaling 0.0001 
*** scaling 0.00001 
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Appendix F (continued) 
 
Table 22: Descriptive statistics – 1980s  
 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable        Mean         Std.Dev.        Minimum         Maximum      Cases 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TURNOUT     72.0145833      13.5128514      39.9000000      96.9000000       60 
 
COMP        .200000000      .403375587      .000000000      1.00000000       60 
PR          .516666667      .503939284      .000000000      1.00000000       60 
PLUMAJ      .383333333      .490301418      .000000000      1.00000000       60 
UNICAM      .466666667      .503097749      .000000000      1.00000000       60 
CAT         .450000000      .501692052      .000000000      1.00000000       60 
FREQ        3.99717514      1.87982878      1.00000000      11.0000000       59 
NUMPART     2.95692290      1.42227560      1.00000000      7.30000000       58 
LITERACY    88.3686275      14.9221596      35.4000000      99.5750000       51 
LEGEFF      .650000000      .480994732      .000000000      1.00000000       60 
CLOSED      .595238095      .496795772      .000000000      1.00000000       42 
DEMO        .928333333      1.97176945      .000000000      10.0000000       60 
RIOTS       .779166667      2.48994328      .000000000      14.3333333       60 
GOVCRIS     .181944444      .390714875      .000000000      2.00000000       60 
HDI         .771911765      .136055574      .360000000      .920000000       51 
GDP         10672.7300      7182.20454      1342.49500      26426.1200       60 
GDP(log)    9.00419775      .792893568      7.20228510      10.1821082       60 
POP*        35311.8705      102768.133      42.6100000      753082.067       60 
POP(log)    8.50079433      2.35759259      3.75208897      13.5319295       60 
WCI         4100.81806      8463.33887      .000000000      40612.3333       60 
WCI(log)    4.82445431      4.10618172      .000000000      10.6118271       60 
POPDENS     3814.77139      4709.01228      51.5000000      28237.0000       60 
POPDEN(log) 7.42876130      1.50641415      3.94158181      10.2483885       60 
DISTRICT*   100.544086      199.345974      3.57500000      1383.41333       58 
DIST(log)   3.71105604      1.36834686      1.27396518      7.23230915       58 
RADIOS**    5305.43722      3540.39472      588.000000      20873.4000       60 
RADIO(log)  8.32571985      .779418437      6.37672695      9.94623090       60 
TVS***      24497.9454      18386.6656      10.0000000      74669.0000       58 
TV(log)     9.49902329      1.72810038      2.30258509      11.2208203       58 
NEWSPAPER** 1873.63836      1531.75664      117.000000      5666.66667       53 
NEWS(log)   7.13856634      .986314200      4.76217393      8.64235633       53 
INFO        10701.6283      7416.36512      303.166667      32714.1333       58 
INFO(log)   8.92216374      1.01186596      5.71428271      10.3955625       58 
 
Note: 
* scaling 1000 
** scaling 0.0001 
*** scaling 0.00001 
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Appendix F (continued) 
 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics – 1990s  
 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable        Mean         Std.Dev.        Minimum         Maximum      Cases 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TURNOUT     67.8786798      15.2811762      21.6100000      96.4000000       89 
 
COMP        .123595506      .330984232      .000000000      1.00000000       89 
PR          .505617978      .502801142      .000000000      1.00000000       89 
PLUMAJ      .325842697      .471344327      .000000000      1.00000000       89 
UNICAM      .561797753      .498977504      .000000000      1.00000000       89 
CAT         .415730337      .495639824      .000000000      1.00000000       89 
FREQ        3.94288390      1.53168325      1.00000000      14.0000000       89 
NUMPART     3.96598423      3.01998041      1.00000000      19.7286350       87 
LITERACY    86.5916892      19.5579710      20.4000000      99.8000000       74 
LEGEFF      .579545455      .496460828      .000000000      1.00000000       88 
CLOSED      .593750000      .495014831      .000000000      1.00000000       64 
DEMO        .511363633      .799978226      .000000000      4.50000000       88 
RIOTS       .257575754      .612163370      .000000000      3.75000000       88 
GOVCRIS     .227272727      .491421829      .000000000      3.00000000       88 
HDI         .771267123      .155415656      .300000000      .940000000       73 
GINI**      38.6179412      10.2254804      22.5000000      61.0000000       68 
GDP         10839.2632      8454.53501      793.555950      40583.1550       87 
GDP(log)    8.93393700      .926720255      6.67652405      10.6111084       87 
POP*        33627.5641      106580.111      30.5000000      938321.800       88 
POP(log)    8.46934611      2.27946857      3.41772668      13.7518482       88 
WCI         2230.48097      3208.70232      .000000000      17496.7500       88 
WCI(log)    4.76655222      3.88074972      .000000000      9.76977043       88 
POPDENS     3687.19299      4734.48783      59.5000000      31010.3333       88 
POPDEN(log) 7.44661850      1.43640057      4.08597631      10.3420758       88 
DISTRICT*   100.653206      209.427955      2.21500000      1721.69000       84 
DIST(log)   3.73673723      1.32654846      .795252403      7.45106165       84 
RADIOS***   5544.70900      3647.47158      384.000000      20929.4000       87 
RADIO(log)  8.35503668      .821780725      5.95064255      9.94891015       87 
TVS****     28861.3900      19601.8822      53.5000000      80164.0000       87 
TV(log)     9.76099246      1.42612273      3.97968165      11.2918298       87 
NEWSPAPER***1586.82478      1425.06287      10.0000000      5960.00000       76 
NEWS(log)   6.83849210      1.25835525      2.30258509      8.69282576       76 
INFO        12512.4817      8084.85297      290.500000      34440.8000       87 
INFO(log)   9.05860715      1.09961503      5.67160358      10.4469972       87 
 
Note: 
* scaling 1000 
** scaling 0.001 
*** scaling 0.0001 
**** scaling 0.00001 
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Appendix G – Bivariate regressions, all variables – General Model 
 
Table 24: Bivariate regressions, all variables – General Model  
 
 
           Coefficient            T-stat  
Variable  _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Institutional 
COMP      9.1   2.7 
FREQUENCY     -1.3   -1.3   
CLOSE      3.3   1   
MAJPLU     -2.8   -1   
PR      5.4   2  
UNICAM     -0.7   -0.3   
LEGEFF     7.4   2.7   
NUMPART     -0.05   -0.13  
DISTRICT(log)     -2.2   -2.2   
 
Socio- economic 
GDP(log)     6.7   3.8  
POP(log)     -0.6   -1 
POPDENS(log)     1   1  
LITERACY     0.2   2.6 
CAT      -0.8   -0.3  
 
Information circulation 
RADIOS(log)     4   2.2   
TVS(log)     1.1   1.5   
NEWSPAPER(log)    0.8   1.4   
INFO (log)     3   2.1  
 
Activism 
DEMOS     -0.8   -0.6  
RIOTS      -1   -1  
GOVCRIS     0.6   0.13  
WCI(log)     0.1   0.2 
 
EASTERN     -2.4   -0.6 
